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In this dissertation it is argued that the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act 2011 and the 
Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority were both necessary and inevitable given the 
trends and traditions of civil defence emergency management (CDEM) in New Zealand. The 
trends and traditions of civil defence are such that principles come before practice, form 
before function, and change is primarily brought about through crisis and criticism. The 
guiding question of the research was why were a new governance system and law made 
after the Canterbury earthquakes in 2010 and 2011? Why did this outcome occur despite 
the establishment of a modern emergency management system in 2002 which included a 
recovery framework that had been praised by international scholars as leading edge and a 
model for other countries? The official reason was the unprecedented scale and demands of 
the recovery – but a disaster of such scale is the principle reason for having a national 
emergency management system. Another explanation is the lack of cooperation among 
local authorities – but that raises the question of whether the CDEM recovery framework 
would have been successful in another locality. Consequentially, the focus of this 
dissertation is on the CDEM recovery framework and how New Zealand came to find itself 
making disaster law during a disaster. Recommendations include a review of emergency 
powers for recovery, a review of the capabilities needed to fulfil the mandate of Recovery 
Managers, and the establishment of a National Recovery Office with a cadre of Recovery 
Managers that attend every recovery to observe, advise, or assume control as needed. 
CDEM Group Recovery Managers would be seconded to the National Recovery Office which 
would allow for experience in recovery management to be developed and institutionalised 
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Chapter 1 From Cold War to Canterbury: The New Zealand 
Experience in Civil Defence Emergency Management 
1.1 Introduction 
This dissertation analyses the development of civil defence emergency management law 
and policies in New Zealand in order to argue that the legislative and organisational 
response to the Canterbury earthquakes was not only necessary but inevitable. The 
Canterbury earthquakes were a series of major seismic events along with thousands of 
smaller aftershocks between September 2010 and December 2011 in the Canterbury region 
of the South Island in New Zealand.1 The earthquakes caused significant damage to the 
Central Business District in the city of Christchurch and to the suburbs to the east and south 
of the CBD2 causing billions of dollars in damage.3 After the February 2011 quakes the 
government created the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act 2011 (CER Act) and 
Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA) to govern the recovery. The research for 
this dissertation began with a very simple question – Why CERA? The aim was to 
understand why new legislation, a new authority, and a new recovery framework were 
created which placed the government at the centre of the recovery when New Zealand 
already had an extensive recovery framework and emergency powers under the Civil 
Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 and the Local Government Act 2002 which 
placed the community and local government at the centre of recovery. Most of the 
scholarship on the recovery from the Canterbury earthquakes has looked at the event in 
                                                     
1 Canterbury Earthquakes Royal Commission “Final Report: Volume 1 Summary and Recommendations in 
Volumes 1-3, Seismicity, Soils and the Seismic Design of Buildings” 2011 at 28. 
2 S.H. Potter, J.S. Becker, D.M. Johnston, and K.P. Rossiter. “An overview of the impacts of the 2010-2011 
Canterbury earthquakes” (2015) International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction (article in press). 
3 M. Parker and D. Steenkamp “The economic impact of the Canterbury earthquakes” (2012) 75 Bulletin: 




isolation by starting with the situation at the time of the disasters and complications that 
arose going forward. But this frames the recovery as a discreet event, as a slice of time. This 
study takes a long-view and considers critical junctures, focusing events and the long-term 
processes which the recovery legislation and institutions are a part of. The purpose of this 
research is twofold – to fill a gap in the civil defence literature in New Zealand and in so 
doing develop a basis for understanding the legislative response to the Canterbury 
earthquakes and options for future emergency management governance. 
The approach taken is called historical perspective which is a method of studying a topic 
from its earliest stages throughout its evolution in order to understand the present.4 It is 
reasonable to ask why look at the history of civil defence to explain the current and future 
governance issues of emergency management in New Zealand. The answer is twofold. First, 
it has to do with the interval between major events such as the Canterbury earthquakes 
which only happen once every 2-3 generations, sometimes even longer. This means that 
civil defence capabilities at all levels of government and society are not regularly tested and 
often forgotten, as are the lessons from the past. Additionally, new civil defence laws have 
been made approximately every twenty years, but with few amendments and relatively 
unchanged principles and philosophies over the past half century. On account of these 
characteristics of civil defence, decisions made and the outcome of those decisions in crisis 
can be separated by decades. Therefore, it is necessary to go back decades to understand 
how New Zealand government and society have prepared for and responded to hazards and 
disasters. By doing so, it becomes clear which limitations have persisted over decades and 
manifested after the Canterbury quakes. As Butler writes, disasters are managed in a “social, 
                                                     
4 Barbara S. Lawrence “Historical Perspective: Using the Past to Study the Present” (1984) 9 Academy of 




political, and geographic context but also in a historical context”.5 Secondly, there is a 
tendency in New Zealand and disaster scholarship overall, to be critical of past practices and 
assume that the evolution of the field naturally leads to better outcomes. But evolution 
occurs in response to the current environment and is not even across a system, nor is it 
intrinsically forward looking. As a result, certain parts which are not subject to adaptation 
are left unchanged – particularly in the case of the recovery component of civil defence 
which is the focus of the latter part of the dissertation. By understanding the traditions and 
trends of civil defence it becomes clear that the inevitable outcome of a major disaster 
would be the central government assuming a leading role in the recovery. With this 
understanding it becomes clear that the scale of the emergency in itself was not the cause 
of the post-disaster problems; it was the catalyst which exposed issues that had existed for 
decades. 
The Canterbury Earthquakes 
The largest earthquakes occurred on 4 September 2010, 22 February 2011, and 13 June 
2011 with Moment magnitude (Mw) of 7.1, 6.2, and 6.0 respectively.6 The most damaging 
and deadly of these were the 22 February quakes which resulted in 185 fatalities and 
widespread damage in the Central Business District of Christchurch and throughout many 
suburbs – in particular in the eastern and southern parts of the city.7 A state of local 
emergency was declared in Christchurch City, Selwyn District to the south and Waimakariri 
District to the north immediately following the 4 September 2010 quakes, and MP Gerry 
                                                     
5 David Butler “Focusing events in the early twentieth century: a hurricane, two earthquakes, and a pandemic” 
in Claire B Rubin (ed) Emergency Management: The American Experience 1900-2005. (Public Entity Risk 
Institute, Fairfax, Virginia, 2007) 11. 
6 Terry Webb “The Canterbury Earthquake Sequence” (Presentation to the Canterbury Earthquakes Royal 
Commission October 2011). 
7 Canterbury Earthquakes Royal Commission “Final Report: Volume 1 Summary and Recommendations in 




Brownlee was appointed Minister responsible for Canterbury Earthquake Recovery two 
days later.8 Within two weeks the Canterbury Earthquake Response and Recovery Act 2010 
(CERR Act) was drafted and passed followed by the establishment of the Canterbury 
Earthquake Recovery Commission (CERC). The Commission consisted of the mayors from 
Christchurch, Selwyn, and Waimakariri as well as four unelected appointees - one of whom 
had to be from the Regional Council, Environment Canterbury. The Commission had only an 
advisory function and the Recovery Minister had no obligation to consult them or follow 
their advice. Strong criticism from a clutch of legal scholars on the vast law-making power 
given to the Executive with minimal constraints by the CERC Act were brushed aside by the 
Recovery Minister and some media outlets as “nit-picking” and “theoretical criticisms of 
latte drinkers”.9 The Commission itself was roundly criticised for being dysfunctional and 
causing confusion about who was in charge of the recovery –the Christchurch City Council 
(CCC) in particular was singled out for their lack of engagement with the recovery process.10 
The CCC did not appoint a Recovery Manager or draft a recovery plan as recommended 
under the CDEM Act 2002 and tended to rely on the Earthquake Commission (EQC) and 
CERC to manage recovery as the CCC focused on business as usual.11 The Canterbury 
Earthquake Recovery Act 2011 and the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA) 
replaced the CERR Act 2010 and CERC after the 11 February 2011 quakes. CERA is headed by 
an appointed Chief Executive and is currently a departmental agency within the Department 
of Prime Minister and Cabinet. Justification for the new governance structure was based on 
                                                     
8  Parliamentary Service “Canterbury earthquake timeline: Government’s and Parliament’s response” 
(Parliamentary Library Research Paper 2010/05,  9 November 2010). 
9 Austin Forbes QC “The rule of law and New Zealand lawyers” [2011] NZLJ 42 at 2. 
10 Rachel Brookie “Governing the Recovery from the Canterbury Earthquakes 2010-2011: The Debate Over 
Institutional Design” (Institute for Governance and Policy Studies Working Paper 12/01, 2012); McCrone “Over 
the top?” (The Press Online edition, 26 April 2011). 
11 Rachel Brookie “Governing the Recovery from the Canterbury Earthquakes 2010-2011: The Debate Over 




the scale and scope of the rebuild, the need for a stronger coordinating body to manage the 
multiple stakeholders and the significantly greater investment from central government, 
and recognition that existing institutions and powers were insufficient given the scale of the 
recovery.12 The Ministry for Civil Defence Emergency Management (MCDEM) and the 
regional CDEM Group were almost entirely left out of the recovery process. The reasons 
why and the implications for future law, policy, and disasters are the subject of subsequent 
chapters. 
1.2 What is civil defence? 
To many people the term “civil defence” invokes images of WWII era plans against aerial 
bombing or Cold War era schemes in case of nuclear war. In New Zealand the term 
describes a modern emergency management system with roots in both the Second World 
War and the Cold War. The Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management (MCDEM) 
is responsible for promoting the 4Rs – risk reduction, response, recovery, and readiness. In 
practice much of these responsibilities are fulfilled by other organisations with MCDEM 
providing national guidance. The evolution of civil defence is a major theme of this 
dissertation, but the place of civil defence within the security framework in New Zealand 
has remained relatively unchanged. As explored in chapters 3 and 4, the civil defence 
organisation was not designed to be a primary response agency. Rather, it was created to fill 
a gap between the demands of an emergency and the capabilities of local emergency 
services13 – and this mandate still exists. 14 To this end, civil defence is activated when a 
                                                     
12 Office of the Minister for Canterbury Earthquake Recovery, Office of the Minister of State Services “Paper 1: 
Canterbury Earthquake Recovery: Proposed Governance Arrangements”. 
13 R.H.F Holloway “Civil defence” (1978) 33 Journal of the New Zealand Institution of Engineers 266 at 268. 




significant and coordinated response is needed. 15  The definition of a civil defence 
emergency has remained virtually unchanged since 1962 and includes a list of hazard types 
from volcanoes and earthquakes to pandemics and explosions. This makes civil defence a 
generalist organisation although it has exhibited a strong bias towards natural hazards and 
the greatest perceived threat – earthquakes. As a result of its generalist and supportive 
mandate civil defence exists alongside other emergency management systems which were 
developed for particular hazard types. The Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency 
Management would be the lead agency only in cases of emergencies resulting directly from 
geological and meteorological hazards and infrastructure failure.16 For other emergencies 
such as a biosecurity incident, a pandemic, or a terror attack the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Forestry, the Ministry of Health, or the New Zealand Police would take their respective 
lead.17 In these situations MCDEM and the regional CDEM Group offices would offer a 
supporting role. For example, it may help to think in terms of deliverables – a network of 
organisations delivers health services during normal times, MCDEM and the sub-national 
CDEM offices are not among them. Instead they play a role in planning for major events 
with other stakeholder groups (such as those in the health sector) and offer support during 
a crisis. Therefore, in a health emergency an Emergency Coordination Centre or Emergency 
Operations Centre may be established by the local CDEM office or regional CDEM Group to 
assist the health sector via a health liaison18 but civil defence is not going to take the lead. 
This national system for health emergencies predates civil defence by several decades. 19 
The influenza pandemic of 1918 resulted in a national response – the outcome was new 
                                                     
15 Ibid. 
16 National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan Order 2015 Appendix 1 Lead Agencies. 
17 Ibid 
18 Ibid at s51(4). 




legislation in 1920. That response and the new health statute serve as the basis for the 
standard planning model used for epidemics and pandemics in New Zealand to this day.20 
While the health sector had a crisis which stimulated a national system relatively early in 
the history of New Zealand civil defence did not have such a crisis until much later. As 
explored in chapter 3 the fear of another earthquake like that which struck Hawke’s Bay in 
1931 and concerns regarding the threat of war in 1939 stimulated the first national civil 
defence system – but it was dissolved in 1945. The threat of nuclear war would reinvigorate 
interest in civil defence, but it suffered from persistent lack of political will. In chapters 4 
and 5 it is shown that it would take crises, criticism, and changing socio-political 
circumstances for civil defence to overcome that lack of political will in order to evolve and 
adapt in the slow evolution of a national emergency management system. These are the 
primary analytic themes of subsequent chapters. 
1.3 Background to the study 
In the more than half-century of its formal existence the laws and policies of civil defence 
have changed to reflect a greater understanding of the hazards the country faces as well as 
international trends in disaster management. Contemporary civil defence emergency 
management (CDEM) finds its origins in wartime preparedness schemes and Cold War-era 
concerns about nuclear attack. Fundamentally, civil defence is built on a philosophy on local 
responsibility and principles of self-help, mutual support between communities, and 
guidance from the central government. Although rare, discourse on New Zealand’s civil 
defence organisation when it does occur tends to be centred on the question of whether 
the country was prepared for a national-level disaster and at just about every point in the 
                                                     
20 Ministry of Health. 2010. New Zealand Influenza Pandemic Plan: A framework for action. Wellington: 




history of civil defence the answer has been “No”. Subsequent chapters will help explain 
why. 
Taking a historical perspective, the focus of this dissertation is civil defence law in New 
Zealand which means it is a combination of three often underserved and even ignored 
topics. Legal historian Richard Boast laments the low value accorded to legal history by Kiwi 
historians and argues that law and the legal system have been mostly excluded from New 
Zealand’s written history both in the academic sphere and in publications intended for a 
general audience.21 Boast cites the 2009 version of The New Oxford History of New Zealand, 
but even the 1981 version gives little space to law, even less to the Cold War (only two 
mentions in the index), and nothing to civil defence. Likewise, the second edition in 1992 
made no mention of domestic Cold War activities and nothing about civil defence or any of 
the natural disasters which have occurred in New Zealand’s short history.22 Even the history 
of the Department of Internal Affairs where the Ministry of Civil Defence was based until 
2014 affords this topic barely a mention.23 New Zealand’s historiography of the Cold War 
tends to focus on domestic and international political issues;24 publications specifically on 
civil defence before and during the Cold War have almost entirely been done by honours 
and graduate students. Not only has civil defence been left out of New Zealand’s cultural 
history as well as military and Cold War scholarship it has also managed to avoid more than 
a mention in political and even legal work.25 The Ministry of Civil Defence published a “short 
                                                     
21 Richard Boast “New Zealand Legal History and New Zealand Historians: A Non-meeting of the minds” [ND]. 
22 W.H. Oliver and B.R. Williams The Oxford History of New Zealand (Oxford University Press, Wellington, 
1981); Geoffrey W. Rice The Oxford History of New Zealand (2nd ed, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1992). 
23 Michael Bassett The mother of all departments: The history of the Department of Internal Affairs. (Auckland 
University Press, Auckland, 1997) 
24 See for example, Ian McGibbon and John Crawford Seeing Red: New Zealand, the Commonwealth, and the 
Cold War 1945-1991 (NZ Military History Committee, Wellington, 2012). 





history” of civil defence in 1991 but much of this publication was culled from a Master’s 
thesis written in 197126 or uncited personal recollections of civil defence personnel – and it 
is riddled with typos.27 Theses gaps in the literature became apparent at the start of the 
research for this dissertation when the aim was to understand how New Zealand came to 
find itself making disaster laws during a disaster. The purpose, as stated in the introduction, 
is to help fill those gaps and give insights into the limitations of civil defence. 
1.4 Why disasters? Why civil defence? 
Many papers on disasters begin with statistics on disaster losses and suffering. And it is true 
that disaster losses are increasing.28 But in the past century the risk from numerous hazards 
have been greatly reduced or even eliminated – many as a result of improved living 
conditions, access to healthcare, and better building standards.  And this, Hewitt writes, is 
what gives disaster scholarship a “positive orientation” – the knowledge that as the risk of 
certain hazards has been reduced or eliminated other hazards may also be reduced or 
prevented.29 This hopeful hypothesis is supported by Hewitt’s directive to understand the 
relationship between the hazards society is exposed to and the practices of society which 
can alter and even eliminate the associated risks. Although the risk of certain hazards has 
indeed been greatly reduced – in particular certain diseases – geophysical hazards are 
having an increasing impact on the built environment with resultant tremendous costs.  
                                                     
26 Martin R. Rawlinson “Organisation for disaster: The development of civil defence in New Zealand 1959-1970” 
(Master’s Thesis, University of Canterbury, 1971). 
27 Ministry of Civil Defence “Civil Defence in New Zealand: A short history”. 
28 UNISDR Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction 2009 (United Nations, Geneva, Switzerland, 
2009); UNISDR Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction 2011 (United Nations 
International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, Geneva, Switzerland, 2011).  
29 Kenneth Hewitt Regions of risk: A geographical introduction to disasters. (Addison Wesley Longman Limited, 




In the post war period until the 1970s the number of large-scale disasters worldwide 
increased along with a corresponding increase in loss of human life.30 Over the next 30 years 
this trend would continue with an increasing number of disasters and greater economic 
costs however mortality would see a relative decrease.31 In 1999 Platt described a rise in 
disaster losses which he attributes to increasing vulnerability due to encroachment upon 
areas often exposed to natural hazards and increasing risk from weather related hazards 
and rising sea levels due to climate change.32 Twelve years later the United Nations 
International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) published a report which confirmed 
Platt’s observation on disaster losses – the main finding was that while the economic cost of 
disasters was increasing mortality from disasters has been decreasing for the past 30 
years.33  This is attributed to improved living conditions (housing, health, education, 
livelihoods) which resulted from successful poverty reduction programmes and better 
warning systems. However, along with this progress have come urbanisation and 
development in areas exposed to natural hazards – the result is increasing economic costs 
from the loss of buildings and infrastructure.34 In addition, the past decade saw a number of 
high-impact disaster in developed economies such as Hurricane Katrina in the United States 
in 2005 and earthquakes in Japan and New Zealand in 2011; in absolute terms richer 
countries incur higher economic losses but as a percentage of GDP the losses are 
                                                     
30 Phil O'Keefe, Keith Westgate and Ben Wisner “Taking the naturalness out of natural disasters” (1976) 260 
Nature 566. 
31 UNISDR Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction 2009 (United Nations, Geneva, Switzerland, 
2009 
32  Rutherford H Platt Democracy and Disasters: The politics of extreme natural events (Island Press, 
Washington, D.C., 1999). 
33 UNISDR Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction 2011 (United Nations 





significantly lower relative to losses in less developed countries.35  The EM-DAT database 
has collected data on disaster impacts from 1900 to present36  and their numbers indicate 
that worldwide these high-impact low-frequency events accounted for 0.26% of recorded 
disasters but incurred almost 80% of disaster losses between 1975 and 2008.37 The lesson is 
that with economic growth and development comes improvements in quality of life but also 
often greater exposure of assets to natural hazards and greater potential for losses if 
governance and legislation either cannot keep up with regulating mitigation or technology 
simply is or was not available when the built environment was created.  
This historical analysis accords with assessments made thirty years ago in New Zealand. In 
1984 the New Zealand National Commission for UNESCO published a report on natural 
hazards in New Zealand.38 Topic experts contributed analysis on the state of each of the 
identified hazards facing the country; the report author’s major conclusion was that none of 
the risks New Zealand is exposed to are expected to decrease in the future. Interestingly 
they identified many of the same reasons for this as the 2011 UNISDR report – “increasing 
population in some areas and the increasing value of fixed capital assets, including the cost 
of damage to structures specifically designed to mitigate the hazard”. 39  The main 
shortcomings identified were also similar to the findings of the later UNISDR report, with 
the Kiwis noting the “lack, inadequacy, and confusion of legislation and regulations covering 
                                                     
35 UNISDR Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction 2009 (United Nations, Geneva, Switzerland, 
2009). 
36 EM-DAT - The International Disaster Database. (2013) http://www.emdat.be/frequently-asked-questions. 
37 UNISDR Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction 2009 (United Nations, Geneva, Switzerland, 
2009). 
38 Task Force on Natural Hazards Scientific, Economic and Social Reviews of Natural Hazards in New Zealand 
(New Zealand National Commission for UNESCO, Wellington, 1984). 
39 UNISDR Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction 2011 (United Nations 




natural hazards”.40  Twenty-five years later researchers came to similar conclusions about 
prospect for rebuilding following a major disaster given the then existing legislation in New 
Zealand.41 To this can be added the findings of this dissertation which show that little has 
changed – there is still considerable confusing and inadequacy in the legislation covering 
natural hazards. Hence, the necessity of studying disasters and civil defence. 
1.5 Research questions 
Research for this dissertation began with the Canterbury earthquakes and the institutions 
created to manage the recovery. The main question at the time was simply “Why CERA?” 
Further inquiry revealed many gaps in the literature on civil defence in New Zealand. There 
were only a few publications on how it originated and evolved over time but they lacked 
insights on the important characteristics such as the underlying philosophy and principles 
and the focusing events which shaped civil defence into what it was at the time of the 
Canterbury earthquakes. At best they are snapshots of civil defence at a given time and fail 
to illustrate the processes and principles that make civil defence an institution. This 
dissertation shows that with analysis on these critical factors in the history of civil defence it 
becomes easier to understand the limitations the country faced when confronted with a 
national emergency. Without this knowledge it is difficult to understand the frantic 
response to create new legislation which gave the government significant authority as each 
disaster unfolded in 2010 and 2011 despite the existence of relatively new legislation 
(CDEM Act 2002), a comprehensive policy framework for recovery, and acknowledgement 
                                                     
40 Task Force on Natural Hazards Scientific, Economic and Social Reviews of Natural Hazards in New Zealand 
(New Zealand National Commission for UNESCO, Wellington, 1984) at 4. 
41  James O. Rotimi, Suzanne Wilkinson and Kevin Zuo 2009 “Legislation for effective post-disaster 




by the government multiple times throughout New Zealand’s history and within disaster 
scholarship that an emergency is a terrible time to interpret legislation let alone make it. 
With this background the guiding questions for the research are: 
How, and why, have the philosophy, practice, and governance of civil defence and 
emergency management evolved in New Zealand and what did they mean in the 




Why were disasters nationalised? How did the government come to take a leading 
role in civil defence despite the philosophy of local responsibility and principle of 
self-help?  
Was the creation of the Canterbury recovery framework under the CER Act 2011 and 
CERA an anomaly necessitated by the extreme nature of the event or was it an 
outcome of vulnerabilities within the CDEM recovery framework? 
 
1.6 Outline of the dissertation 
Part I – Introduction to the research 
Chapter 1 explains the aims, rationale and purpose of the research and introduces the 
research questions. 
Chapter 2 places the dissertation within the broader context of disaster scholarship and 




recovery in New Zealand in particular. This chapter also examines the theoretical basis for 
New Zealand’s civil defence emergency management laws and policies and sets the stage 
for subsequent chapters. 
Part II – The Origins of Civil Defence 
Chapter 3, Political and Legal Origins of Civil Defence, examines the underlying principles, 
the philosophy of local responsibility and the focusing events which stimulated growth in 
the civil defence organisation during its early years. This transformation saw the civil 
defence organisation change from essentially a government service focused on Cold War 
risks to one primarily concerned with natural hazards. However, this chapter demonstrates 
that the government has long been a reluctant participant in civil defence which created a 
gap between principles and practice and severely limited the implementability of civil 
defence law. This would become a perverse tradition within civil defence right through to 
the Canterbury earthquakes. The emergent theme of this chapter is the unfunded and 
unsupported mandate which would become a civil defence tradition throughout its history. 
Part III – The Formative Years 
Chapter 4, Responsibility, capacity, and power: The formative years of civil defence, 
continues the themes of capacity, purpose, and function as New Zealand experienced 
significant governance changes in the 1970s and 1980s. In the 1970s civil defence aimed to 
align itself with the new regional governance structure introduced by the Local Government 
Act 1974. Struggles ensued mainly due to confusing and poorly written amendments to civil 
defence legislation and a lack of enabling elements which would allow the new local 




took a leading role in emergency response, but also introduced a disaster recovery 
component to the Act which was to suffer the same limitations and neglect as response 
had. The outcome was realized after the Canterbury quakes when a new law and 
governance structure were created to bridge the gap between principles and practice. The 
emergent theme of this chapter is the value of civil defence. 
 
 
Part IV – Civil Defence Comes of Age  
Chapter 5, Civil Defence Comes of Age: A new emergency management and the recovery 
from the Canterbury earthquakes, argues that the government response to the Canterbury 
earthquakes and the necessity of CERA were a result of familiar historic patterns and places 
the recovery within the context of decades of practice both within the civil defence 
organisation and the broader governance system of New Zealand. This chapter argues that 
the state of readiness for recovery was extremely poor in the same way response was 
decades earlier. The limitations of the CDEM recovery framework derived from a failure to 
provide the enabling conditions to bridge the gap between principles and practice – an 
unfortunate tradition in civil defence. The country simply was not prepared for a recovery 
from any sizeable emergency let alone one the scale of the Canterbury earthquakes. Despite 
new laws and frameworks, civil defence remained essentially a response and readiness 
scheme for small-medium scale emergencies.  




Chapter 6, Conclusion, answers the research questions by drawing together the main 





Chapter 2 Theoretical foundations of disaster scholarship 
“…unless we clarify and obtain a minimum consensus on the defining features…we will 
continue to talk past one another on the characteristics, conditions and consequences of 
disasters” 
 Quarantelli, 19951  
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the evolution of disaster scholarship from its roots in sociological 
research to its contemporary interpretation as a multidisciplinary and “holistic” field. The 
purpose is two-fold. First, to understand the theoretical basis on which New Zealand’s 
current disaster legislation and policy framework are grounded which provides a foundation 
for understanding New Zealand’s own relationship between society, disasters, and the law. 
Second, as a prelude to the Canterbury case, this chapter will demonstrate how recovery, as 
a component or “phase” of the disaster cycle, has been marginalised from the earliest 
disaster studies compared to response, readiness, and risk reduction. This is evident in 
scholarship and practice in New Zealand and abroad.2  This offers a unique opportunity to 
contribute to the perpetually nascent state of research on disaster recovery with a study of 
how New Zealand’s civil defence emergency management system developed only to be 
side-lined during the recovery from the largest emergency in the post-war years. To this end, 
                                                     
1 E.L. Quarantelli “What is a disaster?” (1995) 13 International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters 221 
at 225. 
2 G. P. Smith, & D. Wenger Sustainable Disaster Recovery: Operationalizing an Existing Agenda in H. Rodriguez, 
E. L. Quarantelli, & R. R. Dynes, Handbook of Disaster Research (New York: Springer Science and Business 
Media, LLC., 2007) 234; C. B. Rubin (2009) “Long Term Recovery from Disasters: The Neglected Component of 




this chapter, and the dissertation overall, takes a historical perspective to help explain the 
trends and focusing events within disaster governance and scholarship. The evolution of 
disaster scholarship parallels civil defence emergency management in New Zealand from its 
Cold War origins and focus on response to the neglect shown to the practical elements of 
recovery and emphasis on adaptation and general frameworks. For these reasons, what 
happens in New Zealand, especially regarding the Canterbury earthquakes, is important to 
the broader context of disaster scholarship and to being better prepared for the next big 
disaster by understanding the limits of civil defence. 
Additional scholarship, especially as it relates to the particulars of New Zealand, is 
integrated within the analysis of primary data in subsequent chapters. The aim of this 
chapter is to give an overview and seat the research within the broader field of disaster 
scholarship. 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter begins with a brief account of scholarship on disasters from its roots in civil 
defence and sociological research to its current manifestation which has adopted 
sustainable development principles and emphasises risk reduction (Section 2.2). In Section 
2.3, the basic concepts of disaster management are explained, including the relationship 
between hazards and disasters, and the fundamental elements of risk, resilience, and 
vulnerability. In section 2.4, conceptual models of disasters – often called the disaster cycle, 
or phases - are presented as heuristic devices for understanding what typically happens 
before and after a disaster. This section also demonstrates how recovery became a 
neglected element within the disaster cycle. Section 2.5 explores how disaster recovery has 




from scholarship on reconstruction as a component of recovery. In subsequent chapters it is 
demonstrated that New Zealand followed a similar path in developing its CDEM system as 
the developments explored in this chapter. The CDEM framework under the Civil Defence 
Emergency Management Act 2002 is well-grounded in the disaster scholarship and theory 
outlined in this chapter and was recognized internationally for its progressive approach and 
recommended as a model for other countries.3 For these reasons, what happens in New 
Zealand is important to our understanding of the principles and practices of disaster 
management. Likewise, understanding disaster scholarship is critical to understanding the 
evolution of emergency management in New Zealand and the limitations of civil defence 
after the Canterbury earthquakes. 
2.2 Understanding disaster: A brief history of modern disaster scholarship 
Modern disaster scholarship has primarily been an American endeavour and has its roots in 
sociological studies from the mid-20th century in the United States.4 The earliest studies 
primarily focused on natural and technological disasters and like most of their successors 
tended to focus on the immediate response to a disaster. Over time, scholarship slowly 
moved further from the point of impact toward the broader social systems within which 
disasters occur but they tended toward pre-disaster response, readiness, and later risk 
reduction. The trend has never been towards recovery. The earliest studies were 
unsystematic but they are important for identifying fundamental concepts and setting the 
stage for future work. Disaster scholarship  was interrupted by WWII and the Cold War, but 
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this interruption had the benefit of introducing national systems for response and readiness. 
The origins of modern, government-led emergency management took shape in the form of 
civil defence and continued to grow as scholarship on the two topics were combined in the 
1950s. 
The first generation of scholars to conduct systematic research on disasters emerged in the 
early 1950s and 1960s. These were mainly sociologists studying social change and individual, 
community, and organisational responses to disasters. Their work included natural and 
technological disasters as well as civil defence and was partly driven by Cold War themes 
such as nuclear attack. This generation was followed by a second wave of disaster-related 
scholarship, mainly from the development field starting from the early 1970s. This group, 
spearheaded by work from the Disaster Research Unit at the University of Bradford in the 
United Kingdom, was focused on the political organisations and institutional arrangements 
involved in disaster management and proposed mitigation and preparedness as the focal 
point of disaster management rather than relief and restoration.5,6 This type of work 
contributed greatly to the first major policy change in disaster management since the civil 
defence-focused post-war era by shifting emphasis from effective post-disaster response to 
pre-disaster risk reduction and planning, and the emergence of the vulnerability paradigm. 
In practical application, this period saw the professionalization of emergency management 
and greater public involvement in preparedness campaigns. The third generation, or “wave”, 
emerged in the 1980s and 1990s and focused on the theme of building resilience to natural 
hazards through vulnerability and risk reduction. This period also saw the 
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internationalisation of disaster policy via the United Nations’ “international decade for 
disaster reduction” which further integrated sustainable development and its derivatives 
with disaster management. This internationalization contributed to the inclusion of disaster 
management into national planning in fulfilment of international agreements. Despite this 
new paradigm emphasizing a holistic approach to disaster management, disaster risk 
reduction (DRR) predominated during this period.  Throughout these periods, long-term 
recovery has received occasional peaks in interest but has typically received much less 
emphasis than other aspects. Most of the references in this section come from the late 20th 
and early 21st centuries, but they build on work done in the 1920s and 1930s by the likes of 
Prince, Carr, and Kutak.7 
Early disaster scholarship 
The earliest academic studies of disasters tended to view disasters as catalysts of social 
change by analysing the immediate response to crisis by individuals and communities and 
how these actions may persist or revert to pre-disaster patterns. Among the earliest studies 
of disaster is Prince’s 1920 dissertation based on the explosion of a French munitions ship 
after a collision in Halifax harbour in 19178 – a study on which much of modern disaster 
scholarship has its origins.9 Whereas earlier publications, such as Stewart’s 1877 work on 
the fires in St. John, New Brunswick (which Prince cites), contained insightful observations 
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they were essentially a dramatized layman’s account. Prince’s work theorized from the data 
to develop concepts which were to be fundamental not only during the nascent years of 
systematic disaster scholarship but mainstays of contemporary disaster studies and policy.10 
In particular, it was the first work to delineate the societal response to an emergency into 
linear phases, something which has persisted to today.11 It was also the first academic study 
of community recovery.12 However, some of Prince’s conclusions, particularly those based 
on secondary data, have been abandoned by subsequent research findings such as his 
comments on hysterical behaviour and a reversion to “savagery” due to the immediate 
stress and confusion of a sudden onset crisis.13 His lasting contributions were based on his 
own primary data collection and analysis of collective behaviour, emergent organisation, 
the linear sequence of a disaster, and recommendations for principles of emergency 
management related to what is now called preparedness planning. Prince praised a local 
citizen’s spontaneous relief committees with members from different social classes – the 
system was supplanted by a central committee of American and Canadian relief experts 
which Prince notes brought improved coordination but lacked effective communication and 
local knowledge.14 This observation contains two key points. First, the informal self-
organising of affected communities in contrast to the “helpless victims” they are often 
perceived as (this perception was held by the Ministry of Civil Defence in New Zealand until 
1968, see Chapter 3). Second, the trade-off between informal local institutions and formal 
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government-led ones. The latter may have been more efficient at overall coordination but 
may also lack local knowledge and have questionable legitimacy and accountability – issues 
which may limit their effectiveness in implementation. This dynamic between local and 
central responsibility and control is a major theme of civil defence in New Zealand and is at 
the centre of the failures of the civil defence recovery framework following the Canterbury 
earthquakes. 
 Both Prince and twelve years later Carr15 included a description of the sequence of events 
immediately before, during, and after a disaster – two of the earliest conceptualizations of 
disaster phases.16 Carr used these phases to organise and explain his analysis of the types of 
adjustments made by individuals, groups, and culturally and the “new equilibrium” found 
after a major disaster. In so doing he described a disaster as not simply a physical event but 
a social one due to the changes in society either before to prepare for the event or after, 
because of the event, and analysed disasters as a process rather than focusing on the time 
and place of impact. This functional use of the descriptive “phases” would persist to the 
present day but it would be more than 50 years until disasters would be looked at as a 
process rather than singular events in emergency management law and policy. 
Similar to Prince, Kutak offered relatively few criticisms of the response process and focused 
on the positive outcomes of a disaster.17  Both Prince and Kutak wrote of the “democracy of 
common disaster” and the spontaneous help from local and nearby communities, and both 
noted that this effect was temporary - as comfort and security returned the “democracy of 
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distress” disappeared.18 Kutak theorized that a crisis could break down social barriers and 
effect positive social change through innovation and concerted efforts towards shared 
community interests and result in a stronger social order which could not develop from 
mundane life – in contemporary parlance this would be called resilience. Kutak proposed 
risk mitigation and preparedness schemes as two solutions to flood hazards, noting that 
mitigation measures need to be sustained even as the ‘acute distress’ felt at the time of the 
initial disaster faded away. He also suggested mechanisms for integrating preparedness 
planning at the community level with agencies and organisations in other communities to 
assist one another – similar to the principles of mutual assistance in New Zealand. Finally, 
he outlined a civil defence scheme similar to that developed in New Zealand in the late 
1950s and 1960s and recommended establishing a dedicated emergency organisation that 
comes into effect during an emergency.19 Despite these innovative ideas, it would be 
decades before they were taken up by other researchers and put into practice as attention 
turned from natural and technological hazards to war with the advent of WWII and the Cold 
War. In the pre and post-war years disaster scholarship was still a novelty and far from 
systematic, but from the 1950s onward it would be the threat of war that would be the 
genesis of modern scholarship on disasters. 
The origins of systematic disaster scholarship 
Systematic research on disasters began in the 1950s in the United States, predominantly at 
the National Academy of Sciences and the National Opinion Research Center (NORC), 
headed by Charles Fritz, which conducted research on individual, group, and organisational 
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responses to disasters.20 From the latter institute E.L. Quarantelli joined Russell Dynes and 
Eugene Haas at the Ohio State University Department of Sociology to form the Disaster 
Research Center (DRC) in 1963 (located at the University of Delaware since 1985). The DRC 
was the only research centre to undertake continuous and systematic research on disasters 
during the 1960s and early 1970s and produced the majority of disaster scholarship outputs 
in that period – much of which is still referenced today.21 The DRC contributed a continuity 
of scholarship and a substantial knowledge-base on the social aspects of disasters. By 2009, 
the DRC had produced 463 articles and dozens of books and reports22 on topics ranging 
from civil defence23  to earthquake hazards and local governance24  and explored the 
fundamental question of what is a disaster.25 While this first generation of scholarship 
focused on individual, group, and community responses to crisis, the second generation 
would bring practical and policy consideration into disaster scholarship. 
The second generation of scholarship was led by the Disaster Research Unit (DRU) at the 
University of Bradford. Similar to scholars from the DRC, and as Tierney referred to in her 
comment about the field being led by core groups of researchers,26 graduates of this 
research centre would go on to be highly influential in disaster scholarship for the next few 
decades. In contrast to the DRC which tended to focus on the sociological aspects of 
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disasters the Disaster Research Unit was considerably more practically oriented. Based 
primarily on development studies the DRU made use of practical case studies to make 
recommendations and introduce new concepts to policy and practice. From their early work, 
they introduced pre-cautionary planning, mitigation, and capacity assessment and 
development,27 as well as preparedness schemes and a disaster model.28 Drawing on their 
work in developing countries the DRU introduced vulnerability assessment as a tool for risk 
reduction. The seminal work of this group was a paper by Lewis which was critical of the 
majority of practical work on disasters because they excessively focused on relief.29  Lewis 
criticised the alleged inefficiencies of relief work and coordination as they served to further 
concentrate attention on relief services rather than working to reduce the need for relief by 
reducing risk. Lewis envisioned a comprehensive strategy which included contingency 
planning, needs and capacity assessments, land use and building regulations, and warning 
systems.30 The United States was one of the first movers in this new approach to disasters – 
the National Governors Association report in 1979 introduced the now familiar conceptual 
framework for disasters based on mitigation, preparedness (planning and warning), 
response, and recovery (short-term and long-term).31 This report laid the foundation for the 
third wave of disaster scholarship and practice by introducing the concept of 
“comprehensive emergency management”, a predecessor to the “holistic framework” 
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adopted by New Zealand in 2002. In practical terms this time period saw a shift from 
disaster response to readiness and the professionalisation of emergency management. 
The third generation of scholarship was essentially an extension and expansion of the 
concepts introduced by earlier generations, in particular the vulnerability paradigm and risk 
reduction. Sustainable development was also co-opted into the emergent disaster paradigm 
during the first international “decade” dedicated to disasters through the UN.32 The seminal 
publication of this generation was a book entitled At Risk, a publication that provided the 
basis for much of contemporary understanding of disaster vulnerability and its adoption 
into international policy. Principally, the authors made the point that risk from natural 
hazards was generated in the social environment rather than the natural environment. 33 
Westgate’s 1995 review of the book describes the “preoccupation” the authors had with 
risk mitigation and improving the conditions under which people live rather than focusing 
on reducing the intensity, frequency, or impact of the hazard itself.34 This reaction seems 
almost quaint in retrospect but it signalled a paradigm shift in disaster management, a 
perspective that was supported internationally though the United Nation’s international 
decade for disaster reduction (1990-1999) and the Yokohama Strategy and Plan of Action 
for a Safer World which adopted a risk-focused and holistic (social, environmental, 
economic) approach to disaster management.35  
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At present we are in the fourth generation of disaster scholarship, and the bywords of this 
generation are reduction and resilience. This generation emerged during the United Nations’ 
second decade for disaster reduction, guided by the Hyogo Framework for Action.36 This 
decade was an incredibly costly period of disasters and is distinctive for multiple disciplinary 
research and the growth of newer fields in disaster scholarship such as law and governance. 
No longer the domain of sociologists, development scholars, or geographers, disaster 
scholarship has reached a point where it transcends any one discipline – but the 
fundamentals remain much the same. What Westgate at the time considered a 
“preoccupation” with mitigation, or more broadly risk reduction, has become an accepted 
foundational principle for international disaster management as well as national plans and 
legislation, albeit with mixed results as the implementation gap between principle and 
practice remains wide.37 There is still regular criticism of the continued predominance in 
practice of disaster response and relief and the slow pace of mainstreaming risk reduction 
by stakeholders in government, civil society, and businesses38 – a trend which also appeared 
in New Zealand. 39  However disasters have become a regular part of international 
agreements and processes such as the Hyogo Framework for Action and its successor, the 
Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction40 as well as the United Nations Conference 
on Sustainable Development outcome document, The Future We Want. 41  Law and 
governance are relative newcomers but are increasingly important after major disasters in 
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developed countries such as Japan, the United States and New Zealand which created 
significant challenges to existing governance and legal arrangements and raised questions 
about the proper role of the central government, local authorities and other stakeholder 
groups.42 In this sense, disaster scholarship has come full-circle to the pre-war findings of 
Prince, Kutak, and Carr who began disaster scholarship by observing and analysing the roles 
of these stakeholder groups in crisis. 
Section summary 
This section has briefly explored the evolution of disaster scholarship from its pre-WWII and 
Cold War origins to its current form as a multi-disciplinary field. During the course of this 
evolution, disasters became an international concern as focus shifted from the effects 
disasters have on communities to reducing the effects of disasters on communities through 
risk reduction. This is undoubtedly a positive trend but the primacy of risk reduction has had 
a side effect – very little attention has been paid to disaster recovery. As the pendulum 
swung from post-disaster relief to readiness and reduction, recovery has never had a similar 
period of intense study. From these four generations of disaster scholarship have emerged 
fundamental concepts which form a common vocabulary for describing natural hazards and 
their relationship with society. 
2.3 Conceptual basis of disasters 
As a multidisciplinary field, disaster scholarship has adopted and adapted numerous 
concepts and terms from a wide variety of fields which in turn have been defined in ways 
which often differ from common usage. The aim of this section is to explain generally the 
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key terms of hazard, disaster, vulnerability, as well as risk and resilience. By understanding 
these terms the message that disasters are a social phenomenon and part of a long-term 
process becomes easier to understand, which in turn supports the historical perspective 
used in this dissertation.  
 Hazards 
Alexander’s intensive examination of disasters explains hazards as naturally occurring 
events which have the potential to cause a disaster when a vulnerable population is 
exposed to the event, particularly when the event deviates from the mean.43 For example, 
excess rain may cause flooding while unusually low amounts of rain may lead to a drought. 
Alexander identifies four critical elements of hazards: location, timing, magnitude, and 
frequency. Certain hazards are known to occur in particular areas, some of which are named 
for the hazard – monsoon Asia for example, or “Tornado Alley” in the American mid-west. 
These may be seasonal as in the previous example, or occur irregularly but consistently over 
time as with earthquakes. Some hazards, such as volcanoes and even droughts, may occur 
with no measurable regularity at all. Alexander explains magnitude and frequency using 
work by Wolman and Miller44 who contrasted infrequent geophysical events of unusually 
powerful magnitude with recurring events of low to moderate intensity. Wolman and Miller 
concluded that it is the latter type which is the most significant in shaping the environment 
and therefore impacting on human developments. This generalisation appears to be 
reflected in New Zealand’s CDEM framework which was structured to respond primarily to 
low-magnitude high-frequency events, but as Alexander cautions the extent of a disaster 
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may not necessarily relate to the magnitude of a hazard per se.45 Rather, the main message 
of Alexander and other disaster scholars46 is that the characteristics of the community 
exposed to the hazard determine the magnitude at which a geophysical event may cause a 
disaster. In the words of Dynes there is a “very low correlation between the agent 
characteristics and consequent social damage”, 47 and misunderstanding this relationship 
can lead to misdirected resources on physical characteristics of a hazard and disaster rather 
than understanding the social characteristics of a community, country, or system which may 
play a much greater role in the susceptibility of the community to a hazard. The 
characteristics which contribute to a community’s susceptibility to be harmed by a natural 
hazard are explained by the vulnerability paradigm which describes why disasters are a 
social phenomenon. 
 Vulnerability and resilience 
The concept of vulnerability has been used in fields across the social and natural sciences 
but with no real consensus on its meaning as each field may define it according to their 
needs.48 As disaster scholarship grew out of development studies the concept was adopted 
and established as a fundamental component of disaster management. In this field it 
describes characteristics of a community which make it susceptible to the impact of natural 
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events.49 A natural hazard may simply be the trigger or tipping point which results in a 
community experiencing a disaster.  This understanding of vulnerability came from 
development studies in the 1970s, spearheaded by scholars from the University of 
Bradford’s Disaster Research Unit. They concluded that “no geological or climatological 
change over the last 50 years adequately explains the rise (in disasters)” therefore it is 
increasing human vulnerability that is the root cause of disasters.50 At the time they 
assumed that the probability of an extreme natural event occurring is constant therefore an 
explanation for the increasing number of disasters must be found in the social world and 
the “growing vulnerability of the population to extreme physical events”.51 In 2011 the 
United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) defined vulnerability 
simply as “the susceptibility to suffer damage or loss”.52 This is definition lacks the 
descriptive elements from a previous UNISDR publication which offered the following 
definition – “Vulnerability refers to a propensity or susceptibility to suffer loss and is 
associated with a range of physical, social, political, economic, cultural and institutional 
characteristics”.53 This definition captures the main categories which can contribute to a 
given population, community or an individual being harmed by a natural hazard but it still 
lacks concreteness. 
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In New Zealand the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management (MCDEM) 
adopted a simple definition of the term – “vulnerability is defined as being prone to or 
susceptible to damage or injury”.54 This is further elaborated in the same document as: 
Vulnerability is the result of a number of factors that increase the chance that a community will 
be unable to deal with a disaster. Vulnerability relates to the characteristics of a person or group 
in terms of their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impact of a hazard. 
Some groups in society are more prone than others to damage, loss and suffering in the context 
of hazards. Such groups may be characterised by class, ethnicity, gender, disability, or age. 
 MCDEM cite this definition as based on the work of Blaikie et al in their book At Risk,55 in 
fact it is a word-for-word direct quote. At Risk explains disasters not as extreme and unusual 
events but as an extension of everyday life. The aim of the book is to “redress” the 
predominant understanding of disasters as being caused primarily by natural processes and 
uses numerous cases from the main hazard types – famine, biological hazards, flooding, 
coastal storms, and earthquakes and volcanoes. At the core of the book are two models – 
the Pressure and Release model (PAR) and the Access Model which were updated in the 
second edition in 2004 and again by Wisner et al.56 The PAR model explains a natural 
disaster as occurring at the intersection of two “forces” – those generating vulnerability on 
one side of the model and a natural hazard or process on the other (see Figure 2-1).  
                                                     
54 Focus on Recovery: A holistic framework for recovery in New Zealand. Information for the CDEM Sector 
[IS5/05] at 7. 
55 Blaikie, Cannon, Davis, Wisner (1994) At Risk, Routledge, London. NOTE: This was incorrectly cited in 
MCDEM (2005) as 1997. 
56 Wisner, B., Gaillard, J., & Kelman, I. (2012). Introduction to Part 1. In B. Wisner, J. Gaillard, & I. Kelman, The 





In this model, disasters are explained in terms of risk, hazard, and vulnerability (Risk = 
Vulnerability x Hazard) – there is a risk of disaster occurring when a vulnerable population 
meets a hazard. Vulnerability emerges as an outcome of a progression from the least 
proximate (root causes) to intermediate (dynamic pressures) and proximate (unsafe 
conditions)57 and is explained according to the various hazard types listed above. Wisner et 
al describe root causes as conditions which “reflect the exercise and distribution of 
power”.58 Dynamic pressures are “processes and activities which translate the effects of 
root causes both temporally and spatially into unsafe conditions”. 
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Figure 2-1 Progression of vulnerability  
Source: Blaikie, P., Cannon, T., Davis, I., & Wisner, B. (1994). At Risk: Natural Hazards, People's Vulnerability, and 




For example, in a famine in the Sudan two of the root causes were identified as 
contemporary Sudanese cultural-political environment and the civil war. These contributed 
to massive social disorder which created Dynamic Pressures such as slavery and subjugation 
of women, plundering and rustling, and counter-insurgency and a large number of internally 
displaced persons. These in turn created Unsafe Conditions – a lack of subsistence 
agriculture and loss of livelihood (mainly due to cattle rustling), loss of labour to slavery and 
war, and a disruption of local markets for livestock and food.59 These social phenomena 
reduced food availability and food access and occurred in the context of unusual rainfall and 
drought which also contributed to reduced food availability. The outcome was a famine 
which resulted in 70-100,000 deaths. Root Causes and Dynamic Pressures were identified in 
Thailand based on the social impact of economic and political factors which resulted in 
flooding. In this example, global demand for timber would combine with power differentials 
between the local population and political and business elites (Root Causes) and lead to 
deforestation (Dynamic Pressure) of a rural area. Without a local market for the expensive 
timber it is exported, leaving unsafe conditions for locals in the form of eroded land, 
inadequate infrastructure to protect against flooding (from warning systems to poorly 
designed roads which may block drainage), a disrupted and fragile local economy 
(dependent on unsustainable resource extraction and local food production reduced due to 
flooding), and possible health consequences from waterborne disease vectors (mosquitos 
carrying malaria, for example). The natural hazard, flooding, may be triggered by rainfall, 
but the local population’s vulnerability to flooding stems almost entirely from the social and 
not the natural environment. 
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In New Zealand an example could be made of historic buildings and seismic risk. Root 
Causes may be colonization and socio-religious traditions which prefer or even dictate the 
construction of stone and brick buildings. Dynamic Pressure may be a lack of awareness or 
concern about earthquake risk when the buildings were constructed (relative to other risks 
such as fire – see Chapter 3) and a lack of political will to enforce retrofitting or replacing 
buildings due to cost and public pressure to preserve cultural heritage. These contributed to 
creating Unsafe Conditions in the built environment. On the other side of the PAR model is 
the hazard – earthquakes. As seismic activity is unalterable it is evident that decisions made 
in the social environment created vulnerability and increased risk. 
The case of New Zealand is instructive. Decisions made by early European settlers to create 
a built environment in New Zealand similar to the countries they came from has created 
communities vulnerable to seismic activity that was not present in the United Kingdom and 
most of Europe. An important contributing factor to vulnerabilities over time is the risk 
perception of government at a certain period. In the 1800s brick and stone buildings were 
not only seen as having greater stature or prestige than wooden structures but they were 
also preferred for their resilience to the greatest perceived threat at the time – fire.60 Even 
after major earthquakes in the 1840s when it was noticed that wooden structures 
performed far better than stone and brick structures, very often cultural values won out and 
much of the built environment, in particular for government and religious structures, was 
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constructed of materials less than ideal for a geography with considerable seismic risk.61 The 
risk, along with the cultural heritage, thereafter was inherited by future generations.  
Resilience is best understood in contrast to vulnerability – the characteristics of a 
community that help them resist the impact of a natural hazard and quickly return to a 
functioning state after a disaster. There is no universally accepted definition,62 but the 
common feature of its usage is resistance and return – a community can be vulnerable to a 
hazard but may still be able to function or return quickly to functionality.63 
Risk 
Using the previous terms disaster risk is a function of the elements at risk, a vulnerable 
individual, group, or community’s exposure to a particular hazard, and the characteristics of 
the hazard itself. Alexander explains risk as being “dynamic and complex” and the “product 
of the elements at risk, their specific vulnerability and the probability that a hazard will 
strike, within the prevailing climate of risk management, and given the level of exposure of 
the various elements”.64 The elements at risk in this conceptualization are individuals and 
communities, the built and natural environments, and economic activities and services. In 
New Zealand the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 defines risk as “the 
likelihood and consequences of a hazard”.65 In other words, it is the probability of a 
particular hazard event occurring and the cost of the outcome of that event (in terms of the 
impact on the elements at risk – human death or injury and damage or loss in the natural, 
                                                     
61 Eiby, G. (1975). A history of anti-seismic measures in New Zealand. Bulletin of the New Zealand National 
Society for Earthquake Engineers, 8(19), 255-259. 
62 Patrick Helm. Risk and resilience: Strategies for security (Civil Engineering and Environmental Systems, 2015, 
32, 100-118) at 102. 
63 Tom Mitchell and Katie Harris. Resilience: A risk management approach (Overseas Development Institute, 
January 2012). 
64 Alexander, D. (2000). Confronting Catastrophe. Hertfordshire, England: Terra Publishing at 16. 




economic, and physical environment insofar as it impacts human society). Efforts to reduce 
risk should be aimed at reducing vulnerability as society’s ability to reduce the probability of 
a natural event occurring is extremely limited. 
Section summary 
The main message from this section is that disasters are a social phenomenon, the only 
thing “natural” is the trigger – for example an earthquake or flood or drought. What makes 
such natural occurrences to be defined as hazards are the characteristics not of the hazard 
itself per se but the characteristics of a community. When a community is exposed to the 
natural event those characteristics which make them susceptible to damage and losses from 
the impact of the hazard are called vulnerabilities and can be general to many hazards or 
particular to a certain hazard type. A hazard becomes a disaster when a community loses its 
capacity to function as usual and to respond to the hazard impact and is relative to each 
community. The sources of vulnerability, that is – the things which cause risk – can come 
from a variety of sources and include government policies and intangibles such as inaction 
or values as well as the more obvious vulnerabilities in the built environment. Earthquakes, 
storms, floods, eruptions and any other sort of natural hazard will inevitably occur – these 
are beyond the control of humankind. Where we live, the sort of buildings we live in, and 
the robustness and reliability of our governance systems – including our emergency 
management systems – are all outcomes of decision made in the social environment. This 
understanding is important for subsequent chapters where vulnerabilities in the civil 
defence framework are identified which impacted communities’ ability to respond to and 
recover from emergencies. Throughout the history of civil defence decisions were made, 




equip emergency responders, and which aspects of civil defence would be compulsory or 
voluntary. As with many sources of vulnerability, decision making which resulted in 
uncertainty and vulnerability was separated not only by distance but also by time from the 
actual disaster. These themes are taken up in the following chapters. The next section 
analyses the conceptual framework on which emergency management in New Zealand is 
based and the manner in which recovery has consistently been overlooked thereby creating 
a vulnerability in civil defence emergency management. 
2.4 Conceptual framework of a disaster: Long-term recovery and the primacy of 
risk reduction 
The purpose of this section is to explain how disasters are conceptualized and how recovery 
as a component of these models has received significantly less attention than the other 
components – reduction, readiness, and response. Researchers use these models to 
organise findings and make recommendations while practitioners use them to organise 
functions and actions.66 Moreover, governments, such as in New Zealand, have used these 
models to develop their laws and policies. Disaster models are usually depicted as a cycle or 
in phases, or as relational components and are heuristic tools for presenting disaster in a 
way which shows how and when humans respond to hazards and disasters, as well as what 
should be done to reduce their impact. The models are typically depicted as descriptive, 
linear, cyclical, functional, and normative – or some combination of these. The term disaster 
cycle is often used but is a misnomer, or at least can be misleading as it may imply 
recurrence of a particular event in a specific place which may not necessarily be the case as 
not all hazards are cyclical.  
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Early conceptualizations of disasters, such as by Prince67 and Carr,68 were short-duration 
linear models focused mainly on the period immediately prior to, during, and after a 
disaster and were descriptive – the authors sought to explain behaviour and events as a 
disaster unfolds. Prince’s research described an emergency period filled with panic and 
confusion followed by a transition period as rescue and relief operations get organised, 
followed by a rehabilitation period. Carr’s work, which cited Prince, aimed to explain 
societal change following a disaster: a preliminary or “prodromal” period during which the 
“forces” that trigger the disaster begin; a dislocation and disorganisation phase at the onset 
of the disaster; readjustment and reorganisation which is dependent on the characteristics 
of the affected community and the severity of the disaster itself. While it is notable for 
addressing social aspects of a disaster and not simply the physical processes or progression 
(i.e. of a flood or earthquake sequences) the limitation of this model and others like it is the 
narrow scope which includes only the timeframe immediately preceding and following the 
moment the disaster occurs. Works by Powell69 and Chapman70 (who used Powell’s model 
as a basis) as well as Stoddard71 (who extensively cited Prince, Carr, Powell, and Chapman) 
contributed variations of the models – what these models have in common is a linear focus 
with an aim of explaining human behaviour pre, during, and post disaster. These early 
models stand in contrast to later models which would describe and prescribe actions which 
can and should occur. 
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In the early 1970s, scholars from the Disaster Research Unit (DRU) in the University of 
Bradford developed a framework of progressive functional elements in a linear model. This 
marked a turning point from descriptive to normative models of disasters. The seminal work 
from this group72 introduced an extensive framework of pre-disaster planning for risk 
reduction and capacity development, and was the conceptual origin for the first illustrative 
model of disaster which implies a temporal disaster cycle.73 Disasters, according to Baird et 
al. should be seen as “occurring within a system of activity” which they divided into 
Predisaster activity  (prevention, mitigation, and warning) followed by the actual disaster 
and Post Disaster Activity (relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction) as depicted in the 
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Figure 2-2 Disaster Occurrence Within An Activity System Over Time (a) 
Source: Baird, A., O'Keefe, P., Westgate, K., & Wisner, B. (1975). Towards an explanation and reduction of disaster 












The diagrams are both descriptive and normative – they outlined what the authors 
identified as the main functional phases before and after a disaster in order to make 
recommendations on what should be undertaken. The above two diagrams are important 
for their historical contributions, not only for what they added to their own time, but for 
how the  concepts continue to be read, recommended, and applied today.74 In their analysis 
of linear, cyclical, and functional disaster models Coetzee and van Niekerk found that 
models by each generation of scholars from Prince and Carr to Chapman and Stoddard, and 
finally Baird, O’Keefe, Westgate, and Wisner were not only foundational but had a 
persistent presence in future models of disasters – in particular the division between 
mitigation, preparedness, relief, and recovery.75  
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Figure 2-3 Disaster Occurrence Within An Activity System Over Time (b)  
Source: Baird, A., O'Keefe, P., Westgate, K., & Wisner, B. (1975). Towards an 
explanation and reduction of disaster proneness. University of Bradford 




This model was further refined in a report by the National Governors’ Association in 1979 
which lead to the widespread use and institutionalisation of a four-component model of 
disaster management consisting of mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery.76,77  
The four components are defined as: 78 
Mitigation: Mitigation includes any activities that actually eliminate or reduce the probability of 
occurrence of a disaster…It includes long-term activities designed to reduce the effects of 
unavoidable disaster (for example, land-use management, establishing comprehensive emergency 
management programs, or legislating building safety codes). 
Preparedness: Preparedness activities are necessary to the extent that mitigation measures have not, 
or cannot, prevent disasters. In the preparedness phase, governments, organizations, and individuals 
develop plans to save lives and minimize disaster damage (for example, compiling state resource 
inventories, mounting training exercises, or installing warning systems). Preparedness measures also 
seek to enhance disaster response operations (for example, by stockpiling vital food and medical 
supplies, through training exercises, and by mobilizing emergency personnel on a standby basis). 
Response: Response activities follow an emergency or disaster. Generally, they are designed to 
provide emergency assistance for casualties (for example, search and rescue, emergency shelter, 
medical care, mass feeding). They also seek to reduce the probability of secondary damage (for 
example, shutting off contaminated water supply sources, cordoning off and patrolling looting-prone 
areas) and to speed recovery operations (for example, damage assessment). 
Recovery: Recovery activities continue until all systems return to normal or better. They include two 
sets of activities: Short-term recovery activities return vital life-support systems to minimum 
operating standards (for example, clean-up, temporary housing). Long-term recovery activities may 
                                                     
76 Coetzee, C. (2009). The development, implementation and transformation of the Disaster Management 
Cycle. Master's thesis, North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus. 
77 Baird, M. E. (2010). The "Phases" of Emergency Management. Memphis: Intermodal Freight Transportation 
Institute - University of Memphis 
78  National Governors’ Association Center for Policy Research. (1979). Comprehensive Emergency 




continue for a number of years after a disaster. Their purpose is to return life to normal, or improved 
levels (for example, redevelopment loans, legal assistance, and community planning). 
This model conveys more than the linear models it resembles by drawing linkages between 
the functions performed for mitigation and recovery, as well as between preparedness and 
relief.79 The Report found that the relationship between these components were not well 
understood or appreciated in practice due to the governance structure and emergency 
management system in the United States which focused primarily on preparedness and 
response; Recovery was found to be essentially a matter of administering federal grants. 
The preparedness description is almost identical that given by Lewis,80 however there are 
no universal definitions for any of these - there are more than thirty definitions for 
mitigation in the United States alone81 but the differences are minimal and usually reflect a 
degree of emphasis depending on an organisation’s mandate. Various organisations may 
use different terminology for essentially the same components. The New Zealand 
government for example use the mnemonic “4Rs” for reduction, readiness, response, and 
recovery.82 In New Zealand these concepts are not presented as a cycle or phases but as 
four interrelated components of a comprehensive and integrated approach to hazard and 
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risk management.83 The Guide to the National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan 
defines the 4Rs as: 84 
Reduction: identifying and analysing long-term risks to human life and property from natural or non-
natural hazards; taking steps to eliminate these risks if practicable, and, if not, reducing the 
magnitude of their impact and the likelihood of their occurring. 
Readiness: developing operational systems and capabilities before a civil defence emergency happens, 
including self-help and response programmes for the general public, and specific programmes for 
emergency services, lifeline utilities, and other agencies. 
Response: actions taken immediately before, during, or directly after a civil defence emergency to 
save lives and property, and to help communities recover. 
Recovery: the co-ordinated efforts and processes used to bring about the immediate, medium-term, 
and long-term holistic regeneration of a community following a civil defence emergency. 
Since the Disaster Research Unit and the National Governors’ Association published their 
findings a major shift occurred which pulled attention predominately from post-disaster 
response to risk reduction in scholarship and international policy if not in practice. It is a 
logical move as a disaster averted is one which needs no response or recovery. However, 
the move away from post-disaster seemed to have left recovery behind. For almost two 
decades scholars have argued that recovery, as a component of disaster management, has 
been neglected and needs more research,85 or as Berke et al. stated in 1993, it is the “least 
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investigated and most poorly understood of the four phases of disaster”86 – a statement 
reiterated by scholars in 200787  and even practitioners in New Zealand in 2012.88  
While recovery has received relatively less attention in scholarship it has also progressively 
diminished in the international policy agenda. In 1994 member states of the United Nations 
adopted the Yokohama Strategy and Plan of Action for a Safer World: Guidelines for natural 
disaster prevention, preparedness and mitigation (Yokohama Plan) as a part of the 
International Decade for Disaster Reduction.89 At that time the four key elements (or 
phases) of natural disasters were described as prevention, mitigation, preparedness, and 
relief – recovery however is conspicuous by its absence not only as a “key element” but in 
the entire document. In preparation for the next ten year plan in 2005 the United Nations 
General Assembly requested the Secretariat of the International Strategy for Disaster 
Reduction conduct a review of the Yokohama Plan.90 In this review, recovery is limited to 
two subsections – the first, “Preparedness for effective response and recovery” mainly 
discusses funding and governance issues for preparedness and response, recovery is 
excluded except for one mention (italics added):91 
The demand is growing within the emergency management community for the investment of 
significantly increased resources in preparedness, prevention and mitigation actions. The concern has 
been expressed that disproportionate amounts are routinely committed by Governments and 
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international organizations to emergency response and rehabilitation, often in haste, resulting in 
duplicated efforts and without the same oversight generally required for development expenditures… 
Many emergency response and recovery funds can be used only once important social and economic 
assets have been lost... 
Recovery again appears in the heading to sub-section 106, however the emphasis again is 
on risk reduction: 
106. Preparedness for effective response and recovery 
1. Expanding public dialogue, official practice and professional involvement related to the 
entire range of shared and complementary disaster and risk management needs and 
responsibilities. 
2. Identifying and allocating existing resources from the establishment, development and 
emergency budgets for disaster and risk management to greater effect in the realization of 
sustained risk reduction. 
3. Evaluating the current suitability of all disaster and risk management policies, operational 
abilities and needs against present and emerging risks. 
 
When the successor to the Yokohama Plan, the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA), was 
agreed in January 2005 the focus was on “reducing vulnerabilities and risks to hazards”.92 
Unlike its predecessor document this time recovery is included in a “disaster reduction cycle” 
along with prevention, preparedness, and emergency response. However the HFA is short 
on specifics - with few exceptions recovery is referred to in the HFA as a time for risk 
                                                     




reduction or is lumped in with response, while none of the “priority action” items refer to 
recovery (although they could conceivably be incorporated into a recovery plan): 93  
Priority Action 1: Ensure that disaster risk reduction is a national and a local priority with a strong 
institutional basis for implementation. 
Countries that develop policy, legislative and institutional frameworks for disaster risk 
reduction and that are able to develop and track progress through specific and measurable 
indicators have greater capacity to manage risks and to achieve widespread consensus for, 
engagement in and compliance with disaster risk reduction measures across all sectors of 
society 
 
Priority Action 2: Identify, assess and monitor disaster risks and enhance early warning. 
The starting point for reducing disaster risk and for promoting a culture of disaster resilience 
lies in the knowledge of the hazards and the physical, social, economic and environmental 
vulnerabilities to disasters that most societies face, and of the ways in which hazards and 
vulnerabilities are changing in the short and long term, followed by action taken on the basis 
of that knowledge. 
 
Priority Action 3: Use knowledge, innovation and education to build a culture of safety and resilience 
at all levels. 
Disasters can be substantially reduced if people are well informed and motivated towards a 
culture of disaster prevention and resilience, which in turn requires the collection, 
compilation and dissemination of relevant knowledge and information on hazards, 
vulnerabilities and capacities. 
 
Priority Action 4: Reduce the underlying risk factors. 
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Disaster risks related to changing social, economic, environmental conditions and land use, 
and the impact of hazards associated with geological events, weather, water, climate 
variability and climate change, are addressed in sector development planning and 
programmes as well as in post-disaster situations. 
 
Priority Action 5: Strengthen disaster preparedness for effective response at all levels. 
At times of disaster, impacts and losses can be substantially reduced if authorities, 
individuals and communities in hazard-prone areas are well prepared and ready to act and 
are equipped with the knowledge and capacities for effective disaster management. 
The mid-term review of the HFA continued this theme.94 In the publication Proposed 
Elements for Consideration in the Post-2015 Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction the UN 
Special Representative of the Secretary‐General for Disaster Risk Reduction Margareta 
Wahlstrom failed to mention recovery at all, not even as an ideal time for risk reduction.95 
The title alone clearly indicates the focus is on risk reduction. Of course risk reduction can 
and should be included in recovery but there is much more to recovery than “risk reduction” 
as argued by Phillips96 and even demonstrated in the CDEM recovery framework which 
despite its many limitations (see Chapter 5) emphasizes not only risk reduction but also 
psychosocial care and other social elements which are not aimed at reducing risk per se.97 
Given the close relationship between disaster scholarship and the Yokohama Strategy and 
HFA, and the linkage between these two and national planning98 it should not be surprising 
that recovery has received such little attention in the literature – and in practice. This trend 
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may be changing – the successor to the HFA, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk 
Reduction now has recovery as a priority area (albeit, grouped together with response 
whereas the first three priority areas are some variation of DRR).99   
2.5 Disaster recovery 
The purpose of this section is to explore how recovery has been conceptualized in disaster 
scholarship and the disaster governance framework in New Zealand. Recovery has been 
conceptualized in two broad ways: as a linear process or in terms of the components 
needed for an effective recovery. In 1977 a logarithmic model of recovery was proposed by 
Kates and Pijawka as a basis for comparing case studies of four historical disasters100 and 
later for analysing the recovery from Hurricane Katrina.101 In this model each of the first 
three stages are approximately ten times longer than previous stages as shown on the Y-axis 
(Figure 2-4), the fourth stage can go on indefinitely. Allowances are made for variation 
depending on the magnitude of the damage, the resources available, prevailing pre-disaster 
trends, as well as leadership and the degree and quality of planning and organisation for the 
recovery.102 A similar model was developed by Alexander (Figure 2-5) with costs rather than 
“activity” on the Y-axis.103  
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Figure 2-4 Logarithmic model of recovery activity  
Source: Kates, R. W., & Pijawka, D. (1977). From Rubble to Monument: The pace of reconstruction. In J. Haas, R. Kates, & 
M. Bowden, Reconstruction Following Disaster (pp. 1-23). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Figure 2-5 Phases of recovery in the aftermath of disaster  
Source: Alexander, D. (2002). Principles of Emergency Planning and Management. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Kates et al recognized criticisms of this linear approach, including that the sequence of the 
phases can be both uneven and overlap and that different social groups may have 
significantly different experiences with each phase.104 Their response is that the model can 
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be separately applied to various groups to compare their rates of recovery across a 
community. Nevertheless other scholars have found that the sequential models did not 
stand up to empirical testing105 or noted that it is an oversimplification of a process (or, 
processes) that are complicated by factors identified earlier in this chapter as contributing 
to vulnerability including power differentials, class, gender, race, previous disaster 
experiences and access to resources.106 It also does not account for preparedness activities 
such as pre-disaster planning which may include models of potential damage and possible 
rebuilding strategies. While the phases approach may be a useful heuristic device107 other 
scholars contend that disasters and the recovery from them progress according to “social 
time”.108 What this means is that recovery progresses according to the capacities, resources, 
and other contextual factors (psycho-social, economic, political) that may not fit neatly into 
a linear chart. 
In contrast to these linear-progression models Rubin developed a framework of the 
recovery processes based on attributes needed for an “effective and efficient” recovery109 
which was revised in 2009 (Figure 2-6).110 This model is holistic and attempts to integrate 
recovery with risk reduction (through mitigation) and some of the necessary attributes and 
demands in a disaster recovery. 
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Figure 2-6 Elements of the recovery process  
Source: Rubin, C. B. (2009). Long Term Recovery from Disasters: The Neglected Component of Emergency Management. 
Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, 6(1), 1-17. 
 
The National Research Council’s Committee on Disaster Research 2006 review of hazards 
and disaster research concluded that the linear model had given way to models which 
recognize and accommodate the uneven nature of the recovery process and instead focus 
on the interaction among issues and concepts.111 Smith and Wenger define disaster 
recovery along these lines as “the differential process of restoring, rebuilding, and reshaping 
the physical, social, economic, and natural environments through pre-event planning and 
post-event actions”.112 The word “differential” accounts for the various groups and aspects 
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of society having different ways and rates of recovery.  That is not to say that time does not 
factor into recovery models at all. Rubin and others such as Smith and Wenger adopted a 
simple division of short and long-term recovery based on an encompassing or “holistic” view 
of the community and not limited to any particular time-scale. This conceptualization 
favours the current inclusive and expansive paradigm of the fourth generation of disaster 
scholarship, and is not limited by descriptive labels for phases such as “reconstruction” or 
“rebuilding” which are more associated with the physical than the social, economic, or 
natural environments. This sort of holistic framework for recovery developed in New 
Zealand and was in place at the time of the Canterbury earthquakes – the Minister of Civil 
Defence and Emergency Management defines recovery as:113 
Recovery extends beyond just restoring physical assets or providing welfare services. Successful 
recovery recognises that both communities and individuals have a wide and variable range of 
recovery needs and that recovery is only successful where all are addressed in a coordinated way. 
Recovery is a process that will certainly last weeks and months but may extend for years and possibly 
decades… A holistic and integrated framework is needed to consider the multi-faceted aspects of 
recovery which, when combined, support the foundations of community sustainability. 
 
                                                     






Figure 2-7 New Zealand's Recovery Framework.  Source: MCDEM. (2005). Focus on Recovery: A Holistic Framework for 
Recovery in New Zealand. Wellington: Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management. 
This framework is based on sustainability principles and is unique for putting community at 
the centre (Figure 2-7) – whether or not this was a good idea was questioned when it was 
being developed, as “community” is difficult to define, changes over time, and varies from 
place to place.114 Putting “community” at the centre also does not indicate who or what 
organisation will be the final decision maker – in Chapter 5, the issue of which level of 
government is responsible for the community is a major unresolved question. Nevertheless, 
this framework has been praised by international scholars as leading edge and a model for 
other countries115  as well as for its connection with sustainability and emphasis on the 
subsidiarity principle.116 A prototype of this framework was introduced in 1987117 which put 
New Zealand at the forefront of disaster recovery – at least on a conceptual level. This 
framework was not tested on a major scale until the 2010 and 2011 Canterbury earthquakes, 
a subject which is examined in Chapter 5. One of the main problems with scholarship on 
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disaster recovery is that it tends to emphasize principles, such as being holistic and 
comprehensive, at the expense of practice and implementation. The practical side of 
recovery is largely absent from scholarship, instead the emphasis is on adaptation.118 And 
this is reflected in the recovery framework in New Zealand. 
Between the inception of the recovery framework under the Civil Defence Emergency 
Management Act 2002 and the Canterbury earthquakes in 2010/11, scholars in New 
Zealand investigated the practicability of reconstruction from a major disaster given the 
provisions within laws governing matter such as land use, buildings, contracts, and, to a 
lesser extent, emergency management. 119  In essence, they re-examined issues with 
planning and law identified at the Wellington Earthquakes Lifelines forum in the 1990s.120 
Considerable barriers were identified by both groups which would make the laws suitable 
only for relatively small-scale emergencies as they were designed for business as usual 
rather than rebuilding after a major disaster. Although he primarily looked at reconstruction 
in his dissertation, James Rotimi also described the limitations for a large-scale recovery due 
to a lack of clarity on recovery roles within CDEM and the absence of powers for 
coordination.121 As insightful as this is, Rotimi failed to recognize that this was by design – 
the intent was for recovery to be carried out with voluntary cooperation and collaboration 
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absent any coercive elements.122 Rotimi’s work is important for highlighting limitations 
affecting reconstruction and to a lesser extent, recovery in general, posed by various statues 
– but his work is essentially a snapshot in time and is limited by not examining why those 
limitations exist. Civil defence emergency management in New Zealand has a long history 
but only a limited number of critical events – as explained in Chapter 1 this necessitates 
taking a long-view and seeing CDEM as a process rather than only looking at its current state. 
Rotimi’s work is also limited in its handling of recovery roles and the capacities to fulfil those 
roles by focusing on “national capacity” rather than capacity in local authorities and 
individual CDEM roles – this is a limitation given the philosophy of local responsibility within 
CDEM. The remainder of this dissertation examines the trends and traditions of civil defence 
emergency management in New Zealand to help further explain the limitations of the CDEM 
framework at the time of the Canterbury earthquakes – and makes recommendations for 
overcoming them. Additional scholarship, in particular work done specifically in the New 
Zealand context, is integrated into the analysis of primary data in subsequent chapters. 
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has explored some of the major contributions to disaster scholarship from the 
earliest academic works to the present and demonstrated the trends which have led to gaps 
in scholarship and practice. Disaster scholarship is a relatively niche academic area with 
research and innovation having gone through several phases or generations, each with a 
particular focus somewhere within the disaster cycle – except for recovery. In this chapter it 
was demonstrated that historically disasters were addressed first in terms of post-disaster 
relief and response; over time pre-disaster preparedness planning and risk reduction began 
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to receive greater emphasis with the aim of reducing the chance of a disaster occurring and 
the impact on the community when they did occur. The “pull” away from the post-disaster 
period toward pre-disaster planning and risk reduction has left recovery neglected – in both 
scholarship and practice, even in New Zealand despite the accolades it has received for its 
recovery framework. The consequences of this are explored in the following chapters where 
it is demonstrated that the same trends that occurred in disaster scholarship and practice 
elsewhere in the world also occurred in New Zealand. The contribution of this dissertation 
to this “gap in the literature” is a study of the emergency management system in New 
Zealand and the limitations within that system which were revealed by crisis – in particular 
the Canterbury earthquakes. The main limitation is the emphasis on principles over practice 
and too little attention paid to implementation. 
Disasters are revelatory events – understanding disasters can help society understand the 
vulnerabilities and weaknesses in their systems which put them at risk when exposed to 
hazards. How a society prepares for and responds to hazards and disasters may reveal what 
we value and how those values can make people vulnerable. For example, putting value on 
speed and cost savings over safety regulations when constructing a new building, or valuing 
certain historic features of a city for their aesthetic appeal despite their known vulnerability 
to certain hazards. Or valuing principles such as cooperation and voluntary compliance over 
the practical necessities of implementation. Vulnerability can also be created from values 
within a political ideology which can create inequity in the social environment but also 
uncertainty in the political environment, especially in crisis – issues take up in later chapters. 
A holistic approach which takes into account both the physical and social elements of 




incorporated into policy, if not in practice. New Zealand has been identified as a world 
leader for its approach to emergency management, especially for the recovery framework – 
again in terms of the legislation and policies if not in practice. Therefore it is important to 
understand why the CDEM recovery framework failed in Canterbury. As it turned out, the 
failure was not in the best practice principles, but in not making sure those principles were 
realistically able to be put into practice. How New Zealand came to that point and what that 





Chapter 3 Political and legal origins of civil defence 
3.1  Introduction 
This chapter introduces the fundamental philosophy of local responsibility and underlying 
principles of civil defence which originated in the 1800s and are still an important 
component of emergency management in New Zealand today. In so doing, it provides the 
basis for the argument that civil defence regularly suffered from a lack of leadership and 
direction throughout all of its iterations, with the government reluctant to take a leading 
role unless compelled to by crisis, criticism, or a new political context. At the same time, 
they regularly failed to provide support for other stakeholders to fulfil their mandated civil 
defence responsibilities which created a persistent gap between principle and practice. This 
gap became a civil defence theme right through to the Canterbury earthquakes. The result 
was that civil defence was reliant on an improbable alignment of local capabilities and the 
capabilities required to effectively manage a disaster. Although the philosophy and 
principles have remained a part of civil defence for more than 60 years it is demonstrated 
that how they are interpreted has changed little which has in turn defined the limits of civil 
defence at the local and national levels. What has remained throughout the history of civil 
defence right through to the Canterbury earthquakes are the unfunded and unsupported 
mandate, the government’s general reluctance towards civil defence, and the widely 
varying interpretation of where responsibility for civil defence ultimately rests. 
Background and overview 
In this chapter the philosophy, principles, and rationale of early civil defence are explored in 




advent of WWII. From the early part of this period the government had a decidedly hands-
off policy towards disasters; by the early 1900s and into the 1930s the government 
gradually became more involved in public safety and security.  
The onset of WWII stimulated the first comprehensive national policy for emergency 
response and brought about the second era of civil defence. The WWII-era Emergency 
Precautions Scheme (EPS)1 was based on the UK model of civil defence and was introduced 
by the wartime Labour government but ignored by the post-war National government who 
introduced its own abortive legislation after the war. The EPS model would serve as a 
template and inspiration for the future permanent civil defence scheme. However, as it was 
developed in a country facing very different risks from New Zealand many adaptations were 
needed to suit the local context – a process which in some ways put New Zealand ahead of 
other countries in terms of natural hazards preparedness but also delayed full 
implementation due to confusion about its fundamental purpose. This second period ended 
with the creation of the Ministry of Civil Defence in 1958 and the subsequent Civil Defence 
Act 1962.  
The short but intense third period was marked by rather confusing discourse within 
government over the purpose and implementation of the Act and whether the focus should 
be on nuclear or natural hazards. Just as this debate ended, with natural hazards taking 
priority, civil defence faced a new crisis – a lack of confidence among the public and some 
sectors of the government.  
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The fourth phase began after the Inangahua earthquake of 1968 and ended with the 
creation of the Civil Defence Act 1983 and was distinguished by recognition of the 
importance of community participation in civil defence. Under the Civil Defence Act 1962 
the principles of civil defence were established – self-help, mutual assistance, and national 
guidance.2 But one of the main problems identified in this and subsequent chapters is that 
civil defence tends to put principles before practice with the expectation that people will 
rise to the occasion in time of crisis using whatever resources and capacities which were 
available at the time.  
The term “civil defence” outside of New Zealand is largely antiquated, having been 
supplanted by emergency or disaster management. Its meaning in this chapter varies 
according to historical context, namely, wartime preparedness measures around WWII, 
nuclear war preparedness during the early Cold War years, and readiness, response, and to 
a lesser extent recovery from the 1960s onward. As with the rest of the dissertation this is 
not an accounting of every disaster event or emergency declaration, rather it considers 
particular situations for what they contribute to understanding civil defence and disaster 
governance in New Zealand – what Birkland calls “focusing events”.3 
3.2 Pre-WWII: The government’s increasing role in emergency management 
The principle of self-help, which was to become a foundation of formal civil defence in the 
mid-1900s onward, originated during this period not so much because of the geographic 
distance between the potentially affected areas and help (as was the stated reason later on) 
but due to the nature of the relationship between government and citizens. Generally, 
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there were no expectations on the part of the government to provide support or from the 
locals to be given support. With time, and experience, it was gradually accepted that 
disasters would need a coordinated response with support from central government. Until 
the 1930s the government’s response to disasters was ad hoc – there was no formal system 
of response and no guarantee of recovery assistance, and very little by way of follow-up to 
lessons learned about creating a safer living environment. Over time, expectations changed 
and governments (local and central) would contribute to major disaster recovery efforts; in 
the very early years however, it was simply a matter of individuals rebuilding and carrying 
on. 
On 16 October, 1848 a magnitude 7.4 earthquake occurred in the sparsely populated 
Awatere valley in the Marlborough District on the north end of the South Island.4 The initial 
quake was felt most severely locally but caused significant damage in Nelson and Wellington 
with much of the damage being caused by aftershocks which caused further damage and 
destruction to structures that had been loosened by the first shakes.5 A local newspaper 
reported that “clay and brick dwellings” sustained damaged whereas the earthquake left 
wooden houses undamaged, noting that the latter were “better adapted than any other for 
this colony”. 6  Most of the 4800 residential buildings in Wellington were built of 
unreinforced masonry while others were built of timber based on European styles at the 
time - after the event the majority of houses were rebuilt with timber.7 The government’s 
response was both superficial and ineffectual. Lieutenant-Governor Eyre ordered all ships 
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attempting to leave Wellington harbour to be detained to avoid feelings among the settlers 
of a mass exodus and to prevent debtors from escaping without paying their debts,8 and he 
ordered a “day of public fast, prayer, and humiliation” two days after the quake.9 The 
newspapers reported on the Lieutenant-Governor’s visit to a local prison and to damaged 
houses where he “endeavoured to console” the inmates and residents.10 There is little 
indication within contemporary accounts of relief or financial assistance offered by the 
government, nor any negative opinions voiced about the government’s response. While this 
could be a reflection of a reserved media culture at the time Brown-Belton concluded that 
not only did the government not see their role as involving more than moral support 
(similar to media accounts at the time) but it is likely they could not have due to financial 
difficulties.11 The government’s lack of involvement may be explained by the view at the 
time that such events were extremely rare and unlikely to happen again. After interviewing 
Maori elders who stated they could not recall such a large earthquake in their lifetime and 
determining that steam or gas had been allowed to vent from the earth thereby relieving 
pressure, the local newspaper concluded that “we are surely justified in considering the 
present as an extraordinary occurrence, an occurrence which in all probability may not 
occur again”.12 
The next major event occurred just seven years later in 1855, although originating from a 
different fault. The Wairarapa earthquake caused significant damage to commercial and 
government buildings in Wellington which had been rebuilt in brick out of concern for the 
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risk of fire13 - and possibly under the assumption that the earth in the region was finished 
quaking for the foreseeable future. Once again, the government’s response was minimal 
with their concern focused more on the government’s buildings than the people they were 
governing.14 A positive outcome of the first earthquake was a trend towards constructing 
buildings using timber – the Government Building was completed in 1877 with its wood 
exterior built to resemble a classic European stone building, 15  thereby appealing to 
aesthetic sensibilities while accounting for the local geomorphology. This trend was 
primarily local and rather short-lived in that houses in Wellington and to a lesser extent 
Wairarapa tended to use timber in the first few years after the quakes but construction of 
the much more vulnerable masonry buildings continued as the perceived risk of fire 
overcame the perceived risk from earthquakes and unreinforced masonry came back into 
popular use16 and for decades after stone and brick remained the preferred building 
material.17 
The eruption at Tarawera was a turning point in both the government’s response and 
society’s perception, as it was the first documented case of the government providing 
compensation and relief. The Auckland Star described distribution of blankets to displaced 
Maori and commented that if local bodies did not allot land to those Maori whose land had 
been destroyed by the eruption then the government would “doubtless be left to provide 
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for them”.18 Indeed, the government did eventually provide £400 to “Native sufferers” in 
the form of assistance and supplies as well as £2000 for “relief and assistance” to other 
sufferers. 19  If the Tarawera eruption was indeed a turning point then the Cheviot 
earthquake in 1901 was a major milestone in which the government took over the cost from 
the Council of repairing local roads and bridges20 and generously offered to manage 
donations from Christchurch and Lyttelton21 as well as contribute £1500 to match a similar 
amount of publically donated money.22  
Along with increasing cases of government assistance, this period also provides early 
examples of risk reduction and readiness – most of which were ignored at considerable cost 
later on. After the Murchison earthquake in 1929, a number of studies were commissioned, 
including one by Ferrar and Grange which explained the geological causes of the 
earthquakes and suggested several reasons for the uneven distribution of the earthquake’s 
impact on nearby communities.23 These reasons were geologic, but they conclude their 
report with simple suggestions for limiting the impact on communities regardless of their 
geologic profile.24  Ferrar and Grange recommended low-cost methods of reinforcing 
chimneys and other “minor precautions” to reduce damage in a moderate earthquake, and 
suggested having water available for domestic consumption and as a fire prevention 
measure after a disaster. They note that these preparedness schemes and mitigation 
measures were beyond the scope of their research but it is suggested this line of thinking 
warranted further inquiry. One year after the Murchison earthquake the Evening Post cited 
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this report noting that lessons from previous quakes had not been heeded and it would be 
against common sense to wait for a larger loss of life before implementing them, concluding, 
“prevention is always better than the cure”. 25 These suggestions do not appear to have 
been acted on, at least not right away, as only two years later fire would cause significant 
destruction following the Hawke’s Bay earthquake, over 10,000 chimneys were demolished 
in Wellington after the 1942 Wairarapa earthquake,26 and 60% of the 600 claims made in 
Christchurch following the 1968 Inangahua earthquake were for chimney damage.27 The 
majority of damage claims following the 2010/2011 Canterbury earthquakes (excluding land 
damage) included damage to chimneys.28 
This period ends with the government starting to take a greater role in creating a safer living 
environment with the creation of a document making recommendations for safe residential 
buildings  which was widely adopted but still did not entirely incorporate lessons learned 
from earlier earthquake experiences.29 Following the Hawke’s Bay earthquakes in 1931 a 
process was initiated to create the first building standard, NZS 95.30 However, these 
standards were not mandatory and they fell far short of a 1929 review of knowledge and 
practice based on lessons learned from previous earthquakes. It would not be until 1978 
that the 1929 recommendations would be fully incorporated into regulations and made 
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mandatory.31 The reliance on voluntary cooperation would persist in various parts of civil 
defence throughout its history right through to the Canterbury earthquakes. 
Section Summary 
This section covered a period of history that introduced two regular elements of emergency 
management in New Zealand – self-reliance and voluntary compliance on matters of public 
safety. The concept of self-reliance would grow into the philosophy of local responsibility 
and the principle of self-help which remain to this day the primary features of civil defence 
in New Zealand. This period exhibited a steady change in policy from pure self-reliance to 
temporary self-reliance until outside help could arrive, but it also showed how despite 
gradually taking on more responsibility for the impacts of disasters the government’s 
response was irregular. However, the trend throughout the 20th century was for 
government to take on a greater role in social matters – including emergencies. The result 
would be considerable tension between central government and local stakeholders in 
matters of responsibility for public safety and community welfare – an issue that manifested 
after the Canterbury earthquakes. This period also demonstrated what would become a 
regular occurrence – the failure to incorporate “lessons learned” from disaster events into 
public policy and law in a display of the regularly occurring short-term memory in society 
and government of the impact disasters have. It would be 83 years from the first major 
earthquake in the New Zealand colony until the first earthquake-related legislation after the 
Hawke’s Bay earthquake, and it would be another 25 years until a systematic approach to 
responding to disaster risk would be instituted. 
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3.4 Origins of civil defence: Earthquakes, riots, and war 
During the 1930s, three types of events would compel the government to act on the 
hazards facing the country – earthquakes, riots, and war. This section examines the early 
stages in the development and institutionalization of civil defence in New Zealand. Until the 
1930s there was no specific legislation related to disasters, they were seen as issues to be 
dealt with locally with occasional support from the Department of Internal Affairs.32 This 
section will introduce four foundational statutes and documents and reflect on how they 
were developed and how they contributed to civil defence. 
During the pre-WWII period the government took a greater role in social welfare and took 
on a more proactive role in public safety and natural hazard. However, they remained 
rather hands-off with responsibility falling to the local level – a trend which would continue 
throughout the history civil defence. It was not until the advent of WWII and the 
establishment of a national emergency preparedness scheme in 1939, along with the 
Earthquake and War Damage Fund in 1944, that the government could be said to have 
taken seriously the need for coordinated disaster response and relief. The remainder of this 
chapter explores the early development of civil defence in law from just before WWII until 
the second civil defence Act in 1983. This occurred in a time during which the government 
had considerable, albeit diminishing, executive power33 amidst major social changes – in 
particular to the economy and the welfare state and changes to the governance structure of 
New Zealand (parliamentary and local). The first iterations of emergency response laws put 
considerable responsibility at the local level without sufficient resources or statutory 
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powers, all the while giving considerable power to the central government. This hold on 
executive power is explained partially by the social context of the time – the depression 
related strikes of the early 1930s and later civil unrest and Cold War insecurities. However, 
these can also be seen as examples of the government being wholly distracted by current 
events and not seeing (or caring about) the big picture in terms of ever present risk from 
natural hazards. What is particularly striking is how the legislation itself clearly reflects these 
two concerns – civil strife and natural hazards – but in terms of implementation and even 
interpretation at the outset the former initially won out over the latter. 
Hawke’s Bay Earthquake Act 1931 
The Hawke’s Bay Earthquake Act 1931 was passed nearly three months after a magnitude 
7.8 earthquake caused damage and casualties in Napier, Hastings and other smaller 
settlements nearby. 34  While many buildings were damaged, in particular stone and 
unreinforced masonry, the greatest damage was caused by fire. Local residents self-
organised rescue activities and citizens’ committees were established for relief and recovery 
but both groups struggled due to limited authority and capacity.35 The government offered 
assistance but responsibility was largely placed on local authorities and the affected 
communities.36 The resulting conflicts over authority and responsibilities lead to the passing 
of the Act; awareness of these challenges would be the primary lasting outcome of the 
disaster. 
At the time, there were no national plans for emergency response, no legislation or 
provisions for emergency measures, and little by way of local preparedness. Powers given to 
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the government under this Act through the Governor-General are very broad, to “make 
such regulations as he deems necessary, having regard to the exigencies of the Hawke's Bay 
earthquake and the conditions arising therefrom, for the purpose of validating, authorizing, 
or prohibiting any act (whether of commission or omission), thing, or proceeding.”37 A list of 
twenty-four examples are given ranging from (but not limited to) fundraising through taxes 
to restricting legal proceedings against officials acting in “good faith” for the emergency and 
the restoration of public infrastructure. Any regulations made under the Act would override 
any other Act, Order in Council, or regulations, Proclamations, rules or bylaws.38 The Act 
also delayed local elections for two years from the time of the earthquake and allowed the 
Governor-General to appoint a Mayor or council member during that time as needed. One 
of the major challenges presented by the subsequent fires was the loss of public records 
and other important documents – in particular land titles.39 The Hawke’s Bay Adjustment 
Court was established under the Act in order to hear and determine claims and to grant 
relief to people suffering “undue hardship” because of the earthquake on obligations 
“wholly or partly pecuniary in its nature” related to their person or property. The President 
of the Court is the Chief Justice or a past or present superior judge appointed by the Chief 
Justice, along with two members – any nomination or appointment cannot be challenged 
“on any grounds whatsoever”.40 The Court was never formally disestablished and remains 
the responsibility of the current Chief Justice. Similarly, the 1931 Act has no expiration date 
and is still technically in force.  
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The earthquake response and the Act itself seem to have had a very limited impression on 
the government – no permanent scheme or precautions were taken to prepare the country 
for the next big disaster. However, two main outcomes can be discerned. In terms of 
disaster governance the main lesson learned that would be carried on into future legislation 
came from the disorder caused by the lack of a coordinating mechanisms and unclear 
authority. The need to designate an authority to coordinate relief efforts until the 
government can take over (if need be) was included in the Public Safety Conservation Act 
1932. More generally the event itself would serve as a reminder of earthquake risk. While 
subsequent government documents referred to the Hawke’s Bay earthquake it would 
remain as a token lesson for at least the next 30 years as risks from the social rather than 
natural environment would continue to be major drivers of legislation and policy. 
Public Safety Conservation Act 1932 
The Public Safety Conservation Act 1932 was enacted shortly after the Hawke’s Bay 
earthquake (1931) and Auckland depression riots of 1932 and gave similar powers to the 
government as the Hawke’s Bay Earthquake Act. In the course of the Parliamentary Debate 
on the Bill the discussion indicated the intention was primarily to control civil 
disturbances.41 After the Bill was passed the objective was clarified by the Minister of 
Internal Affairs, stating the Act was to “prevent civil disorders and to ensure the 
preservation of law and order”.42 Partly in response to the confusion regarding authority 
and coordination after the Hawke’s Bay earthquake the aim of controlling civil disturbances 
was achieved in the Act by clarifying authority in the immediate aftermath of an emergency 
and giving special statutory powers. It did not include any other pre-event planning other 
                                                     
41 19 April 1932 232 NZPD 175. 




than allowing action to be taken if authorities perceived a situation may arise causing a 
breakdown of civil order. This Act enabled the government to declare a state of emergency 
anywhere in the country in response to a situation which negatively affects “the supply and 
distribution of food, water, fuel, or light or with the means of locomotion, to deprive the 
community or any substantial portion of the community of the essentials of life” whether 
caused by a person or people or if the “circumstances” indicate that public safety or order 
are or may be threatened. The scope of emergencies defined in the Act is only clarified in 
reference to situations in which the local police would be given responsibility for an 
emergency situation before the central government can be involved. This list included both 
natural hazards such as earthquakes and floods as well as civil strife and fire – whatever the 
source. While it is notable that this is the first mention in legislation of natural hazards it is 
odd that these particular examples would be given as the conditions for declaring an 
emergency were set out in the first page of the Act but not the trigger, or cause. It may be 
an indication that the main lesson learned from the Hawke’s Bay earthquake was the need 
for a locally designated authority in an emergency, at least until the government arrives. 
Regardless, the cause of the emergency was not particularly important as this Act was 
aimed at giving special powers to government officials and police for the purpose of “the 
preservation of life, the protection of property, and the maintenance of order”43 whatever 
the root cause. These rather broad powers are articulated in Section 3 (1):44 
Where a Proclamation of Emergency has been made, and so long as the Proclamation is in force, it 
shall be lawful for the Governor-General, by Order in Council, to make all such regulations as he 
thinks necessary for the prohibition of any acts which in his opinion would be injurious to the public 
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safety, and also to make all such other regulations as in his opinion are required for the conservation 
of public safety and order and for securing the essentials of life to the community.” 
Any regulations made under this Act would be applicable anywhere in New Zealand, not just 
in the declared area or areas. The Act was only used twice and was heavily criticised, in 
particular by legal scholar and former Prime Minister Geoffrey Palmer who called it a 
“draconian piece of legislation” that was a “blot on New Zealand’s record”.45 The Public 
Safety Conservation Act was an enduring legislation, lasting until 198746 and was amended 
only once in 1960 in order to clarify when and how a proclamation of emergency should be 
communicated to Parliament.47 The Act was reflective of the significant power wielded by 
the executive when it was made and used, in particular in 1951,48 in contrast to when the 
Act was repealed in 1987 during a time of major political change and decentralisation. 
Emergency Precautions Scheme 1939 
The Emergency Precautions Scheme, instituted by the Department of Internal Affairs in 
1939, was a means to help prepare local authorities and communities for emergency 
situations arising from natural disasters or from enemy action.49 There were a number of 
factors which influenced the creation of this scheme. The introduction to the draft EPS 
describes the Murchison and Hawke’s Bay earthquakes as events which could occur in any 
municipality in New Zealand, therefore it was seen as the government’s duty to develop a 
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system for cooperation between local authorities and various government services.50 The 
EPS was based in large part on the British Air Raid Precaution scheme and introduced 
fundamental principles of civil defence which would persist to the present, in particular 
local responsibility for community safety, government support and guidance, volunteerism, 
and regional commissioners. At the time it was created New Zealand was facing challenges 
on two fronts – the main concern was the threat of a Japanese attack and New Zealand’s 
own military contribution; domestically, civil unrest resulting from labour disputes between 
unions, employers, and the government – an issue which would be largely put aside during 
the war years as work stoppages were made illegal.51  
The stated objective of the EPS was to have a “Dominion-wide organization for the control 
in any locality of all essential services when they have been suspended by a natural disaster, 
or by enemy action”.52 The EPS prioritized relief activities such as provision of food and 
shelter as well as management of public, health, and financial services. The second priority 
was the restoration of the “normal activities” of the community without explaining in detail 
what these may be. In order to avoid improvisation at the local level during an emergency 
the EPS contains rather comprehensive and prescriptive plans, however it states that even 
more detailed plans must be completed at the local level.53 This mention of improvisation in 
the introduction of the EPS is in reference to the committees set up in Napier after the 
Hawke’s Bay earthquake. Public notices were issued explaining the objectives of the EPS as 
developing communities which are able to mobilise “manpower and resources” in time of 
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emergency. 54  Through these public notices the public were encouraged to actively 
participate through training in first aid, firefighting, and welfare centres.  
The EPS was essentially an agreement for cooperation between the government and 
ministries and local authorities in times of emergency and it put responsibility on local 
authorities for preparing an “organisation for action” in an emergency.55 This organisation 
would be guided by the EPS guidebook on subjects such as law and order, medical, 
transport, and supply, as well as a case study of the organisations formed in Hastings after 
the Hawke’s Bay earthquake of 1931. The resulting local organisations would differ 
significantly based on local resources and population. Despite the preoccupation with war, 
executive authority was placed in each local organisation and not the military. However, the 
three appointed Regional Commissioners were all former military men who liaised between 
the military and EPS organisations.  The Regional Commissioner represented the north and 
south parts of the North Island and South Island; the regions were subdivided into 16 
districts administered by a Controller. Although at first composed largely of volunteers in 
1942 the government made membership in EPS organisations compulsory in response to 
advances made by the Japanese through Southeast Asia and the Pacific. 56 By 1945, the EPS 
was disbanded with the only callout occurring in 1942 with the earthquakes in Wellington 
and Masterton.57 
Two aspects from the EPS which were adopted directly from the Air Raid Precautions 
organisation in the UK endured and influenced later CDEM arrangements conceptually and 
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structurally. Conceptually, New Zealand adopted the idea of responsibility for emergency 
management primarily belonging to local government and community volunteers with 
guidance and a coordinated response from the government. The EPS relied on volunteers as 
it would be costly to maintain a full-time countrywide emergency response force, and this 
contributed to the concept of local responsibility as communities would be able first look for 
help from within rather than the government. Structurally, the EPS system of multiple layers 
at the local, regional, and central levels was adopted by later civil defence schemes as was 
the condition for the government only assisting as needed. The regional system introduced 
a layer of governance between the local and central government which meant the country 
was divided into three areas rather than a nation of hundreds of individual communities. 
Therefore, communities could not only look within for volunteers but horizontally within 
their region for support. These concepts and structures became a part of civil defence law 
and policy under the Civil Defence Act 1962 and remain a part of the CDEM system to this 
day.58 
Local Authorities Emergency Powers Act 1953 
“An Act to confer on local authorities certain powers in emergencies arising from earthquake, 
fire, or flood, or in time of war from enemy action or enemy sympathizers.”59 
The Local Authorities Emergency Powers Act 1953 (LAEP Act) was created during a time of 
growing concerns about communism and the Cold War along with union related civil unrest. 
Similar to the building regulations being optional, the Act empowered, but did not require, 
local governments to make arrangements for basic emergency management. Compared to 
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the Public Safety Conservation Act 1938 the LAEP Act had a much broader focus and gives 
greater emphasis to natural phenomena whereas civil disturbances are limited to wartime 
action:60  
"Emergency" means an emergency arising from earthquake, fire, flood, or other natural phenomenon, 
or from action in time of war by enemy powers or enemy sympathizers, which causes or is likely to 
cause in New Zealand large scale loss of or injury or damage to life, health, or property. 
For this reason, and because the Public Safety Conservation Act already existed, it is 
improbable that civil unrest was the primary driver of this legislation, rather natural hazards 
and concern about the Cold War turning hot. Although short-lived it is another foundational 
document as it contributed a very basic framework of activities to undertake in an 
emergency and suggested arrangements for carrying them out. However its weaknesses 
greatly limited its practicality. 
Principles from the EPS were adopted, although not in complete form. It reiterated the 
concept of local responsibility for emergency response, with the Minister of Internal Affairs 
stating “earthquake disasters do not affect the whole Dominion, so that a national 
organisation is not what is required at that time but more a local organisation that will act 
quickly in case of a disaster in its immediate locality”.61 Despite this statement the Act gave 
significant powers to the Minister to give orders to local authorities in an emergency or if 
he62 considers there to be an imminent threat of an emergency.63 The Act was rather weak 
in a number of areas. Despite providing a helpful list of emergency response and welfare 
services the Act did not offer much by way of actually carrying out the activities, for 
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example there were no requisitioning provisions and no provision for compensation for 
injuries or death resulting from work carried out during an emergency. There was nothing 
compelling local authorities to undertake the actions prescribed in the Act unless the 
Minister specifically issued written instructions during or prior to an emergency – civil 
defence response was effectively optional. Not complying with the Minister’s written 
directive during an emergency could result in a summary conviction of three months’ 
imprisonment or a fine; such similar conditions did not apply to directives from local 
authorities. The only financial arrangements were loans through the Local Authorities Loan 
Board. These weaknesses undermined the basic intentions of the Act – that of local level 
responsibility for emergencies – and the result was a Minister-focused system as that is 
where the power and finances remained. Other than giving extraordinary power to the 
government in time of emergency the LAEP Act failed to specify what exactly the 
government’s planning and operational role would be and neglected to even bestow such 
powers on the government.64 It also failed to specify how the local plans were supposed to 
align with the national plan were either the local or central government to even make plans. 
Although the Minister of Internal Affairs believed the LAEP Bill and proposed system were 
“comparable to the EPS”65 the Bill differed significantly in that the EPS was a nationwide 
organisation with significant guidance from and cooperation within the government. 
According to the Minister, the LAEP was aimed at natural disasters which he stated, “do not 
affect the whole Dominion”, therefore a nationwide organisation was not needed. At first 
glance this may seem like splitting hairs but under this Act responsibility was put on local 
government but authority (but no clear planning or functional role) given to the Minister 
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and there were no agreements for cooperation or coordination between ministries and 
local authorities. The Act merely “enabled” local bodies to do what conceivably they would 
have done without the legislation, i.e. respond to an emergency, but without giving them 
additional powers or funding to carry out the recommended tasks. The Minister’s 
statements also stand in contrast to previous actions by the government in their response 
to “local” disasters which would clearly indicate that they are more than a local problem. 
This situation repeated itself 57 years later with recovery after the Canterbury earthquakes. 
A national plan called Government Action in a Major Emergency, or G.A.M.E., was approved 
by Cabinet in 1954 which provided for a committee of “Ministers, senior officials, and 
services personnel”,66 a move that seemed to be aimed to overcoming the lack of national 
planning within the Act. However it was highly-centralized with many cumbersome 
procedures which put it at odds with the government’s insistence that emergencies were 
local issues.67 
The LAEP Act remained a rather obscure and ineffectual document during its time, 
exceeded perhaps only by G.A.M.E. in this regard, as it was rarely mentioned in subsequent 
discussions on civil defence and emergency management and not at all in Parliament 
between 1953 and 1958 when it was temporarily used as the statutory basis for a national 
civil defence scheme. Mainly this Act served to highlight the contradiction within the 
government of responsibility being pushed to the local level while the government retained 
power and authority and the lack of appreciation at the time of the impact natural hazards 
could have on the country. It also continued the tradition of public safety being largely an 
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optional component of local governance. The Act was repealed and replaced by the Civil 
Defence Act 1962.68 
Section summary 
By this time the rationale – the risk from natural hazards and civil unrest -  and a basic 
philosophy of civil defence (local responsibility and self-reliance) had been established in 
law and practice, although it was still an emergent phenomenon. Four laws had been 
created in response to events which threatened or actually caused harm to part or all of 
New Zealand society. All mention natural hazards to some extent but none established an 
effective and permanent system to address the risk posed by natural hazards or to mitigate 
their impact. Certainly the government was aware of the persistent risk of natural hazards 
to the country yet they only acted in response to disasters, war, and civil strife. The wars, 
economic depression, and riots ended leading to relative peace, an improved global 
economy, and full employment in New Zealand. However as nothing changed with respect 
to the geomorphology of the country it is difficult to understand why no further action was 
taken even after a civil defence programme was created during WWII that specifically 
mentioned natural hazards. Instead, the EPS was dissolved at the end of the war. It would 
take the threat, albeit incredibly minimal, of total destruction of the country from a nuclear 
attack before a permanent civil defence and emergency management system would be 
implemented. That is not to say, however, that no lessons were learned from past events 
and made into law. The Hawke’s Bay earthquake for example highlighted the need for 
leadership and special powers of authority in an emergency and, for all the good it did, this 
                                                     




was adopted into the Public Safety Conservation Act and eventually into future civil defence 
plans. 
3.5 Nuclear versus Nature: The Civil Defence Act 1962 
The beginning of a permanent, nation-wide, centrally-organised civil defence scheme began 
in the late 1950s in response to the perceived threat of nuclear attack, if not war, from the 
Communist Bloc. From the earliest stages there were divergent interpretations of the law 
and policy and of risk and responsibility which created confusion about the purpose of civil 
defence and doubts about its necessity. By associating civil defence with the remote risk of 
nuclear war instead of the more tangible risk of natural hazards, and by continuing to push 
responsibility – moral and financial – onto local authorities, the government hampered the 
introduction of an effective emergency management system. Without any concrete plans 
and limited financial support and with moral duty being the only compulsion for local 
authorities to act civil defence was off to a shaky start under the Local Authorities 
Emergency Powers Act 1953. Implementation in the years following the passing of the Civil 
Defence Act 1962 was hampered by unclear policy priorities and a lack of guidance from the 
central government as well as unclear and insufficient financial support for local authorities. 
The Ministry of Civil Defence underestimated the importance of information management 
and public relations via the media and poorly communicating the rationale for civil defence 
to the public. After the Inangahua earthquake in 1968 public perception changed for the 
better – but lingering image problems and a lack of certainty about what constituted a 
disaster and civil defence’s role therein slowed the development of civil defence and 




political will and poor public engagement would become a sort of civil defence tradition and 
are explored in different civil defence contexts in this chapter, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. 
First step – Establish a Ministry 
In 1957 the Ministry of Defence published a review of defence policy outlining their position 
on the threat posed by the Communist Bloc and nuclear war.69 In this paper the Ministry 
acknowledged the changing global context presented by nuclear weapons and Communist 
aggression as the most likely threat to New Zealand’s interests. As New Zealand had limited 
resources it would be unable to offer much of a defence against the Communist Bloc as it 
continued its expansion through South-East Asia. Nor could the country afford nuclear 
weapons as a deterrent, were such weapons even available. The paper outlined the 
strategic alliances and agreements made with the other “free and democratic” countries 
and explained New Zealand’s duty to have a military of sufficient size and readiness to meet 
their international obligations. The focus of the paper is almost entirely on overseas military 
action, no mention is made of any specific defensive options other than deterrence through 
strategic alliances.  
In 1958 the Ministry of Defence issued a second policy report which reiterated the changing 
shape of global war – not just nuclear war in general but also the threat of intercontinental 
ballistic missiles - and recommended the establishment of a ministry of civil defence as part 
of a new strategy of “flexibility for effective preparedness”.70 Essentially the limitations 
were the same as the year before – New Zealand did not have the resources for an effective 
military which meant a two-pronged approach based on strategic alliances and a civil 
                                                     
69 Ministry of Defence Review of Defence Policy (1957). 




defence system should the alliance fail to protect the country. The risk of an actual global 
nuclear war or direct attack on New Zealand was considered minimal yet as the impact of 
either such occurrence would be very high the government felt it necessary to take 
adequate measures to protect and prepare the civilian population. However, the first 
fourteen and a half pages of this fifteen page document are dedicated to military strategy, 
the final paragraph of the last page is dedicated to civil defence and states that “(t)he 
safeguarding and educating of the civil population against the effects of nuclear war must, 
for the first time, become an essential part of national defence plans”. It is questionable 
how serious or even how widely accepted the risk really was considered then. The 
document introduces a rather conflicting message as the section exhorting the urgency of 
the “atomic threat” is immediately followed by a statement emphasizing that civil defence is 
a precautionary scheme and not indicative of any clear and present danger – a theme which 
would continue in public messages on civil defence from the government. 
In Parliament at the time the issue of civil defence was subordinated by other matters, in 
this case the abolition of compulsory military service which was also in the Review. Civil 
defence was not even mentioned when the Review was debated in Parliament. 
Nevertheless, the government took action and established the Ministry of Civil Defence 
within the Department of Internal Affairs in 1959.71 That the Ministry of Civil Defence was 
positioned in the Department of Internal Affairs seems appropriate for that time as it was 
home to a wide variety of functions including local authority matters.72 The rationale for 
civil defence was expanded when in October of that year the Minister of Finance, A.H. 
Nordmeyer, mentioned in Parliament the dual purpose of having an “effective 
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system…which could operate in the event of war but also in event of an earthquake or other 
major disaster”.73 This put the plan in line with previous civil defence schemes and other 
legislation such as the LAEP Act and Emergency Precautions Scheme, but attention would 
primarily remain on the nuclear issue. The vague reference to “event of war” was narrowed 
in the 1959 report from the Department of Internal Affairs to the House of Representatives. 
74 The report included a subsection entitled “Civil Emergency” that described how during 
the past year special arrangements for the government to respond to a natural disaster had 
been made and in addition to this the government had decided to prepare civil defence for 
the risk of a nuclear attack on New Zealand. Ultimately, this never happened. 
 LAEP Act and EPS as the statutory and organisational basis 
In 1960 the Ministry of Civil Defence published a pamphlet entitled Civil Defence in New 
Zealand which outlined the rationale and a very basic conceptual framework for civil 
defence. 75 The statutory basis for implementing the policy as outlined in the pamphlet was 
the Local Authorities Emergency Powers Act 1953; 76  however it went unamended despite 
the creation of the Ministry and appointment of Regional Commissioners. Once again based 
on the UK model and described as being “comparable to the E.P.S.” civil defence was 
intended to be an “all-purpose organisation for major emergency in peace and war”. 77  In 
fact, the proposed scheme bore little resemblance to the EPS. The main similarity was the 
country was divided into four regions each with a Commissioner appointed by the 
government in 1960 – these would be the first staff hired specifically for civil defence. 
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However, civil defence was essentially a paper-based organisation with the Secretary for 
Internal Affairs also serving as the Director of Civil Defence.78 Each region was based around 
a major urban centre – Auckland, Wellington, Christchurch, and Dunedin. In practice only 
three regions were created, two in the North Island and one in the South Island.79 The task 
of implementation rested primarily with appointed Regional Commissioners, former military 
men. Unlike the EPS, which was highly detailed about roles and emphasized horizontal and 
vertical cooperation by each level of government, the LAEP Act was vague on specifics, in 
particular for the function of the central government in civil defence, and silent on the role 
of regional governments and the Regional Commissioners (a position which was created 
seven years after the LAEP Act which remained unamended, thereby making no statutory 
basis for the Regional Commissioners). That the LAEP Act would even be considered as the 
basis for a nationwide system is incongruous with the Act itself which, as the title would 
suggest, was designed – however poorly – for local-level emergency management. 
Regardless of how inefficacious the LAEP Act was, the civil defence pamphlet was the most 
significant development in civil defence from the time the Ministry was created the year 
before. Over the next few years, implementation would proceed at a slow pace.  
 Poor governance and mixed messages delay wartime and peacetime civil defence 
Civil defence was greatly hindered in getting off the ground between 1958 and 1962 by 
mixed messages from the government about the rationale for civil defence and a perplexing 
lack of leadership, support and follow through despite dire warnings of the possibilities of 
modern warfare and to a lesser extent, natural disasters. The Minister of Civil Defence, W.T. 
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Anderton, stated that it was with “mixed feelings” that he had to recommend the proposed 
civil defence scheme, but given the threat posed by scientific advancement (read: nuclear 
weapons) the country needed civil defence.80 Every section of the Ministry’s 1960 policy 
document is about wartime measures in general and nuclear war in particular save the final 
two paragraphs. There it was simply stated that civil defence in war was essentially the 
same as in peace, the only differences being the “specialized wartime aspects” for nuclear, 
biological, and chemical attacks and the lack of warning given by earthquakes compared to 
enemy attacks. Also in 1960 the Ministry of Civil Defence reported that the national and 
regional organisations for natural disasters were “in reasonably good shape”, and it was the 
local level that needed to make progress, with guidance from the Commissioners.81 The 
reality however was more complex and even contrary to this statement. 
The fundamental barrier to developing civil defence was the lack of clarity on the role and 
function of the central government and exaggeration of the severity of the risk posed by 
nuclear war to New Zealand. By the Ministry’s own evaluation this caused reluctance among 
otherwise willing local authorities and was a major impetus to creating new legislation – yet 
conflicting statements and confusion about rational and responsibility persisted.82 While the 
government, through Minister Anderton, argued that local authorities should bear the cost 
of organising local civil defence units, some local authorities argued that as the primary 
reason for civil defence was nuclear war the cost should be borne by the central 
government as war is a matter of national defence.83 The lack of leadership also manifested 
itself in conflicting statements and guidance from Ministers. Whereas the Labour Minister 
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of Civil Defence Anderton stated “there need be no emotional propaganda that could create 
a fear complex in the public” when speaking at the New Zealand Municipal Association 
conference in 1960, his successor in 1961, National Party Minister of Civil Defence F.L.A. 
Gotz, explained to the same organisation that,84 
…weapons of unspeakable horrors exist in the world today and we have a duty to safeguard our 
people…against potential dangers which can come from the skies... So long as such weapons exist and 
the occasional earthquake still occurs then so long must we be prepared to guard against the effects 
of these things.  
The advocating of moral duty was the government’s way of pushing the issue of 
responsibility to the local authorities while not actually committing themselves to anything 
in particular. 
While the Ministers were sending unclear messages, the Regional Commissioners were at 
least consistent in their own messages even though it put them at odds with the 
government. The Regional Commissioners took a hard line in the early 1960s on the nuclear 
or nature issue. In contrast to statements made by the Minister of Finance and the two 
Ministers of Civil Defence that at least attempted to espouse the dual goals of civil defence, 
Rawlinson provides evidence of the Regional Commissioners pushing the nuclear agenda by 
stating that nuclear must come first with preparedness for natural disasters a by-product of 
preparing for nuclear war.85 As they were effectively the front-line staff (and the only 
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people hired specifically for civil defence)86 in the face of “limited ministerial direction and 
consultation”87 this position would aggravate and delay implementation of civil defence 
under the LAEP Act and even the Civil Defence Act 1962. It is an odd position for them to 
take as, other than Minister Gotz’s alarming vision of horrors raining down from the skies in 
1961, the official stance was always that the nuclear threat was minimal. And yet, it was 
given priority. That the Regional Commissioners were able to carry out their own agenda 
from 1959 onward is not surprising as the position was only formally created in 1962 under 
the Civil Defence Act 1962 which outlined their duties but even then did not specify to 
whom they were responsible to, thus giving them the freedom to pursue their own agenda. 
This would contribute to the debate about not only the purpose of civil defence but also 
where responsibility ultimately rested. 
The lack of leadership is anomalous considering the only lesson that was really learned from 
previous disasters and incorporated into legislation was that of the necessity of leadership 
during an emergency. At a greater scale however this lesson seems to have been lost on the 
government. Rawlinson sums up the overall sentiment succinctly, stating that while no one 
was opposed to the principle of civil defence there was generally a lack of interest in taking 
any kind of action – be it financial or even making clear plans.88 It was in this context that 
the Local Authorities Emergency Powers Act 1953 was repealed and the Civil Defence Act 
1962 created.89  
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Second step – Make legislation 
The Civil Defence Act 1962 was developed following the realisation that the LAEP Act had 
numerous shortcomings which, among many other things, precluded a leading role for the 
central government or any other central organisation in developing national plans. As noted 
in the previous section, in 1960 the Ministry of Civil Defence reported that national and 
regional organisation for civil defence was in “reasonably good shape” but the local 
authorities would need to move forward with guidance from the Regional Commissioners.90 
In 1961 the perspective changed in light of the noted limitations of the LAEP Act. The 
Ministry reported that the barrier to implementing civil defence policy was not at the local 
level as stated the year before but due to shortcomings of the law regarding the role of the 
central government.91 In 1962 the Ministry acknowledged that a new, comprehensive 
organisation with a substantial legislative basis was needed, and that the process to create 
such legislation was underway.92  
The Civil Defence Act 1962 was a major step forward in establishing a permanent, 
nationwide system for civil defence that included both natural hazards and wartime 
emergencies, and at 35 pages it was seven times longer than the LAEP Act. The structure 
and many of the roles and responsibilities outlined in the Civil Defence Act itself and the 
guidance documents produced in the 1960s and early 1970s remain in place today. While it 
did add clarity in terms of roles, responsibilities, and rationale, it failed to address some of 
the important shortcomings of its predecessor. The Act underwent six amendments in its 
21-year history. In terms of the aforementioned lack of support from the government and 
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mixed messages regarding the true aim of civil defence, it put into law once and for all the 
dual rationale for civil defence and the beginning of a comprehensive emergency 
management system. Civil defence was declared to be a system for, 93  
…the planning, organisation, coordination, and implementation of measures, other 
than measures amounting to actual combat or preparation therefor, that are 
necessary or desirable in respect of the safety of the public, and are designed to 
guard against, prevent, reduce, or overcome the effects or possible effects of a 
national emergency or a major disaster.  
A “national emergency” referred to enemy attack and warlike acts, a “major disaster” 
referred to everything else.94 This dual purpose would be a contentious component of civil 
defence and have a lasting effect on the public’s perception and political will for the 
organisation. 
 The public and the Ombudsman’s inquiry 
For all the bold statements about the “very real threat” of nuclear war very little was 
accomplished in the two years following the new legislation’s enactment in 1962. An 
Ombudsman’s inquiry began in late 1963 after complaints from “responsible citizens” and 
negative press coverage on the lack of progress made by the government.95  The main 
concerns were on the government’s deficient administration of the civil defence 
organisation and advisory committee, the “lack of leadership and guidance” by the central 
government which inhibited the local authorities from making their plans, and the overall 
secrecy surrounding civil defence which resulted in inadequate publicity and information 
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sharing to the point that the public were generally unaware of what their responsibilities 
were.96 The Ombudsman met with the Director of Civil Defence who attributed the delays in 
forming a National Council and planning committees (under s10) 97 and national plans from 
each committee (s13) to various difficulties with time management (the Director and 
Deputy Director of Civil Defence held other positions with DIA) and a lack of resources – 
both personnel and financial. The Director added that he thought the local governments 
should organise themselves and only then could there be a national plan based on the local 
plans.98 Ultimately, the Director felt, the success of civil defence rested on the interest the 
public took in it at the local level, and only then could the Ministry act. The Ombudsman 
replied that if the government and Parliament had felt the need to pass the Act in the first 
place then it was up to the Ministry to put it into effect. If they could not do that due to 
resource constraints then it was the Director’s responsibility to take up the issue with the 
Minister and not blame a lack of interest among local authorities and citizens. With the 
Ombudsman’s inquiry and prodding, the National Council was formed and met in February 
1964.  
The formation of the National Council itself was not without controversy however as the 
media were excluded and portrayed by the Minister as not a suitable conduit for 
information in an emergency.99 As Rawlinson remarked, during the first four years of civil 
defence (1958-1962) the press had been “generally sympathetic, though not particularly 
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interested in civil defence”.100 After the Act was passed the press took a critical interest in 
civil defence, mainly in regard to it being a retirement organisation for former military men, 
for being a paper-based organisation in the central government (as compared to the EPS) 
and for its focus on the nuclear threat rather than natural hazards.101 The exclusion of the 
media is reflective of the civil defence organisation’s inward looking hierarchal structure 
with external communication done as the Ministry put it “as circumstances require”102 
rather than proactively reaching out to the public. But this communication strategy was 
clearly at odds with comments made by the Director of Civil Defence to the Ombudsman 
about waiting for public interest to increase before acting on national plans and the 
repeated message that civil defence was a local responsibility. In effect, civil defence was a 
government operation done with minimal community involvement. It would take 
substantial amendments to the principal Act and two natural disasters before the 
community and civilian were brought back into civil defence. 
 Coercive coverage 
Between the passing of the Civil Defence Act 1962 and the first major disasters in 1968 the 
Act was amended twice. The Civil Defence Amendment Act 1965 put further obligations on 
local authorities by compelling them to make certain that once a plan is approved and 
operative they take “all necessary steps to ensure that the civil defence organisation 
provided for in the plan is able to implement the plan”. How this would be done is not clear. 
The Amendment Act also extended coverage to those injured or killed while carrying out 
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“civil defence work”103  regardless of whether they were members of a civil defence 
organisation or working under the guidance of one. This is meaningful because the principal 
Act only covered members of approved civil defence organisations – people acting under 
the control of a local authority that had not yet received approval for their civil defence 
plans were only covered for the first 12-months after the 1962 Act was passed.104 The 
absurdity of this is clear as the Civil Defence Act 1962 states: 105  
In considering any local plan or joint plan submitted to him, the Regional 
Commissioner shall have regard to national plans. 
Twelve months after the Act was passed the central government had not even formed 
committees, let alone national plans from those non-existent committees, which made it 
impossible for local authorities to make their own plans within 12 months. This provision 
was essentially a coercive measure aimed at compelling local authorities to complete and 
get approval for their civil defence plans by using financial and moral pressure; no similar 
compulsion was felt by the central government until the Ombudsman intervened. This is a 
highly unusual case of the government using a coercive measure to force compliance – 
typically, in civil defence, if local authorities do not fulfil their planning obligations then a 
plan would be made for them at cost. Other amendments in 1965 were administrative, as 
were the changes made in the Civil Defence Amendment Act 1967 which only dealt with 
traffic officers during a declared emergency. 106  Both amendments passed without 
significant debate in Parliament. 
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Finding a focus for civil defence 
There is a clear divergence between central government and the Regional Commissioners 
about the purpose of civil defence. Within one year civil defence was alternately described 
as an organisation made to respond to a nuclear attack that can also be scaled down for the 
“lesser threat” of natural hazards, and as an organisation made to respond to natural 
disasters but could also be scaled-up for a nuclear attack. The dual purpose of civil defence 
was undermined by such actions as the publication of a 1963 document entitled Civil 
Defence Planning Guide for Local Authorities.107 This booklet was meant to assist local 
authorities in making their civil defence plans as required under s27 of the Act. Written by 
the Regional Commissioners it is very clear about priorities, stating “(t)he major threat to 
any country today must be global warfare”, followed by reference to nuclear warhead 
equipped intercontinental ballistic missiles.108 Natural hazards are acknowledged as a more 
concrete problem but they are designated a “lesser threat” and a local issue. This depiction 
is at odds with the legislation which allows for an emergency declaration to be made for a 
natural disaster at any level – national, regional, and local. The plans made according to the 
booklet would prepare communities for a nuclear attack and would only need to be scaled 
down for the “lesser” dangers from Mother Nature. Actions in case of nuclear warfare 
however were designated matters for the central government to consider and “beyond the 
scope” of local governments. As such, there is no mention of specific actions or measures to 
take when the nuclear bombs start landing, instead the booklet is remarkably similar to the 
Emergency Precautions Scheme in terms of specific planning that local governments should 
do, albeit far less detailed. Regardless of the threat, real or imagined, of nuclear war coming 
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to New Zealand the booklet was a major step forward in civil defence planning and much 
better than the initial vague instructions for local authorities to make civil defence plans for 
nuclear war issued under the impotent LAEP Act. There were some issues that were carried 
over from the LAEP, in particular no additional funding for local authorities to use for civil 
defence. In terms of financing the plans, local governments were permitted to pay for civil 
defence from their budgets is s46 (1) or to get a loan s46 (2) and (4). 
The nuclear issue and vague wartime references would gradually disappear from civil 
defence publications after the new Minister of Civil Defence, D.C. Seath, in 1964 made a 
statement that effectively dropped nuclear in favour of natural hazards: 109 
I am not suggesting that planning against the consequences of nuclear disaster should be ignored, but 
first let us bend our energies to preparing against the known forms of natural disaster...As to any 
special additional preparations that may be necessary to meet the threat of nuclear attack those are 
matters which in my view might well be left to examination at a later stage of your proceedings.  
This is a complete reversal from earlier statements which planned to simply downgrade 
from nuclear preparedness to natural disaster response. In other words, civil defence would 
now prepare for natural disasters and scale-up to nuclear war rather than scale down. The 
divergence between central and regional civil defence lingered into the late 1960s. The 
Minister’s statement in 1964 should have been a turning point for civil defence but the 
Regional Commissioners continued with their “nuclear first” propaganda. Even the Ministry 
of Defence issued a statement in 1966 complimenting the efforts made for civil defence and 
concluded that although it could be used in the case of a nuclear attack the greatest use of 
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civil defence could be made by focusing on natural hazards.110 And so it was that the 1968 
General Information Civil Defence Handbook emphasized two points – the civil defence 
system was designed to function in the event of a natural hazard by making use of existing 
resources, and secondly that special procedures and knowledge would be necessary in the 
event of a nuclear attack. Existing resources in this case referred to other government 
organisations that would operate under the direction of civil defence personnel. In other 
words, the community was still a recipient rather than a participant in civil defence and 
there were few provisions for strengthening any community’s capacity to respond to an 
emergency. Shortly after this booklet was published New Zealand experienced its largest 
storm event and the first earthquake disaster for civil defence in the post-war years which 
would change the government’s perspective on emergencies and the public.  
Section Summary 
This section ends in early 1968, just prior to a large storm and the Inangahua earthquake 
which serve as a focal points for the next section as the first major events for civil defence. 
From 1959-1964 very little was done to prepare for a nuclear war; likewise even less was 
done to prepare for natural disasters. From 1964 to 1968 considerable progress was made, 
on paper at least, in terms of making plans within the civil defence organisation. With new 
and subsequently amended legislation local authorities and the central government had a 
clearer understanding about roles, functions, and responsibilities and had made headway 
on financial support for preparedness and indemnity for civil defence personnel and 
spontaneous volunteers; meanwhile other civil defence organisations were actively 
pursuing their own civil defence goals. The Police met their 1965 target of 2076 “civil 
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defence police” – volunteers given special powers during a declared emergency or disaster 
and trained in first aid.111 By 1968 the Police had created a national training syllabus and 
recruited 3105 citizen volunteers; all police districts had created comprehensive civil 
defence response plan.112 The Fire Service created a national committee and distributed a 
civil defence coordination plan to urban fire authorities in 1967.113 In the annual report from 
the Department of Internal Affairs during this period reference to wartime or nuclear 
measures was absent. If any specifics were made it was to natural hazards, not nuclear. The 
Regional Commissioners remained defiant about the dual purpose of civil defence, even in 
the face of changing policy. Whatever the focus may have been for the various actors 
involved, the functions, rationale, and philosophy of civil defence became clear in this 
period. The functions are identified by the various national plans for government action, 
communication, traffic control, supply, medical, law and order, transport, welfare, 
evacuation, and firefighting.114 The rationale remained rather divisive but the focus shifted 
from nuclear war towards preparing for natural disasters while recognizing the possibility of 
warlike acts occurring. The self-help principle of civil defence needs to be understood in the 
context of the era. Self-help meant that locally based government organisations would help 
the community in time of crisis with support as needed from higher levels of government. It 
essentially puts the people of the community in a position to rely on help rather than being 
self-reliant as the concept of “self-help” may be interpreted today. There was little 
involvement by community members – civil defence was being organised for the public, not 
with them. The use of existing resources would be problematic not only for civil defence 
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response, but recovery as late as the Canterbury earthquakes (see Chapters 4 and 5) as it 
assumes a suitable alignment between local resources and the demands of an emergency. 
The purpose of this section is not to criticise the decision to create a civil defence system 
due to the threat of nuclear war – other Western countries at the time had similar concerns 
and also did little to implement measures.115 In both 1939 and 1958 it took a threat to the 
entire nation to stimulate the creation of a nationally planned and locally-based emergency 
response system despite a history of destructive earthquakes in the capital region and 
regular flooding around the country. Given the international climate at the time it is easy to 
understand the government’s concern about global nuclear war, and even the unlikely 
event of a direct strike on New Zealand. What is not easy to understand is the lack of 
concrete planning and abdication of moral responsibility to the local authorities for what 
would ostensibly be a failure of national defence – in particular between 1958 and 1964. 
The positive side to the reaction to the unlikely threat of a nuclear strike was the 
establishment of a permanent emergency response scheme – albeit one that existed mainly 
on paper for the first few years. 
A major part of Rawlinson’s thesis was that the focus on the perceived nuclear threat was a 
distraction that confused the public, resulted in criticism from the media, and caused local 
authorities to be hesitant about making civil defence plans. The effect, he argued, was a 
delay in implementing a system for responding to and recovering from the persistent threat 
from natural hazards. Rawlinson is certainly correct about the mixed messages and lack of 
support, there is significant evidence to support those conclusions – but it is the latter issue 
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that was the greatest problem. It is one thing to conceive a national system of civil defence 
– that is the easy part. Making plans and creating the enabling conditions for them to be 
implemented is the hard part – and this was not done, at least not at the scale sufficient for 
a nuclear attack or a major earthquake. This theme is taken up in section 3.7 where the civil 
defence system of Canada is contrasted with New Zealand to show just how absurd the 
nuclear-focused planning was in this country. This is a reoccurring theme for civil defence – 
grand ideas with poor follow through, Chapter 4 continues this theme for response and 
Chapter 5 for recovery. Fortunately, from 1968 onward, the nuclear narrative effectively 
ended. The new challenges for civil defence would be based on identity and very basic 
questions of what can civil defence do, who does civil defence, when can civil defence be 
done, and even why civil defence rather than other organisations such as the military or 
police. 
3.6 A new civil defence – the return of the civilian 
The year 1968 proved to be a major turning point for the perception of what civil defence 
could do for the public and for what the public could do for civil defence. The 1962 
legislation did not fully eliminate the shortcomings of its predecessor legislation but through 
amendments, greater financial support, training, and completion of national, local, and 
organisational plans a nationwide civil defence scheme had begun to take shape by 1968. 
While the gap may have narrowed between what the government aimed for with civil 
defence and was accomplished in practice, another gap existed between the civil defence 
organisation and the general public. This first came to light after a major storm and the 
Inangahua earthquake in 1968. Despite legislative amendments (six in total for the 1962 act) 




was well aware of and set out to address. Correcting this perception became a major driver 
of change as civil defence came of age (Chapter 4). The purpose of this section is to examine 
how civil defence was conceptualised and operationalised around the time of two major 
disasters – a storm and earthquake in 1968. Public perception of civil defence would be a 
driving force behind the professionalization and later expansion of civil defence as it was 
further developed into a modern emergency management system. 
Inangahua Earthquake and the storm of ‘68 
On the 9th April, 1968, ex-tropical Cyclone Giselle made landfall on the North Island. The 
storm was considered the worst on record in New Zealand and caused significant damage 
from rainfall, flooding, wind, and landslips.116 The storm tracked the east coast of the North 
Island then turned towards Wellington during the night before continuing south on the 10th 
to Christchurch where it arrived early in the morning of the 11th. There the storm was met 
with a high tide and caused flooding in the coastal areas of Christchurch, including near to 
the home of the Leader of the Opposition N.E. Kirk. The storm caused further damage in the 
south and was the first widespread event for civil defence. Even before the storm Kirk had 
been a vocal critic of civil defence. In the days after the storm Prime Minister Holyoake, the 
Minister of Civil Defence, D.C. Seath, and Kirk garnered significant press coverage with their 
views on the state of civil defence. Kirk’s criticisms varied from questioning the very 
necessity of civil defence to demanding a “thorough shake-up” starting with its “pseudo-
military background”.117 He was predictably critical of the response in Christchurch but his 
main targets were the delays in making emergency declarations and the related issue of 
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information sharing within the government.118 Both the Prime Minister and Minster were 
defensive about the principles of civil defence and its necessity, but they were self-critical 
and within days a list of practical measures was proposed and published in the media.119 
Among these was the recommendation that local governments take a precautionary 
approach to emergency declarations if there is an “imminent threat” and for arrangements 
to be made to keep the public better informed of civil defence activities.120 The main reason 
the government identified for the reluctance of local authorities to make a declaration was 
a lack of initiative and information from the central government. Essentially the local 
authorities were looking to the central government for leadership and top-down 
communication on how to act in a civil defence situation as they had never experienced 
such an event before – the government’s hands-off approach and policy of local 
responsibility had failed. The result was a situation similar to 1962-1964 when the local 
authorities were looking for the same sort of guidance when trying to make local plans as 
they were in 1968 when trying to implement them. The message was clear – the 
government needed to take a leading role in civil defence. But the recommendations were 
not implemented before the next major disaster occurred, an event which also revealed 
another limitation – the failure to involve civilians in civil defence. 
On the 24th May, 1968, a magnitude 7 earthquake occurred north of Inangahua on the 
northwest coast of the South Island at 5:24am primarily affecting the communities of 
Inangahua Junction and Reefton.121 Roads, bridges, and railways in the area suffered 
considerable damage or were rendered unusable due to landslips while electricity and 
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telecommunications were disrupted which delayed accessing help from beyond the 
Inangahua area.122 Along the Buller River north of Reefton landslips caused the only 
fatalities as a result of the earthquake and created a risk of flooding after the river was 
blocked.123Damage to buildings was superficial, primarily resulting in collapsed chimneys 
and broken windows. The Local Controller for civil defence declared a state of local major 
disaster in the Inangahua Country Civil Defence Area at 11am. Due to telecommunication 
disruptions approximately an hour later the declaration was relayed by radio to the Regional 
Commissioner in Christchurch.124 As it was the first large-scale disaster since the 1962 
legislation, Inangahua exposed a number of limitations in legislation, policy, and practice. 
These “Civil Defence Lessons” as the Ministry called them included human resources 
limitations and competing obligations of civil defence personnel, public relations 
management, emergency powers and when to make a declaration, and the necessity of 
support and information sharing vertically within the structure and horizontally with other 
civil defence organisations.125 
In their report on the Inangahua earthquake the Ministry identified human resources 
challenges early on – the local civil defence organisation was understaffed due to attrition 
and a failure to replace members who had left. The region itself had been suffering 
economically and was reliant on central government departments for many economic 
activities.126 Relying on local capacity introduced a challenge for civil defence as many key 
positions such as communications and transport were not filled as the local officials were 
engaged in their regular duties; additionally some key personnel were outside of the region 
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and no replacements had been named.127 Communication was problematic, both internally 
within the government and between civil defence and the public. The Director of Civil 
Defence was not notified until four hours after the first government department other than 
Civil Defence had received notice of the situation; after the declaration was made other 
departments such as the Ministry of Works received “civil defence (related) information” 
and performed restoration work that they did not always share with the Ministry of Civil 
Defence.128 A journal article written by a Ministry of Works official shortly after the 
earthquake explained that the role of civil defence was only for rescue and welfare, not 
restoration, indicating a gap between expectations and understanding among ministries.129 
An issue arose with public relations and the media who initially had direct access to the 
Controller and Deputy Controller. While this was convenient for the media personnel, civil 
defence staff found it was a distraction to have them constantly in their presence. 
Consequently late into the second day a press officer was appointed who issued press 
releases and accompanied media within the disaster area. The report emphasized the 
importance of press relations and the necessity of appointing a Press Officer during the 
early stages of an emergency. Nevertheless, the Ministry still complained of inaccurate 
reporting and wanted the reporters to clear their articles with civil defence authorities 
before going to press.130 This is indicative of the naivety and lack of understanding of the 
media that civil defence authorities had at the time, viewing them as simply a conduit for 
conveying only the particular information the civil defence organisation desired to share.  
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In terms of outcomes, the Ministry of Civil Defence recognized that civil defence could not 
spontaneously emerge from local governments as an emergency unfolded – it needed to be 
more proactive in terms of preparing personnel and in terms of declaring an emergency.  In 
their report the Ministry acknowledged that civil defence needed to engage with the 
community not just through public relations during a disaster but by informing citizens of 
their potential contributions to civil defence.131  The Ministry also suggested a precautionary 
principle for emergency declarations similar to their recommendations after the storm the 
month before. This included opening the National Civil Defence Operational Headquarters 
and the Regional office as early as possible even in the case of local emergencies in case the 
situation escalated. The main message was to be prepared for the worst possible outcome 
rather than adapt as the emergency progresses. The reasoning was that cancelling a 
declaration if an emergency did not eventuate would be easier than declaring an emergency 
after it had occurred and trying to mobilise resources then. Finally, the report reemphasized 
the importance of self-help and mutual aid among civil defence organisations – but this had 
to be reconsidered given the extent of spontaneous volunteers from the local community 
compared to the limited capacity of civil defence officials. The Inangahua disaster 
demonstrated that local capacities were not uniform therefore the principles of self-help 
and mutual aid could not be realised or relied upon in all communities – particularly if civil 
defence activities were primarily carried out by local authorities without engaging with their 
communities. Most importantly, what Inangahua showed was that civil defence could 
actually work. 
                                                     




Civil defence and community participation 
The period from 1968 to 1979 showed steady progress in developing the civil defence 
organisation through legislative amendments and policy changes aimed at improving public 
relations and reaching out to the community. In 1968 two enduring features of civil defence 
in New Zealand were initiated – community-based response teams and a civil defence 
notice on the last page of the telephone book. The Civil Defence Amendment Act 1968 was 
aimed at enabling an easier and earlier emergency declaration by local authorities and 
subsequent activation of the civil defence organisation. In response to the hesitation among 
some local authorities to declare a “major disaster” the Act changed the terminology to 
“civil defence emergency” and reduced the duration from 28 days to 7 days with the option 
of an extension of not more than 28 days. Local authorities who had not yet submitted and 
received approval on their civil defence plan were given until 31 December 1969 to do so, if 
not, the Regional Commissioner would do it for them with all costs assumed by the local 
authority for the Regional Commissioner’s work. All local authorities either met the goal or 
had submitted plans for review.132 In 1969 more community-based response teams in local 
businesses were trained in first aid and light rescue while “civil defence” was introduced in 
some schools as an extracurricular activity; the New Zealand Broadcasting Corporation aired 
a 30min programme on civil defence which boosted volunteer inquires.133 
The Department of Internal Affairs reported positively in 1971 the impact of the 1968 
amendment with emergency declarations having been made early in various communities 
which allowed for better preparedness and response. The DIA stated that given the success 
the civil defence organisation had experienced over the year that “vesting of control in 
                                                     





[local authorities] was correct” – perhaps in reference to the criticism in the media and from 
Norman Kirk about eliminating civil defence and relying on the police.134 The Civil Defence 
Amendment Act 1971 brought the Regional Commissioners under the direction of the 
Director of Civil Defence which ended their ability to orient civil defence toward nuclear war. 
This also established a direct linkage between the Ministry and local authorities as before 
this Amendment the Regional Commissioners stood between the two. 
Also in 1971 the Civil Defence Public Relations Plan was published which recognised public 
relations as an “integral part of the Civil Defence Organisation”.135 The objectives were two-
fold: 
1. To gain public understanding of and active support for civil defence objectives and 
requirements. 
2. To ensure effective communication with the public within disaster areas and 
outwards by getting to the public vital factual information plus news and views that 
will support morale and assist the primary tasks of Civil Defence. 
In 1972 as part of its new outreach policy the Ministry commissioned a 15 min “instructive 
and general information” film to be made.136 The rationale was that to date the Ministry 
had relied on British and American civil defence films but these focused on “nuclear 
catastrophe” rather than natural hazards which for New Zealand was the “more immediate 
concept of civil defence”.137 In a major change from the previous General Information 
handbook in 1968, the 1973 Civil Defence Handbook made no mention of the nuclear issue, 
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the only reference to specific hazard types are natural.138 The next year the annual report 
from the DIA acknowledges that nuclear warfare was the stimulus for civil defence but 
states that “for many years…all planning, doctrine and training” had been directed towards 
natural hazards (emphasis added).139 Regardless of the Department’s changing narrative on 
its previous focus, civil defence was now a community-oriented organisation preparing for 
natural disasters with funding directed to training volunteers, constructing buildings for 
local civil defence, and more types of outreach such as the now familiar civil defence display 
at local fairs and shows. The purpose was for citizens to have a better understanding of their 
own role in assisting both the local authorities and themselves in an emergency.140 This 
marks another step in the shift from civil defence being done “to the community” to “by the 
community”.  
Numerous amendments were made to the Civil Defence Act in 1975 to align it with the 
Local Government Act 1974, to make changes in compensation for injury or death which 
included Acts other than the War Pensions Act 1954 and to make amendments to clarify 
who could make declarations of emergency to align the Act with other administrative 
changes. The Civil Defence Amendment Act 1979, which was intended as a bridge between 
the 1962 legislation and the newly proposed Civil Defence Bill,141 simplified the definition of 
a civil defence emergency, and once again aligned the Act with administrative changes and 
changes in other legislation. This process was not without major challenges as the slow pace 
of creating regions under the Local Government Act 1974 consequently meant that civil 
defence could move at best at an equally slow pace in regionalisation (further analysed in 
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Chapter 4). The eleven year period following the storm and earthquake in 1968 saw major 
changes in civil defence policy and many legislative amendments to keep up with 
administrative changes and changes in local governance arrangements. Most of all, civil 
defence reoriented itself from focusing on external threats and intergovernmental 
coordination to natural hazards and involving the community as an active participant and 
member of the civil defence organisation. 
Section Summary 
The year 1968 was pivotal for civil defence as it grew out of its nuclear war origins and 
refocused on natural hazards. Media and political criticism also changed following candid 
public discourse of civil defence by the government and a successful response to the 
Inangahua earthquake. Most important was the realisation that civil defence needed to 
engage with the communities it aimed to help – the civilian needed to be brought back into 
civil defence. Legislative amendments in 1968, 1971, and 1975 helped make declaring an 
emergency easier and brought the Regional Commissioners under the direction of the 
Director of Civil Defence which surely aided policy coherence and public communication in 
civil defence. Community outreach and engagement became the primary focus of the 
Ministry during the 1970s through volunteer training, public outreach, and classroom 
education. Despite this PR campaign and the legislative amendments, civil defence faced 
many challenges from administration and capacity to lingering poor public perception. It 
also appears that lessons from the past did not receive widespread acknowledgement - the 
main message of Inangahua was to be prepared for the worst possible outcome and avoid 
improvisation as the emergency progresses – a similar message came from Hawke’s Bay as 




civil defence responded to the next major emergency – the Abbotsford landslip in 1979 (see 
Chapter 4 for a study of this event) and with limited training and few large-scale disasters 
there was little by way of practical experience for all parts of civil defence from which 
knowledge could be generated and improvisation avoided. 
3.7 New Zealand’s civil defence in a global context 
This section compares civil defence in other modern democracies in the post-war and Cold 
War years and shows that the path taken in New Zealand was typical for its time. New 
Zealand was much later at creating a civil defence organisation than other Western 
countries but they were also quite early to refocus onto natural hazards. Arguably only 
getting off the ground in 1964, after 1968 the practical focus of civil defence was on natural 
hazards. There are notable similarities between other Western democracies and New 
Zealand in the first years – namely, a lack of real action and leadership by the central 
government and likewise very little done at the local level. But there are also key differences 
– New Zealand tended to base decisions on principles rather than practical actualities and 
limitations – a problem which persisted for decades and manifested again with the 
Canterbury earthquakes (see Chapter 5). This is most evident by comparing the early years 
of civil defence in New Zealand with Canada where practical elements of civil defence drove 
change compared to New Zealand where principles stalled progress. 
New Zealand civil defence in contrast – Canada and informed evolution 
 Comparison with Canada shows strong similarities in terms of civil defence being a 
troublesome political issue suffering from a lack of leadership. In both countries civil 




by minimizing or terminating the nuclear narrative. Comparison with Canada particularly 
highlights the extraordinary naivety of the Regional Commissioners in New Zealand to the 
realities of nuclear weapons. Whereas New Zealand adjusted their civil defence strategy 
based on perceived risk, the evolution of Canadian civil defence in the 1950s and 1960s was 
informed by scientific knowledge about nuclear weapons. This knowledge would have been 
available to the New Zealand public as it was to the Canadian public yet it did not appear to 
inform civil defence planning in New Zealand as it did in Canada. While geography would 
create different imperatives (with Canada being located between the two major Cold War 
belligerents) the underlying concern was much the same – global nuclear war or a direct 
nuclear strike. 
What really differentiated Canadian policy from New Zealand is the influence of technology 
on policy. As nuclear weapons became more advanced and as the technology behind their 
production and means of delivery improved Canadian policy and strategy was adapted to 
the new international context.142 Civil defence in New Zealand was certainly initiated on the 
grounds that technological developments necessitated domestic readiness for a nuclear war 
(and the “occasional” earthquake) but changes in law and policy were primarily stimulated 
by revelation of weaknesses in the existing system and changed perception of risk rather 
than by accounting for new knowledge. Essentially the general plan in New Zealand 
remained the same throughout the 1950s and 60s –civil defence was a local responsibility 
and local personnel would respond to a disaster whether it was nuclear or natural. Largely 
absent in the New Zealand context was debate on the practical realities of civil defence 
measures compared to the impact of a nuclear strike – a debate that was at the heart of the 
                                                     




civil defence debate in Canada and other Western countries.143 Canada on the other hand 
moved through distinct stages of civil defence strategy before ultimately refocusing on 
peacetime disasters around the same time New Zealand did in the late 1960s.144  
Civil defence in Canada started earlier than in New Zealand but they shared a similar 
trajectory and suffered from public image problems which proved troublesome in gaining 
support from within government and the public. As in New Zealand, civil defence in Canada 
was based on the United Kingdom’s WWII system but unlike New Zealand Canada 
emphasized the utilization of “existing services and facilities of government at all levels, 
assisted by volunteers and non-governmental organizations”.145 New Zealand’s Cold War 
civil defence did not in principle include non-governmental civilians until 1968. While 
initially consisting primarily of government organisations (as with New Zealand), 
implementation of civil defence plans depended heavily on community volunteer 
participation encouraged by a message of civic responsibility whereby citizens owed the 
state as part of “fulfilling the obligations of citizenship”.146 Comparatively, responsibility in 
New Zealand was to community and neighbouring areas (by providing mutual assistance) 
rather than to country. Collaborating with local volunteer organisations gave civil defence in 
Canada not only an immediate presence on the ground but also gave a sense of credibility 
while helping form a bond between the community and the state.147 In contrast to New 
Zealand where initially citizens were recipients of civil defence rather than active 
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participants, in Canada civil defence was based on a concept of “citizen as defender” of their 
community and relied heavily on community participation almost from the beginning. 
Burtch describes Canada’s civil defence system progressing through three stages with 
changes driven by awareness of the practical realities of nuclear warfare: community self-
help, evacuation, and then national continuity of government and individual self-help.148 
The first stage of civil defence began in 1948 and was based in part on the UK model of self-
help at the community level. This form of civil defence focused on basic rescue functions 
and first aid activities and was in a practical sense near identical to the New Zealand model 
ten years later. The underlying assumption of civil defence planners at the time was that a 
nuclear attack could be prepared for in the same way as conventional ordinance. In 1952 
technological advances lead to the successful detonation of the hydrogen bomb and the 
second stage of civil defence planning. The community self-help strategy was supplanted by 
an evacuation strategy from 1954. 149  The evacuation strategy allowed for urban dwellers to 
escape to the rural areas where they would be fed and sheltered. It was also a period of 
increased recruitment and publicity, in particular in rural communities near possible target 
cities. 
During the evacuation strategy period (1954-1959), community leaders retained an 
important role or status in civil defence but technological progress, mainly thermonuclear 
weapons and Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, led to a new stage of civil defence that 
changed the relationship between individuals and the government, or more accurately, 
between citizen and country. 150  In 1957 the Emergency Measures Organization was 
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established at the federal level with the aim of creating programmes directed at the 
“survival of Canada as a nation” in the event of a nuclear war”.151  As the government and 
public came to understand more about radioactive fallout the evacuation strategy gave way 
in 1959 to a “national survival” strategy. In this third stage self-help changed its meaning 
from the community to the individual household as survival became a personal rather than 
a community initiative. Personal survival, continuity of government, and reconstruction 
were the main aims of this third stage with the government building underground shelters 
and encouraging citizens to do the same under a policy of shelter and evacuation.152 
Essentially, “civil defence” in Canada at the time meant giving up all hope of effectively 
managing a nuclear disaster and simply surviving while in New Zealand plans were just 
getting underway. By 1962, the Canadian public was beginning to lose interest in civil 
defence as Cold War belligerents began to improve their relations and the futility of hiding 
from nuclear fallout became apparent153 – in Canada if not New Zealand.  
Throughout all stages the Canadian government faced public criticism that preparing 
citizens as a means to mitigate the impact of war would undermine the peace process and 
even strengthen support for military options.154 Such concerns were never raised in New 
Zealand.  Instead, the main concern was who would pay for the training, planning, and 
implementation costs. Nevertheless, by the mid-1960s civil defence in Canada had lost its 
nuclear fervour and refocused on “peacetime emergencies”.155 The civil defence name 
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continued to be used however; in 1969 in Kamloops, British Columbia a civil defence 
simulation was held which tested the community members’ and emergency services ability 
to respond to a mass casualty situation caused by a crashed bus. Local volunteers were 
trained in first aid and worked in collaboration with Girl Guides and Scouts. In the 
simulation documents no mention is made of any sort of nuclear or wartime emergency. 
What this indicates is that during the time New Zealand was grappling with principles of 
local responsibility and self-reliance, Canada had gone through three distinct civil defence 
strategies driven by the practical limitations of community response. 
The shift in focus from nuclear or even “warlike” acts to civil emergencies and natural 
disasters was not at all unique to New Zealand and Canada. As Vale found, the vast majority 
of countries with civil defence schemes had either eliminated them or shifted focus to 
natural hazards by the 1980s and those that still professed nuclear preparedness (US and 
Russia) were in the clear minority.156 Compared to other Western countries, New Zealand 
never moved beyond the self-help stage of civil defence and relied on principles rather than 
practice to drive change. Not only were they a decade behind in creating a post-war civil 
defence scheme, by the time they did so other countries such as Canada and the US had 
already evolved their civil defence programmes beyond local self-help to a system that had 
much greater central government involvement and took into consideration scientific 
knowledge about nuclear weapons. New Zealand’s refocusing from nuclear to natural 
occurred earlier than most but was still a normal pattern for most countries with a civil 
defence programme – the notable exceptions being those most actively involved, as it were, 
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in the Cold War, namely the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union.157 In 
terms of nuclear preparedness New Zealand had more in common with the first two 
countries in that their programmes remained underdeveloped and were subject to rather 
more political discourse than concrete action – at least for the first few years in New 
Zealand. 
3.8 Conclusion 
Civil defence in the post-war years struggled with issues of purpose, implementation and 
identity based on divergent policy interpretations, ineffectual laws, and a lack of leadership 
from central government combined with an overall lack of political will. These would 
become themes for all aspects of civil defence, in particular for response and later, recovery. 
The rationale for civil defence had always been that the country faced threats from natural 
and manmade hazards and therefore a system was needed to reduce the impact of those 
hazards. But the system that was created lacked a practical focus; civil defence was an 
organisation that primarily existed on paper with the expectation that local authorities 
would somehow rise to the occasion during an emergency using whatever resources they 
had available. The principles of local responsibility and self-help are reasonable in that help 
from Wellington is a long way off for most communities in New Zealand – but when 
combined with limited training, funding, and guidance civil defence offered little practical 
value greater than the capacities already existent in any given community. The Civil Defence 
Act 1962 gave power and responsibilities for emergency response to local authorities but 
offered little by way of wherewithal to fulfil the responsibilities and utilize the powers in an 





emergency. This is a recurrent theme throughout the history of civil defence and is taken up 
for response in the next chapter (Chapter 4) and recovery in Chapter 5.  
As Rawlinson found, the early history of civil defence is one of periods of apathy, 
complacency, and indifference interrupted occasionally by natural disasters or civil 
disturbances which stimulated short lived periods of activity and interest. To Rawlinson’s 
analysis of crisis we can add criticism and political context as drivers of change in civil 
defence. The Cold War created the political context which compelled the government to 
establish a national system of civil defence in the post-war years. It took criticism and crisis 
to compel the government to make national plans after the Ombudsman’s inquiry in 1964 
and to broaden the scope of civil defence to the community after the Inangahua earthquake 
in 1968. The risk of a major catastrophe from a natural hazard alone was not enough to 
establish a national system of civil defence, but it was enough to sustain it. But sustainability 
does not imply sustained activity or interest, and civil defence has a habit of not learning 
lessons from the past. Very few lessons from previous disasters were “learned” in the sense 
that they were incorporated into law or policy or put into practice. Despite a successful 
experience with WWII-era civil defence, the importance of national guidance, the role of the 
citizen, and the function of communities in civil defence all seem to have been lost on the 
central government in the early Cold War years.  
There was also a distinct lack of awareness and honest appraisal within government of civil 
defence during this period. Unlike other countries, such as Canada, the New Zealand 
government changed their focus from nuclear to natural based not on scientific evidence 
about nuclear warfare but on principles and perceived risk. By the early 1960s when New 




already changed plans from one of sending rescuers to a bombsite to one of getting as 
many people as possible out of harm’s way. The civil defence Regional Commissioners in 
New Zealand ignored or were simply ignorant of widely available knowledge about the 
impact of a nuclear attack and continued to insist on a strategy of sending people into a 
nuclear war instead of moving civilians away or to seek shelter. As a result, New Zealand’s 
plans for civil defence were comparatively primitive. Additionally, the Department of 
Internal Affairs displayed a lack of forthrightness about the state of civil defence by 
alternating year on year the blame for a lack of progress between local authorities and 
central government. The Department’s annual reports on civil defence in the late 1960s 
omitted any mention of war – nuclear or otherwise – which stands in contrast to the 
guidance document made by the Regional Commissioners for local authorities in 1968 that 
focused almost entirely on nuclear war. Add to this the bewildering comment from the 
Minister of Civil Defence to the Ombudsman in 1964 regarding the central government 
waiting for local authorities to act before they could make plans – this statement 
exemplified the lack of honest engagement with civil defence more than any other event at 
the time. The greatest oversight though was the failure to include civilians in civil defence, 
but addressing this omission did not rectify the problem of capacity to fulfil the civil defence 
mandate. In other words, expanding the number of people who have civil defence 
responsibilities did not ensure the capabilities existed to meet the demands of the risks the 
community faced. This is the most intense theme of civil defence from its origin in this early 
period through to the Canterbury earthquakes. 
After the Inangahua earthquake in 1968 the government was compelled to bring the 




interpretation of “local responsibility” and “self-help” – instead of local authorities providing 
civil defence to the general public, civilians would be doing civil defence for their 
communities. But this simply expanded the problem of disparate capacity from local 
authorities to the community at large. Civil defence was still reliant on existing resources in 
a given community which makes it difficult to understand what distinguished civil defence 
from what could reasonably be expected from a community during a crisis. Recall Chapter 2 
which examined the earliest scholarship on disasters which focused on this topic – the 
natural response by community members to self-organise and help themselves. With 
limited or no training, civil defence as a system essentially dictated that people could do 
what they would likely have done anyway with the resources they had available – recall the 
cases from Canada and the US cited in the previous chapter, and even Napier after the 
Hawke’s Bay earthquake in 1931, where communities spontaneously formed response 
teams and recovery committees.158 The primary differences between business as usual and 
an emergency under the Civil Defence Act 1962 were emergency powers, assurance from 
the government of support if required, and insurance coverage for civil defence responders. 
When the government attempted to use insurance as leverage for coercing local authorities 
to make civil defence plans (while failing to make any national plans) they were taking away 
one of the few elements that made civil defence a system and reduced the incentive for 
citizens to join. While this particular problem was overcome with a legislative amendment in 
1965, other problems persisted and were exacerbated by later amendments. Capacity 
development, community engagement, and clarifying responsibilities would continue to be 
major challenges for civil defence due to poorly written legislation, a lack of political will at 
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all levels, and poor public image. Perhaps the most concerning is the granting of emergency 
powers without any systematic training in emergency management – a factor explored in 
the next chapter. In the next chapter it is demonstrated how it would once again take crisis, 
criticism, and a changing political context to compel the government to take action on the 




Chapter 4 Responsibility, capacity, and power: The formative 
years of civil defence 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter introduced the basic structure, rationale, and principles of civil 
defence and the emergence of what would become persistent trends: uncertainty about 
responsibilities and capabilities and the unfunded and unsupported mandate which is 
sustained by a perpetual lack of political will. This chapter and the next continue to examine 
these trends but also explore drivers of change and barriers to implementation – namely, an 
overemphasis on principles and a lack of appreciation for practical considerations, in 
particular the capabilities needed to utilise the powers and fulfil the responsibilities 
prescribed by law. This is accomplished by analysing factors which hindered civil defence 
and those which overcame weak political will and compelled the government to take 
measures to bridge the gap between principle and practice. This was a process of gradual 
acceptance that the interpretation of local responsibility, self-help, and national guidance 
had to change in order to make civil defence fit for purpose. This chapter shows how the 
government came to accept that if they did not provide support for the civil defence 
mandate they would end up being involved in all but the smallest emergencies – and this 
would defeat the purpose of having a system of civil defence. 
Where the government has proven itself to be uniquely delinquent is in the one area of law 
that should be treated with extraordinary care given the potential to curtail basic civil 
liberties - the allocation and use of emergency powers. This chapter demonstrates how the 




lack of understanding, confidence, and interest in civil defence by officials and the public. A 
new analytic theme for this chapter and the next is the value of civil defence. In 1974, civil 
defence was described as a decentralised system within which the local community would 
have to “fend for itself” using resources already available to it;1 skills were gained elsewhere 
by community members.2 But this meant a community was only as prepared for a disaster 
as the people were skilled in areas relevant to emergency response. Until capacity 
development and training became a national priority the main difference between a world 
without civil defence law and with it was local officials were granted extraordinary powers – 
but the use of these was not always clear, and training to utilize them largely absent. From 
1975 onward, major changes in civil defence form and function were initiated not by 
recognition of these limitations per se but external events – namely, regionalisation in local 
government and crisis in the form of the Abbotsford landslip in 1979. The process of making 
amendments to accommodate regional government and reflection on the crisis gave a 
platform for civil defence reform which otherwise had shown no signs of changing. During 
this time political will became the commonly proclaimed root cause of a weak civil defence 
system. As such, the first part of this chapter examines the process of regionalisation and 
what it meant to civil defence and the second part examines political will and other barriers 
to fulfilling the civil defence mandate. 
While this chapter examines this process for emergency response the next chapter 
examines disaster recovery which was a new addition to civil defence in the 1980s but had 
limited use in practice until 2010. The lessons learned for emergency response in this and 
the previous chapter were not heeded for disaster recovery which resulted in similar 
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limitations being included in the CDEM recovery framework and exposed by the Canterbury 
earthquakes. 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section analyses the process of 
regionalisation initiated by the Local Government Act 1974 (LGA 1974) and demonstrates 
how party politics and limited political interest in civil defence allowed uncertainty and 
weaknesses in the civil defence system to persist. The process of reform which started in 
1975 culminated with the Civil Defence Act 1983 which was an attempt at consolidation and 
clarification but with little by way of innovation. There were some victories – the process 
had considerable impact on the structure of civil defence as civil defence regions were 
harmonized with regions under the LGA 1974 and responsibility was shifted from centrally 
appointed Regional Commissioners to elected officials in regional and unitary councils. 
Additionally, an important development was made with changes to the law regarding 
emergency declarations which reduced uncertainty about mutual assistance during a crisis. 
But the larger issues affecting implementation and reification of the basic principles 
remained unchanged. The unfunded and unsupported mandate continued as little by way of 
training or resources accompanied the regionalisation process – civil defence was still 
reliant on extant capabilities. The process, however, revealed weaknesses and opportunities 
for the Ministry to undertake changes toward a more proactive civil defence informed by 
scholarship and reflection on their own practices. After a major crisis, and considerable 
criticism, in the form the Abbotsford landslip in 1979 the government, via the Ministry of 
Civil Defence, made a serious and sustained effort to bridge the gap between principle and 




The second section analyses the main issue identified as the primary barrier to a fit for 
purpose civil defence – political will. This is achieved by defining what political will means 
and examining the relationship between risk perception, public pressure and weak political 
will. In so doing, this section offers insights into why civil defence was treated the way it was 
and the resultant mishandling of a potentially extremely powerful area of law.  
4.2 She’ll be alright: Regionalisation, responsibility, and emergency powers3 
With the passing of the Local Authorities Act 1974 (LGA 1974) a process of decentralisation 
began within civil defence under the banner of regionalisation. The purpose was to align 
civil defence regions with those created under the LGA 1974 and to allocate responsibilities 
to regional governments as mandated by the LGA 1974. This required several amendments 
to the Civil Defence Act 1962. The emergent theme during the regionalisation and 
amendment making process was a lack of awareness of what civil defence was, what it 
needed, and even what civil defence law had the potential to do. Where there was 
awareness there was little concern other than a few key voices in Parliament. Developments 
in civil defence law in this period were hampered by weak political will, party politics, bad 
grammar, and a Minister who did not always seem to understand the Bills he was 
presenting to Parliament. This process saw the creation of new laws that would change the 
structure of the civil defence organisation which to that point had put planning for local civil 
defence with local authorities while regional coordination was the responsibility of 
nationally appointed and unelected officials. The regionalisation process was an important 
development in civil defence governance as it put more decision making and power in the 
hands of locally elected officials thereby bringing civil defence closer to its stated principles. 
                                                     




The new laws would also enable the regional or central government to compel local districts 
to provide assistance to other districts during a declared emergency – previously this 
principle of mutual assistance was assumed but never assured. However, the process of 
regionalisation failed to include measures to ensure those responsibilities could reasonably 
be fulfilled which had the effect of simply widening the gap between principles and practice. 
Gradually the awareness turned to acknowledgment and finally acceptance that the civil 
defence system was not fit for purpose and a new law and institution to address the 
capacity deficit were introduced. 
The Local Government Act 1974 and civil defence regions 
The Local Government Act 1974 (LGA 1974) introduced an additional element to 
subnational governance – regional and unitary councils.4 Implementing the LGA 1974 
involved many struggles and delays5 but for civil defence, most of the challenges in 
decentralisation and regionalisation were internally derived. The LGA 1974 initiated an 
amalgamation process which saw the functions of over 700 ad hoc bodies absorbed into 
either regional or district councils or transformed into new institutions.6 Regional councils 
would primarily be responsible for matters related to the environment with their borders 
determined largely by water catchment basins and mostly, but not always, aligned with the 
borders of districts.7 It is intuitive to think that regional government formed a middle-tier 
between the central and territorial local authorities (TLAs), but officially they are simply 
another form of local government not necessarily above TLAs. Their intended function in 
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relation to TLAs, as Bush describes, was one of complementarity rather than hierarchy.8 In 
contrast to this conceptualisation of local government under the LGA 1974, civil defence 
had an explicit 3-tier hierarchy with local plans requiring approval from Regional 
Commissioners, or regional councils after 1975, who would evaluate based on national 
guidance. Likewise, as the scale of an emergency increased responsibility for control 
ascended from the local to the regional and then the national level. Regionalisation within 
civil defence could only be fully implemented at the pace regions were made under the LGA 
1974. By 1980, only ten civil defence regions had been created in Auckland, Wairarapa, 
Taranaki, Marlborough, Nelson Bays and the West Coast, Wanganui, Bay of Plenty, East 
Cape, Canterbury, and Southland.9 The rest of the country remained the responsibility of 
the Regional Commissioners. Despite the civil defence governance structure being at odds 
with the normal governance structure in New Zealand it does not seem to have caused any 
problems and was further developed into regional Groups under the Civil Defence 
Emergency Management Act 2002. Problems arose not from the structure under 
regionalisation, but the process. 
More power, more problems: The Civil Defence Amendment Act 1975 and 1979 
The first step towards regionalisation of civil defence was the Civil Defence Amendment Act 
1975. The two main purposes of this Act were to first make changes consequential upon 
two other new statutes – the Accident Compensation Act 1972 (ACA 1972) and the Local 
Government Act 1974 which necessitated the establishment of a civil defence mandate for 
regional governments.10,11  The second purpose was to enable mutual assistance between 
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districts by allowing parts of the Civil Defence Act 1962 to be declared in a district near to 
but not directly affected by an area where an emergency has been declared. These 
amendments were a major step forward in realising local responsibility by putting 
significantly more responsibility and power in the hands of locally elected officials and their 
appointees in the form of the regional councils and regional controllers rather than 
nationally appointed Regional Commissioners. Secondly, it greatly contributed to the 
principle of mutual assistance by allowing, legally, needed resources to be requisitioned 
from districts beyond where the emergency was taking place. The reason given by the 
Minister of Civil Defence, H.L.J. May, for this addition was to further alleviate concerns 
about making an emergency declaration and instead target specific resources to perform 
particular tasks rather than mobilizing the entire civil defence organisation.12 As noted by 
the Opposition this sort of assistance could be done voluntarily but the amendment offered 
the advantage of removing uncertainty and potential resistance to providing support during 
an emergency.13 When the Civil Defence Amendment Bill 1975 went before Parliament it 
was warmly received with very few concerns expressed about its provisions. But it was not 
without problems which required another Amendment Act in 1979 to serve as a bridge to 
new legislation in 1983. 
When the Minister of Civil Defence introduced the 1975 amendment to the Civil Defence 
Act 1962 he not only displayed a lack of awareness about the Bill but also grossly 
understated the importance of the clauses within. As he introduced the Bill for the first 
reading, he emphasized that civil defence is not a mandatory provision for regional 
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government under s76 of the Local Government Act 197414 – in fact it is one of only two 
mandatory provisions under that section.15 This oversight was ultimately inconsequential 
but indicative of the level of awareness in Parliament about the Civil Defence Bill not only 
from the Minister who was presenting it but also from others as no mention was made to 
correct this error. In the case of the Accident Compensation Act 1972 he admits Parliament 
forgot about civil defence and had to back-date the section on compensation, and he called 
the provision for making an emergency declaration in a district not directly affected by an 
emergency as “procedural”.16 In fact, this provision was a major factor for removing 
uncertainty and supporting the principle of mutual assistance between districts. Before this 
amendment it could only be assumed, but never assured, that this principle could be relied 
upon in practice. It is also recognition that resources in a given district may not be sufficient 
for the risks it faces and voluntary cooperation could not be relied upon in crisis.17 To say 
that it is procedural is to downplay the significant powers involved in an emergency 
declaration. The unfunded mandate persisted as funding and training to accompany their 
new responsibilities remained as limited for regional councils as it was for territorial local 
authorities. The Opposition gave their full support to the Bill during the first reading with 
only a few words of caution regarding the section on requisitions, noting that it should be 
used only for protecting human life. The Bill received no other comments during its first 
reading and only one comment while at the Local Bills Committee regarding the backdating 
of the clause on compensation. That the Bill received such little attention was noted by a 
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member of the Opposition as being unusual and perhaps a sign that it was not well 
understood – this point was not addressed any further.18 
During the second reading, there was confusion about the role and responsibilities between 
regional and local authorities. This mainly derived from the Minister’s statement when 
introducing the Bill for the second time that the functions carried out by Territorial Local 
Authorities would be done by Regional Councils.19 This is not correct and the Minister’s 
comments sparked an unnecessary discussion about Territorial Local Authorities losing 
power and responsibility which if true would have been a violation of the fundamental 
principles and philosophy of civil defence. In fact, regional councils were given most of the 
powers and responsibilities of the Regional Commissioners in regions that had been created 
under the LGA 1974, and TLAs were still responsible for their own planning and for 
coordination within their districts during a local emergency. 20 In a region that had been 
established under the LGA 1974 responsibility for approving local plans was changed from 
officials appointed by the central government (Regional Commissioners) and given to 
regional councils which were elected locally.21 It also gave the emergency powers granted to 
the Regional Commissioners to regional councils so that during a declared emergency the 
councils could direct resources when agreed to by local authorities.22 The Minister’s 
confusion, and that of others in Parliament, likely stems from how this section was written – 
it lacked clarity due to grammatical issues and poor word choices which made it unclear 
when local authorities would be in control and could be interpreted as local authorities 
losing control to regional authorities during a declared local emergency (in contrast to a 
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regional emergency). But the Minister introduced the Bill by saying TLAs would give up all 
functions to regional councils, which is wrong. As a result, Parliament spent more time 
discussing the Minister’s misinterpreted elements and the wider problems of civil defence 
than the provisions of the Bill itself or solutions to the problems. For example, the 
Opposition described civil defence as suffering from “lethargy” and it was in danger of being 
a “paper based organisation” – the same critique levelled at civil defence in its first years.23 
In terms of finance, it was described as operating on a “show-string budget with inadequate 
support”.24 One thing that both the Government and Opposition agreed on was civil 
defence did not get sufficient support from the public. This demonstrates an awareness of 
the problems facing civil defence on the whole but the comments were limited to the fact 
that problems existed rather than ways to overcome them.  
Regarding the use of emergency powers, the Opposition questioned the necessity of 
requisition powers to which the Minister of Civil Defence responded that such powers 
would only be used in emergencies25 which is hardly reassurance as that is when emergency 
powers are to be used. Other than that, the Opposition stated there was “nothing bad in 
the Bill” and gave their blessing to these sections.26 The caveat on the use of emergency 
powers should have been the starting point of an intense discussion, not the end of a brief 
one. Neither the Government nor Opposition sought clarification on the parts of the Bill 
delegating responsibility and power during a declared emergency. The result was the Bill 
was passed although it was riddled with problems of its own and very little was done to 
address the problems raised. This of course only served to delay decentralisation and no 
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doubt further damaged the reputation of civil defence by causing significant confusion 
about which level of government would have responsibility and emergency powers. The 
solution was the Civil Defence Amendment Act 1979 which was a stop-gap measure while a 
new Civil Defence Bill was being drafted. 
The stated aim of the Civil Defence Amendment Act 1979 was to clarify the “civil defence 
planning and other responsibilities of regional and united councils”.27 The first problem 
arose from poor word selection – within the 1975 Amendment Act section 38a(1)(a) states 
that regional councils must prepare a “local plan for its district”. Under the 1979 
Amendment Act, regional councils were tasked with making regional plans while local 
authorities were to make local plans for their district as it would be confusing for the 
Regional Council to make a “local” plan for its region based on local plans submitted by local 
authorities. The 1975 Amendment Act also called for regional councils to provide adequate 
training but with no provision for funding or other means for doing so and no explanation of 
what “adequate” consisted of. The Civil Defence Amendment Act 1979 removed the 
compulsion to provide training, instead regional councils were to “promote” training which 
did not solve the problem. Lastly, the 1975 Amendment Act contained a troubling addition 
with the following s38(e): 
During a civil defence emergency, [Regional Councils will have] the control and co-ordination for the 
purposes of this Act of the personnel, material, and services made available by other local authorities 
having civil defence responsibilities within the regional council's district, Departments of State, other 
Government agencies, statutory corporations, public bodies, or other organisations or persons. 
Grammatically s38(e) is questionable as it appears to be missing a conjunction between the 
regional council’s district and the other items in the list. More importantly, it is troubling 
                                                     




because it does not specify which type of emergency be it a local, regional, or national civil 
defence emergency which creates uncertainty about which organisation would be in charge 
of coordinating resources during a declared civil defence emergency. A conflict could 
potentially have arisen between regional and local authorities if a local authority declared a 
local civil defence emergency. Additionally, the word “other” is problematic as it implies all 
other local authorities within the regional councils’ regional district. It does not preserve the 
power a territorial local authority would have if they declared a local civil defence 
emergency. It could be argued that the purpose was to allow regional councils to requisition 
personnel and other resources from neighbouring districts directly unaffected by the 
emergency but this is covered by another provision. Section 5 of the 1975 Amendment Act 
gave regional councils the power to declare a limited civil defence emergency in 
neighbouring districts (and thereby have “control and coordination”) so another provision 
for that same purpose would be redundant. The 1979 Amendment Act rectifies these issues 
with the following amendment (s9(1e)): 
During a state of national emergency or of civil defence emergency, the control and co-ordination for 
the purposes of this Act of the personnel, material, and services made available by other local 
authorities having civil defence responsibilities within the regional council's district, and by 
Departments of State, other Government agencies, statutory corporations, public bodies, or other 
organisations or persons:  
Provided that this paragraph shall not apply during a local civil defence emergency declared under 
section 22 of this Act by a Chairman of any local authority (other than a regional council) or by any 
person qualified to do so in his place. 
In this way, the Civil Defence Amendment Act 1979 served its purpose of clarifying the 




Parliament willingly passed a Bill which gave extraordinary powers for entering and 
preventing access to private property by the owners, the taking of private property, 
restricting movement, and compulsory evacuation without being entirely clear about who 
would be exercising those powers.28 The 1979 Amendment Act itself was not without 
problems as it maintained a definition of an emergency in such a way as to cast doubt on 
whether a declaration could be made before a crisis or if a crisis had to exist – the impact of 
this poor use of grammar is taken up in the next section. It also contributed to the problem 
of understanding the principal Act by adding another list of amendments. As such, it served 
as a short-term bridge while a new Civil Defence Bill was being drafted. Before the Bill could 
be made into law however and shortly after the 1979 Amendment Act was passed the first 
major disaster since Inangahua would occur in Dunedin. 
The Abbotsford landslip and the capacity deficit 
After the Inangahua earthquake and before the creation of new civil defence legislation in 
1983 was the Abbotsford landslip in the city of Dunedin in 1979.29 This event was not the 
most costly during that period, and other declared emergencies resulted in many more 
evacuees than in Abbotsford, but once again civil defence faced public scrutiny and political 
pressure which this time resulted in a Commission of Inquiry. 30  This Commission of Inquiry 
is an important part in the development of civil defence as it was the first time that civil 
defence was the subject of such scrutiny and analysis of its purpose and limitations – in 
particular for emergency powers and capacity. But once again the linkage would not be 
made between power, responsibility, and capacity. Instead, the Commission based their 
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comments on the importance of accountability between those empowered to respond to an 
emergency and those most closely affected by the emergency. 
Between the Inangahua earthquake and Abbotsford there were 45 emergency declarations, 
of which 31 were the result of flooding.31 The worst of these in terms of cost were in Lower 
Hutt in 1976 where an estimated $85 million in damage was caused and Mataura in 1978 
where an estimated $30 million in damage was caused plus millions more in stock losses.32 
In all 45 events the declared emergency lasted from a few hours to a number of days. The 
Abbotsford landslip resulted in a month-long emergency declaration with approximately 
600 people evacuated and $7.17 million in EQC claims.33 The Inquiry was initiated based on 
criticisms stemming mainly from two matters – the physical causes of the landslip itself, be 
it an outcome of natural or manmade factors; and the actions taken by authorities before, 
during, and after the event.34 Their specific orders were to inquire into and report on:35 
a. The cause of the disaster; 
b. Whether modifications to the land made by man contributed to the cause of the 
disaster, and if so, the respective contributions of the natural conditions of the land 
and those modifications; 
c. The adequacy of the measures and steps taken, before, during, and after the landslip 
by persons of authority, being measures and steps taken for the purpose of giving 
warning of the landslip or coping with its consequences; 
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d. The suitability and adequacy of the legislation (if any) relating to –  
i. The power to declare a local civil defence emergency under the Civil 
Defence Act 1962, and the powers and authorities derived from the 
declaration of such an emergency, in circumstances such as those 
surrounding the Abbotsford landslip; 
ii. The planning requirements and other constraints affecting the 
subdivision of, and the building upon, land in new developments; 
iii. The engineering and geological survey requirements in relation to 
such developments; 
iv. The availability of insurance or indemnity cover, whether under the 
Earthquake and War Damages Act 1944 or otherwise, for damage to 
land, buildings, or other property caused by earthquakes, severe 
weather conditions, or other extraordinary natural occurrences; 
e. If that legislation or the practices or procedures of any authorities are found to be 
unsuitable or inadequate in any respect, suggestions for correcting and improving 
the legislation, practices, or procedures so that, as far as possible, like disaster may 
be prevented or their harmful consequences diminished; 
f. The nature and scope of any additional legislation which, in your view, should be 
enacted: 
g. Such other matters that may be thought by you to be relevant to the general 




From the Commission’s report the two topics of greatest relevance to civil defence at the 
time36 are the conduct of officials (point “c” above) – in particular as it relates to civil 
defence’s use of volunteers, and point “d” above, regarding the “suitability and adequacy” 
of the civil defence legislation – in particular as it relates to declarations of emergency and 
the democracy of civil defence. Their findings and recommendations were based primarily 
on concern for accountability and civil liberties during an emergency based on support for 
the subsidiarity principle and local responsibility. 
The majority of criticisms from the public directed towards local civil defence officials 
stemmed from communication and information sharing difficulties, in particular specific 
information on the nature of the risk before the landslip occurred, possible outcomes, and 
the duration of the evacuation order.37 While these concerns were a large part of what 
instigated the Commission many of the criticisms directed towards civil defence were 
withdrawn or “substantially toned down” during the hearings – as people were given the 
chance to publicly vent their frustrations they tempered their criticisms.38 The remaining 
criticisms of conduct by civil defence personnel were dismissed by the Commission largely 
due to the way the Commission conceptualised and carefully defined civil defence. By 
describing civil defence as “the community organised in a particular way and possessed of 
special and unusual powers for a particular purpose” the Commission felt that the volunteer 
organisation could not be held to the same standard as professional emergency services. 39 
In this context the Commission chose to praise civil defence for what had been 
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accomplished rather than criticise them for what may be expected of professionals – the 
lack of training and resources served to the advantage of civil defence in this case, if not the 
communities they were supposed to help. The Commission gave considerable leeway to civil 
defence not only on the basis that they are a volunteer organisation, but also because the 
alternative was unpalatable in a democracy as they saw it. 
Accountability and professionalism  
The Commission rejected a suggestion for civil defence to be replaced by a standing 
professional service such as the Army on the grounds of accountability. 40  Although it was 
recognized since the earliest days of civil defence that it would not be feasible to have a 
stand-alone professional emergency response service the Commission rejected the idea on 
the basis of local accountability to the community and concerns about the exercise of 
extraordinary power during a declared emergency. Also of concern was responsibility for 
the emergency responders, who would be acting under emergency powers, being taken 
away from the local authorities. The Army are not accountable to the local community or 
answerable to local officials in the same way as civil defence which draws local volunteers 
under the authority of locally elected officials. The Commission acknowledged that there 
could conceivably be greater efficiency with the Army but they were not willing to sacrifice 
accountability for efficiency. The Army, they argued, could be a part of the overall 
community effort rather than being imposed by an external body. Additionally, the 
Commission rejected a proposal from the Local Controller suggesting restrictions on civil 
defence being investigated and scrutinized in order to avoid having civil defence personnel 
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second-guessing themselves during an emergency out of concern for later repercussions.41 
This was rejected on the grounds that doing so would cast civil defence as an organisation 
apart from the community, rather than a part of the community as the Commission saw it. 
In this way the Commission discussed civil defence in terms of a false dichotomy – either 
professionally trained responders or local volunteers. 
People and Property: Civil liberties and emergency declarations 
The “suitability and adequacy” of civil defence legislation rested on two aspects – the ability 
to declare a state of local emergency and once having done so, the powers and authority 
civil defence officials would have. The Commission introduced their comments with a caveat 
about emergency powers, stating, “Our constitutional and legislative traditions are such 
that the granting of such powers has been treated with suspicion”.42 This quote succinctly 
captures the Commission’s cautious attitude toward emergency declarations and the 
powers granted therein. Along with accountability, the Commission’s other main concern 
was the defence of civil liberties. Suggestions were made to the Commission for graduated 
stages of emergency in the form of an intermediate-stage declaration before an emergency 
and a “disaster area” after limited to the impacted area. This was rejected on two points – 
first, the Commission declared that “extensive and necessary powers with their necessary 
infringement on civil liberties should be confined”; and introducing multiple emergency 
declaration types would contribute to more, not less, confusion as decisions would have to 
be made in an emergency (or potential emergency) context. The justification for creating 
intermediate and post-disaster stages was to protect property. However, the Commission 
did not want emergency powers declared under the Civil Defence Act only to protect 
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property as the Civil Defence Act 1962 could take power away from the local government 
and they decided property was not worth saving at the expense of the civil liberties which 
may be infringed upon if the purpose was not to save lives. The proposed solution was for 
the Local Government Act 1974 to be amended to include emergency provisions to save 
property and relieve distress.43 As the central government had ultimate decision making 
authority for emergency declarations under the Civil Defence Act 1962 this decision seems 
to have been aimed at avoiding having the central government making decisions about 
property at the local level while also suspending many civil liberties. This “solution” is 
reflective of the Commission’s wariness of emergency declarations and connects the 
protection of civil liberties with accountability. That is not to say that the Commission was 
opposed to a declaration of emergency as they concluded that a major local emergency 
should have been called earlier and covered a wider area based on the worst-case scenario, 
not the most likely scenario.44 In other words, it was less the case that they were 
recalcitrant towards emergency powers as they were in support of the philosophy of local 
responsibility upon which civil defence was supposed to be based. 
A difficult situation arose when local officials wanted to evacuate residents before their 
safety was imperilled to an extent necessary for a civil defence emergency to be declared. 
The Commission consider a suggestion for the Public Safety Conservation Act 1932 (PSCA) to 
be utilized in such times, but ultimately rejected the proposal. As cautious as the 
Commission was about the Civil Defence Act 1962 they were especially so regarding the 
PSCA. The rejection was based on the spirit of the law – the PCSA was created to manage 
civil unrest, not civil defence. Although the police were given special powers under section 4 
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of the PCSA, and that section specifically mentions natural disasters, the Commission was 
reluctant to suggest utilizing the PSCA as it took power away from the local level. While they 
did acknowledge the necessity of the powers granted to the police they were opposed to 
the broad powers given to the central government which effectively removed the local 
authorities from decision making. The alternative strategy suggested by the Commission 
was to take the powers given to police in s4 of the PSCA and include them in the Civil 
Defence Act 1962 with provision in the Local Government Act to delegate said powers to 
the police and other emergency services.45 
Potential and Immediacy: Clarifying emergency declarations 
The Commission was presented with a problem with the wording in the Civil Defence Act 
1962 which caused confusion about when a civil defence emergency could be called. The 
confusion stemmed from whether personal safety faced an immediate versus a potential 
risk. The original Act defined a “major disaster” as any happening (other than an enemy 
attack or warlike event) “that causes or threatens to cause large scale loss of life or injury or 
distress to persons or in any way endangers the safety of the public in New Zealand or in 
any part of New Zealand”.46   
 
The 1968 amendment changed a “major disaster” to a “civil defence emergency” and 
changed the definition to:47 
Civil defence emergency means any fire, explosion, earthquake, eruption, seismic sea wave, flood, 
storm, tornado, or other happening (not attributable to an attack by an enemy or to any warlike act) 
that causes or may cause loss of life or injury or distress to persons or that in any way endangers the 
safety of the public in New Zealand or in any part of New Zealand. 
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The 1979 amendment changed the definition to: 48 
Civil defence emergency means a situation (not attributable to an attack by an enemy or to any 
warlike act) that causes or may cause loss of life or injury or distress or in any way endangers the 
safety of the public and which requires the adoption of civil defence measures. (emphasis added) 
The problem was based on the difference between potential for harm (may cause) versus 
the immediacy of danger (endangers) and emerged by combining the statements referring 
to “persons” and “the public”. According to the Commission the word “endangers” implied 
that imminent danger rather than probable danger would be necessary before a civil 
defence emergency could be declared.49 As the landslip was a slow-onset event and the civil 
defence’s expert advisors could not say with certainty the timing or extent of the landslip 
there was considerable confusion about whether or when a civil defence emergency could 
be called. The Commission’s comments were similar to those made after previous disasters 
(and subsequent ones) – a clear understanding about emergency plans, the law, and the 
designation of responsibility needs to be attained before an emergency occurs, not during 
an emergency.50 The Commission recommended clarifying the law to make it unambiguous 
that an emergency declaration could be called in a potential situation which would align the 
law with the original intent behind the 1968 amendment of making it easier, not more 
difficult, to make an emergency declaration when there was a threat and not yet an actual 
emergency. This issue was resolved with in the 1983 legislation which states “endangers or 
may endanger the safety of the public”.51 
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Uncertainty, convention and cooperation 
Other issues raised indicate little had changed since the 1960s. Complaints were heard 
regarding the lack of support from governmental departments with cooperation usually 
coming from individual civil defence officials’ own initiative rather than departmental 
directives.52 The issue of funding civil defence was also raised, this time to note not just the 
insufficiency of subsidies from the central government but the awkwardness of the system 
itself discouraged local governments from allocating resources to civil defence – a problem 
which would only be exacerbated as regional councils added an additional layer of 
governance to the system. In terms of the governance arrangements, the Commission 
suggested a closer arrangement between local authorities and the emergency services 
which would have the effect of reducing uncertainty. In this case the Emergency Services 
Co-ordinating Committee had a good relationship with the local borough council but the 
message from the Commission was to not rely on instances of good relations for 
communication between civil defence and local authorities but to formalize the relationship 
and not rely on chance sharing of information and decision making. Oddly, despite 
recognising the limitations of civilian responders compared to professional emergency 
services, the Commission did not make a similar recommendation for improving response 
capabilities as they did for incident management between elected officials and the 
emergency services. 
Synthesis of the Commission of Inquiry into the Abbotsford landslip 
The Commission was a unique and substantial form of discourse on the nature and 
reliability of civil defence at the time and served to further highlight the gaps between the 
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law, policy, and practice. Within their decisions the Commission was working to maintain 
the original spirit of the civil defence law and the basic philosophy of local responsibility – 
but they also reinforced the limitations of relying on extant capacity by creating a false 
dichotomy of civil defence responders being either professionally trained or local citizens 
and officials. There is no mention of increasing local capacity – instead the Commission 
praised the local civil defence response for doing well despite not being well trained. The 
lack of professional training for civil defence worked to its favour by quelling criticism during 
the inquiry, however, the lack of training hurt its image in the public as this was the source 
of much of the criticism that was dismissed by the Commission on the grounds that civil 
defence should not be expected to be professional. On the other hand, the Commission 
identified issues with funding and cooperation between government agencies and exposed 
the weaknesses in a system that relies on personal relationships instead of systematised 
cooperation and planning supported by the law. 
 It also appears that lessons from the past did not receive widespread acknowledgement - 
the main message of Inangahua was to be prepared for the worst possible outcome and 
avoid improvisation as the emergency progresses – a similar message came from Hawke’s 
Bay as noted in the introduction of the Emergency Precautions Scheme in 1939. However 
improvisation was essentially the way civil defence responded to the Abbotsford landslip 
disaster indicating that whatever planning and training that existed was insufficient in 
practice. Additionally, local authorities and civil defence officials were unsure of their ability 
to declare an emergency when threatened by a hazard if they were not in immediate 
danger. While the Commission strongly embraced the philosophy of local responsibility they 




comes to emergency powers. Both the Commission and Parliament failed to consider 
whether local authorities had the competency to use the powers they were granted. It was 
acknowledged that resources were limited, and likely insufficient, for the mandated 
responsibilities in crisis but the same thought process was not applied to emergency powers 
despite such powers being an apparent source of suspicion. 
The Civil Defence Act 1983 and the politics of civil defence 
By 1982 the Civil Defence Act 1962 had been amended six times with significant changes 
made to the governance structure and responsibilities of regional and local government. 
These changes resulted in some confusion not only due to the number of amendments but 
to problems within the amendments themselves regarding responsibility, emergency 
powers, and the state of civil defence. Additionally, the Abbotsford landslip exposed serious 
concerns with the declaration of emergencies and the limitations of untrained local civil 
defence officials and responders. The solution was a new Civil Defence Act, with the Bill 
introduced in late 1982. When the Civil Defence Bill was being read in Parliament the 
purpose was variously described as “to aid communities suddenly struck by disaster” and 
that civil defence was every citizen’s responsibility53 while the basic concept of community 
self-help remained unchanged. 54  The idea behind this inclusion of “citizens” and 
“community” was to ease the burden on local authorities. While this would help fulfil the 
basic mandate and principles of civil defence it does not address the main civil defence 
issues – enabling and ensuring local government and citizens are able to do what was 
required and requested of them under the law – and it ignores the role of the government 
to enable the law to be carried out by providing national plans for guidance, financial 
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support to local organisations and authorities, and training for capacity development. On 
these points, the Parliamentary debate was split along party lines – Labour in Opposition 
cited the Abbotsford landslip and concerns raised by local authorities as evidence of the 
need for capacity development; the National-led Government cited examples of civil 
defence doing well thus far and therefore needing no further improvement and emphasised 
the government’s role as an option of last resort in an emergency, which missed the point. 
Without adequate training, the government’s involvement would necessarily occur sooner 
and more often. The familiar historic pattern was set to continue which meant the outcome 
was a statute that further decentralised responsibilities for civil defence but very much 
resembled its predecessor in that it retained many of the limitations. As the Bill passed 
through Parliament the debate increasingly focused on capacity and the responsibility of the 
government to support not just the production of civil defence plans but also the 
wherewithal for them to be fulfilled. In the face of overwhelming evidence the Minister 
capitulated and a national training centre was established with the aim of standardising 
training – but it was an initiative driven by members from the Opposition and the Director 
of Civil Defence. 
One of the main themes during the debate was the role of the government in civil defence 
relative to local governments and other sub-national stakeholder. The Civil Defence Act 
1983 was lax toward the central government and national organisations while it was quite 
clear on local responsibilities. For example, the National Civil Defence Committee could 
recommend to the Minister that a planning committee be established to “prepare plans in 
respect of any aspect of civil defence or national emergency”.55 However the Act does not 
specify what, if any, topics should be covered by national plans or when, if ever, they should 
                                                     




be made. Compare this with regional plans which had to be made by 1 June 1984 or within 6 
months of the first regional council meeting after the law was passed - and they were only 
valid for up to three years.56 Territorial local authorities were given the same conditions but 
with their plans subject to approval from regional councils.57 Regional plans were to be 
subject to the approval of the Civil Defence Commissioners who were appointed by the 
National Civil Defence Committee and had to be consistent with whichever “operative” 
national plans existed.58 However, a similar situation occurred as with the predecessor 
legislation – it would be a slow and seemingly arbitrary process through which national 
plans would be made. While the government was certain to be vague about their own 
responsibilities and the importance of local responsibility, they were clear in maintaining a 
respectable distance from sub-national stakeholders. Despite the talk of local responsibility 
and community involvement the issue of whether or not to include representatives from 
local authorities on the National Civil Defence Committee was divided along party lines. The 
Minister was initially unsupportive of a suggestion from the Opposition to recognize a 
request from a consortium of local authorities consisting of counties, municipalities, and 
regional and unitary councils to have a member on the National Committee.59 Ultimately, a 
concession was reached whereby the Minister could allow a representative for local 
authorities to temporarily sit on the National Committee on occasion.60 
Party politics also stood in the way of one of the few potentially meaningful changes in 
emergency management. The only substantial topic that was actually debated was the 
matter of nuclear accidents. In their role as the Opposition, Labour wanted to include 
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nuclear spills in the list of happenings which could require civil defence measures and 
questioned whether additional preparedness measures should be taken as the nature of the 
risk was likely greater than local capacity.61 The National-led Government refused this 
suggestion and accused the Opposition of using civil defence as a proxy in their anti-nuclear 
campaign, and they likely were. But an important issue was lost in the debate – whether 
there were risks that would require resources and capabilities greater than those usually on 
hand in a community, and the extent to which civil defence should prepare for extreme 
events. The issue is important to civil defence for both practical and functional reasons. In 
terms of function, the debate challenged the interpretation that civil defence would only be 
activated for an imminent threat and the argument that local resources and capabilities at a 
given time were the limits of civil defence. National’s response was three-fold. The first 
response from the Government came from Norman Jones who dismissed the risk by stating 
there would be a greater chance of contamination if he urinated into the Tasman Sea than if 
a ship carrying nuclear materials had a spill.62 Second, the issue was rejected by the 
Government on the grounds that doing so would be restrictive as it would focus on causes 
rather than effects. For example, an explosion is an effect, the cause could be any number 
of issues. This was important for making emergency declarations easier as it could be 
difficult to identify the type and source of hazard in an emergency or potential emergency. 
Instead, it was argued there should be a general category of hazardous gas or substances in 
the same way there were general categories for explosions and fires. Third, the Government 
accused Labour of political grandstanding as it was a sensitive issue and ultimately 
dismissed the topic altogether.63 The Government made a strong case on a practical basis 
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but an important issue was lost in the debate when Labour argued that capacities did not 
exist to respond to a particular hazard. While the nuclear issue was soon dropped, the topic 
of capacity and whether or not civil defence was fit for purpose became the predominant 
issue while the Bill was making its way through the House. 
 When the National-led government introduced the Civil Defence Bill in 1982, the Minister 
of Civil Defence explained the purposed was to “make better provisions for the 
performance of civil defence functions by regional and local governments”.64 Instead of 
providing resources or training, the Bill, and later the Civil Defence Act 1983, aimed to ease 
the burden on local authorities by making civil defence a “total community response” and 
assigning responsibilities for emergency response to other organisations including schools.65 
But as the Labour Opposition argued on multiple occasions the Bill did not provide the 
“wherewithal” for this to actually occur.66 As Braybrooke stated, “we are living in a fool’s 
paradise if we reassure ourselves that local authorities are equipped, financed, and capable 
of dealing with a major civil defence emergency”.67 The Labour Opposition cited the 
Abbotsford landslip as an example of local civil defence officials being quickly overwhelmed 
and reported on the Education Boards Association which stated they did not have the 
resources themselves to fulfil their civil defence responsibilities, nor had their teachers 
received any training or funding for equipment to do civil defence response.68 The response 
from the Government that directly addressed issues of capacity and resources while the Bill 
was in Parliament was twofold – both of which missed the mark. First, Norman Jones argued 
that civil defence in his Southland region had adequately responded to all emergencies that 
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it had been called to thus far, therefore it would continue to do so for the future, and it was 
unfeasible to prepare for a major emergency anyway.69 Such comments were repeated by 
other Government members. But as Braybrooke pointed out in Parliament70 and Britton 
argued in his scholarship,71 New Zealand had been fortunate enough to experience a 
relatively calm seismic period in the post-war years therefore past experience was no 
indicator of future success. Second, the Minster stated that the Government’s role was a 
supportive one and only in “exceptional circumstances” would the government intervene, 
otherwise local communities would have to rely on their own resources.72 But this misses 
the point that even for unexceptional circumstances the civil defence organisation was little 
more than a paper-based organisation with extraordinary powers. The voices in Parliament 
against training, funding, and capacity development were increasingly at odds with evidence 
and opinions from scholars,73  experiences such as the Abbotsford landslip, and the 
Department of Internal Affairs74 and Ministry of Civil Defence75 which both lamented the 
poor state of readiness. From 1979 the Civil Defence Act 1962 came under review which led 
to a series of consultation meetings with local and national stakeholders that revealed a 
strong need for better training – in particular for emergencies at the regional or national 
level.76 The strongest words came from the Director of Civil Defence in 1978:77 
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“…many districts have neither sufficient people nor other resources upon which to base viable civil 
defence organisations...Individual civil defence volunteers may be trained to perform particular tasks 
by a local authority. Some attend courses conducted by the Ministry of Civil Defence and a few are 
trained at the Australian Counter Disaster College. In the main, however, reliance is placed on the 
abilities and skills acquired in other contexts. Most local civil defence organisations have no 
experience in dealing with disasters at any level and a significant number do not engage in training or 
regular practice of any sort.”  
Those who were opposed to improving civil defence were either out of touch or playing 
politics, or both. In the end, the Minister consented that some training would be necessary, 
although in Parliament he was opposed to the idea so long as Labour was in support of it. By 
the time the Civil Defence Bill became law in 1983 there was overwhelming evidence that 
civil defence was in poor shape due to its reliance on extant capabilities stemming from a 
strict interpretation of local responsibility and self-help. However the Civil Defence Act 1983 
very much resembled its predecessor, only with more responsibilities given to regional and 
community-level stakeholders. In the coming years the Ministry would take a leading role 
not simply with national plans but national training and exercises and a new appreciation 
for research on emergency management. 
From acknowledgment to action: The professionalisation of civil defence 
“The ability of civil defence to give the community protection against the consequences of 
major disasters continues to give concern to the department.”78 
Between 1974 and 1983 it was gradually accepted by a combination of crisis, criticism, and a 
new political context that civil defence needed to be strengthened in almost every aspect. 
After years of concerns raised by local authorities, elected officials, and even the Director of 
Civil Defence, the Department of Internal Affairs, in which the Ministry of Civil Defence 
resided, finally acknowledged that civil defence was in need of strengthening in the 
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capabilities necessary to carry out the functions prescribed by the law.79 But acknowledging, 
accepting, and acting on the problem created a new dilemma – finding the right level of 
national guidance without undermining the philosophy of local responsibility. To not 
address the capacity problem would mean the central government would have to regularly 
intervene, which would be contrary to the purpose of civil defence, and would also make 
the civil defence organisation consist of little more than untrained, unfunded, and 
inexperienced officials and volunteers with extraordinary emergency powers. This meant 
recognition of not only a general capacity deficit but also of uneven capacity across 
communities. As noted in the previous section, some Parliamentarians were opposed to the 
idea under their interpretation of local responsibility and self-help, and the misguided belief 
that civil defence had done well thus far and therefore was not in need of change. But they 
were in the minority as better training and knowledge were needed for civil defence overall 
to fill the gap between the demands of an emergency and the capabilities of the emergency 
services but also the gap in knowledge of risk and the hazards facing communities.80 What 
this meant was acceptance that the endogenous capacity within a community – be it local 
officials, voluntary organisations, or community members – was not sufficient for 
responding to a major emergency. It also meant the Ministry could no longer satisfy the 
principle of national guidance with the occasional national plan and lamenting the 
recalcitrant local authorities. Instead, it would need to take on a leading role in preparing 
the civil defence organisation and informing the community at large about risk and 
emergencies.  
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This marked a major change in the interpretation of the fundamental principles and 
philosophy of civil defence to include an anticipatory element by aiming to prepare for the 
risks the community faced rather than planning with a mind toward the capabilities on hand 
at a given point in time. This did not require a change in law; rather, it required a different 
interpretation of the law. The Civil Defence Act 1962 (and subsequent amendments) 
defined civil defence as the measures taken to “guard against, prevent, reduce or overcome 
the effects or possible effects” of a range of hazards which included all “planning, 
organisation, coordination, and implementation” as well as training.81 The Civil Defence Act 
1983 had a similar mandate. The way this was originally interpreted was that civil defence 
was meant to operate under conditions of immediacy and respond to “the worst effects of a 
major disaster”. 82  The anticipatory component of civil defence planning involved 
“contemplating” measures that may be necessary during a declared civil defence 
emergency83 but it was very limited beyond the scope of response. Consequently, the civil 
defence mandate was defined by the immediacy of an emergency – that is, an impending or 
unfolding emergency that would be responded to by the community using its own resources 
at the time. This imperative of immediacy in turn determined the functions civil defence 
would perform and when they would be performed. This interpretation changed gradually 
from 1975 onward with the reaction to the Abbotsford landslip giving a final push towards 
reform. 
In the absence of increased funding for local governments the solution proposed by the 
Ministry of Civil Defence was threefold – better training for civil defence personnel at a new 
national training school, increased public awareness of their own civil defence 
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responsibilities, and better knowledge on civil defence and emergency management. These 
areas became the focus of the Ministry for the next 10 years as it sought to rebuild the 
social contract between the central government, local governments, and the community 
that had been damaged by a lack of willingness among all parties to engage in civil 
defence.84 The aim was to create a groundswell of support for civil defence from the bottom 
up rather than top down but for this to occur the Ministry would need to take on a stronger 
leadership role rather than rely on the tactic of using moral responsibility and fear as  
motivators. Traditionally the role of the Ministry was to give “guidance” via national plans 
and rely on local authorities to be a conduit to communities but with the new threefold 
strategy the Ministry would have to take a more proactive leadership role in civil defence. 
However, the Ministry identified two potentially conflicting challenges – entrenched views 
from the local level against intrusions from central government and a lack of “firm guidance” 
from the Ministry itself which meant it would be treading new ground.85 As an issue 
emanating far earlier than the Ministry’s own existence the central-local power conflict 
would not only persist but be occasionally inflamed by the Ministry’s efforts to get 
compliance from local authorities and cooperation from communities. The second challenge 
fell within the Ministry’s control and from 1983 it began to take a stronger leadership role 
with the establishment of a national training centre and the Research and Planning Unit 
within the Ministry of Civil Defence in 1983.  
When the Civil Defence Bill was before Parliament the main theme was whether the country 
was prepared for a major disaster, the answer was probably not, and the reason was a lack 
of capacity to fulfil civil defence responsibilities. The Minster’s solution was to give more 
                                                     





responsibilities to sub-national stakeholders – schools in particular, but without any training 
or funding. The process to centralise and standardise training was begun by Director Robin 
Holloway who acknowledged that while there was no reasonable alternative to local 
responsibility for disaster response he criticised the persistent belief within the civil defence 
organisation that groups of locally sourced, untrained and inexperienced volunteers would 
be sufficient to manage civil defence emergencies – especially large earthquakes.86 It was 
also recognition that response capabilities were not the only problem – for local level 
planning, capacity development and new knowledge were needed as most plans at the time 
were rudimentary87 “conceptual policy documents” aimed more at getting approval and 
funding than practically preparing for emergency response.88 However, as Director Holloway 
observed, more was known about the impact of an earthquake the size of the one that 
struck Hawke’s Bay would have on buildings than on society.89 As discussed in Chapter 2, 
the social impacts of disasters had been the subject of sustained scholarship since the early 
1950s in the US but it only began to make an appearance in the New Zealand emergency 
management scene in the early 1980s.90 As a result, 1983 was a turning point for civil 
defence with the passing of the Civil Defence Act 1983 and the establishment of the 
National Civil Defence School and the Research and Planning Unit within the Ministry of Civil 
Defence.91 In Chapter 3 evidence was shown of training and outreach programmes initiated 
after the Inangahua earthquake response, but they were not systematic or regular. The 
National Civil Defence School was opened in recognition that while the new civil defence 
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law prescribed actions and responsibilities how well they would be carried out depended on 
the capability of people, especially frontline responders and officials. 92 Likewise, the 
Research and Planning Unit would fulfil a similar responsibility by supporting informed 
planning and policymaking. 
This proactive civil defence was first led by Director Holloway whose focus was aligned with 
the concerns expressed in Parliament – capacity development, especially for Controllers on 
legal understanding.93 After his departure in 1983 his successor, Wira Gardner, had a vision 
for civil defence which meant challenging the status-quo of local governments standing 
between the Ministry and the community, but also of identifying and addressing hazards 
rather than waiting for hazards to become disasters.94 In this way Gardner described a much 
more proactive civil defence which meant emphasizing the role of community members – 
something which presented two challenges, both of which resulted in backlash that led to 
his resignation. The first was overcoming a poor public perception of civil defence which, he 
noted, was often referred to as “Dad’s Army” and a Mickey Mouse outfit; his aim was to 
overcome such “erroneous and misconceived images”- but such a characterisation did not 
sit well with the civil defence community.95 Recall that the government’s aim with the 1983 
Act was to spread responsibility for civil defence beyond local officials and into the 
community – but as the community generally had a low opinion of civil defence it would 
make achieving that aim difficult. 96  In Section 4.3 the relationship between public 
perception and political will for civil defence is examined – in brief, a poor public image 
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made it difficult to get people involved with civil defence which contributed to weak public 
pressure and therefore, weak political will. Weak political will meant the Ministry had 
difficulty achieving its aims. Second, his emphasis on direct engagement with the 
community resulted in backlash from local authorities who felt he was overstepping his 
boundaries as a high-level official.97 He expressed concern about the recalcitrant attitude 
shown by some local authorities to guidance from the central government and commented 
that many local level civil defence officials had “drifted” due to a lack of firm guidance from 
the Ministry. 98  His aim of improving the public image of civil defence through 
professionalisation and greater engagement with local stakeholders and doing more to 
understand and reduce risk was progressive, but his direct approach was controversial and 
ultimately led to his departure from the Ministry of Civil Defence in 1985. His successor, 
Edward Latter, would take up the initiatives started by his predecessors with continued 
training and outreach but with a strong focus on the community. His solution to the “civil 
defence problem” was to bring civil defence to the people and break down public apathy 
and overcome the image problems described by Gardner. 99  Always careful of not 
overstepping his boundaries and crossing local officials, Latter’s aim was to increase civil 
defence awareness and preparedness at the community level through four groups – schools, 
businesses, homes, and skilled people. Latter’s approach was closer aligned with Director 
Holloway’s reactive civil defence than Director Gardner’s proactive and anticipatory civil 
defence as it focused on what to do in case of an emergency rather than actively identifying 
risk – the imperative of immediacy had sustained itself. Conversely, the Research and 
Planning Unit began introducing international concepts into the civil defence dialogue in 
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New Zealand with reviews of policy and practice in other countries and the dissemination of 
scholarship on disaster recovery and risk analysis.100 
Despite this new focus, or perhaps because of it, the Ministry struggled with finding 
meaningful outcomes from its leadership role and found itself in another catch-22. By 1987, 
local plans were still being criticised for not being realistic or practical and most of the 
national plans were still a work in progress.101 By taking a stronger and active leadership 
role the Ministry risked undermining their intended outcome of local responsibility. If local 
authorities failed or were unable to ready their communities to respond to an emergency or 
failed to mitigate risks then it would be on the central government to make up for these 
failures in case of emergency – large or small. This of course would defeat the entire 
purpose of the civil defence system which meant the simple readiness/response system 
needed to change. The changes began in 1987 with the publication of the first national 
recovery strategy102 and the adoption of a risk-based approach to emergency management 
in the 1990s. The path from these events to the Canterbury earthquakes is the focus of the 
next chapter. 
Section Summary 
Crisis and criticism tend to go together and in this case the Abbotsford landslip in 1979 
highlighted greatly varying capacity among communities to respond to the hazards they 
faced. But it alone may not have been enough, the crisis occurred during a time of change in 
the governance structure of New Zealand. The limitations of civil defence became an issue 
in Parliament only when the Local Government Act 1974 demanded a regionalisation 
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process without which there is little indication that any moves would have been made to 
improve civil defence. Recall that in 1974 the Department of Internal Affairs, in which the 
Ministry of Civil Defence was located, wrote that civil defence was a decentralised system 
where local communities would have to “fend for themselves” using what they had 
available – which really brings into question the existence of a “system”. What value did civil 
defence bring that wouldn’t be there if the law didn’t exist? Emergency powers of course, 
but they were distributed with a cavalier attitude and little concern for those who would 
wield them and those who would be subjected to them. The first few decades of civil 
defence were tentative and amateur; the regionalisation process led to a gradual 
acceptance, despite some opposition and ignorance, that the status quo would need to 
change with government grudgingly coming to accept that relying on existing capacities 
while conferring extraordinary powers was not getting the results they wanted. 
The 1983 legislation was intended as a consolidation of amendments and a way to clarify 
responsibilities for regional and local civil defence organisations. However, the process 
leading to the passing of a new civil defence statute revealed many of the same challenges 
identified with the Local Authorities Emergency Powers Act 1953 and during the first decade 
of the Civil Defence Act 1962. That is, simply giving responsibility to a particular level of 
government does not confer the requisite capacity to fulfil those responsibilities, nor is 
there any assurance that the necessary resources would somehow exist in every community 
to respond to the hazards they face. Failure to accept this would necessitate government 
involvement in all but the most mundane emergencies. The issue on whether civil defence 
should prepare for a nuclear incident was shouted down by the Government but it 




the capabilities you have. The outcome of this process was a statute with a clearer 
delegation of powers and responsibilities at the local level which was, arguably, a 
demonstration of the central government’s commitment to the first two principles of civil 
defence – self-help and mutual assistance. However, it also demonstrated the regularity of 
the government’s willingness to foist responsibility on local authorities without provisions 
enabling those responsibilities to reasonably be carried out while continuing their own 
reluctance to hold themselves accountable for their own responsibilities, namely, national 
plans but also ensuring civil liberties were adequately protected.  
The Commission of Inquiry into the Abbotsford landslip noted that the granting of 
extraordinary powers such as those contained within the Civil Defence Act 1962 is normally 
“treated with suspicion” in New Zealand. 103 Yet when the newly formed regional councils 
were given such powers in 1975 and 1979 hardly a word of concern was raised in 
Parliament despite the amendments being unclear and both the Government and 
Opposition acknowledging capacity, funding, and training for civil defence was limited and 
probably not sufficient for a major emergency. The Commission of Inquiry reaffirmed local 
responsibility not because of proximity to the emergency itself as was stated in civil defence 
doctrine, but to maintain close proximity between the exercise of emergency powers and 
those in the affected area. What was not addressed by the Commission was whether those 
who were granted emergency powers and responsibilities in crisis were suitably prepared – 
the emphasis was on accountability rather than capability. Emergency powers were the 
defining feature of civil defence until 1983 when a national training school was opened. Yet 
when civil defence went through the process of regionalisation the part of the law that 
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allocates emergency powers was amended to be incomprehensible – and it took four years 
for the law to be repaired. Recognizing that local authorities were having difficulties 
meeting their civil defence responsibilities, the self-congratulatory introduction of the Civil 
Defence Bill lauded the decentralisation aspects as a means to ease the burden on local 
authorities by giving responsibilities to schools and other institutions. The problem was not 
that local authorities were concerned about easing the civil defence burden by spreading it 
around; rather, the problem was not being able to do what was required of them by law. 
Local authorities had been given the primary responsibility of responding to emergencies, 
along with a suite of powers to assist them in doing so, but with no systematic means of 
ensuring they were able to do so. The next section aims to develop insights into why civil 
defence had such little support despite the potential risks and powers involved. 
4.3 The Civil Defence Problem 
“The whole problem of civil defence does not seem to be taken seriously.”  
Gerald O’Brien (1975)104 
No other area of law has had such a great discrepancy between the powers and 
responsibilities under the law and the resources available to utilise and fulfil them as civil 
defence. The aim of this section is to understand why civil defence proceeded in the manner 
it did as described in the previous section. In other words, to offer an explanation as to why 
civil defence was not a major public concern – and therefore not a major political concern. 
The answer comes from both ends of the political spectrum as captured by Gerald O’Brian’s 
above statement to Parliament which reflects the situation not only in government but also 
                                                     




among the public. Three successive civil defence Directors cited political will, misperception 
by the public of not only civil defence but also the risks they faced, and capacity as major 
challenges for the civil defence organisation and barriers to fulfilling civil defence 
responsibilities. 105  The lack of political will can be explained to a great extent by 
understanding the latter two issues – public perception and capacity. In this section it is 
argued that the lack of political will is linked to poor public image, a generally poor 
understanding of civil defence and risk in general, and insufficient capacity to carry out the 
civil defence mandate. Weak political will at the national level is explained using an analytic 
framework which identifies characteristics of political will and indicates the areas in which 
civil defence was lacking.  
Public perception and public pressure 
In the early years of New Zealand’s government the outcome of a disaster was the 
responsibility of the individuals affected. From the early 20th century onward the 
government assumed a greater role in citizen’s lives with the development of laws aimed at 
social welfare in health, income, injury and disasters.106 These social welfare policies 
deepened and became entrenched after WWII. The outcome, Cleveland argues, was that 
regardless of the political party in power in New Zealand there was a feeling the 
government must provide for the people, and citizen survey showed great expectations 
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among the public on the government to provide for them.107 Additionally the nature of the 
New Zealand political system was one of compromise and consensus between the political 
parties that could result, at times, in ineffective policies if they failed to target the needs or 
expectations of citizens. In some such cases, pressure groups were often created to drive 
political change for a particular social concern such as education, farming, business, 
women’s issues, and even sport.108 But civil defence never had a pressure group as the few 
disaster that did occur in the post-war years were quickly forgotten or their significance 
quickly reduced in hindsight.109 Essentially, civil defence was an unknown variable for most 
people110 or one which was quickly forgotten after the fact. This partly explains the lack of 
political will – the policy failures in civil defence had failed to result in public pressure which 
would have motivated political will in other areas of social policy where there was an 
expectation that government would provide for the people. This can be attributed to the 
way the public viewed risk from natural hazards and the way the public tended to view their 
own and the government’s responsibilities. 
Scholarship in the 1970s on public perception of risk and civil defence demonstrates the 
misconceptions commonly held about risk and the expectations the public felt toward 
government institutions which undermined the principles and philosophy of civil defence. 
Surveys conducted on citizens in Napier, Inangahua, and Christchurch on their risk 
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perception of earthquakes found that people tended to discount the risk they faced in three 
ways: 111 
1. Earthquakes had not happened in the area in recent memory therefore 
they were probably safe. 
2. Earthquakes had already happened (Napier/Inangahua) so probably safe 
for now. 
3. Earthquakes had happened but no real damage therefore little need to 
worry. 
On the other hand, there was also a prevalent attitude among respondents that if a serious 
event were to occur the central government (mainly by way of the Earthquake and War 
Damage Commission) would be there to assist or compensate – a classic example of moral 
hazard. Furthermore, the surveys found people were generally not aware of the functions of 
civil defence or if they were aware they generally were not confident in civil defence’s 
capabilities.112 These surveys are revelatory of the misconceptions people held about the 
nature of the risks they faced and the responsibilities of individuals, communities, and the 
government in contrast to civil defence doctrine and dogma. The views on earthquake risk 
are ill-informed; as Britton argued the reason for few recent experiences of damaging 
earthquakes was due not to any particular initiative to mitigate risk by the government or 
                                                     
111 Martin R. Rawlinson “Organisation for disaster: The development of civil defence in New Zealand 1959-
1970” (Master’s Thesis, University of Canterbury, 1971); P.M. Bligh “Human adjustment to earthquake hazard” 
(Master’s Thesis, University of Canterbury, 1972); Neil Britton 1977 The social implications of earthquake 
prediction and warnings on and for organisation. Background report for a paper presented at the Seminar on 
the Social and Economic Effects of Earthquake Prediction. 12 October 1977. 
112 Neil Britton “The social implications of earthquake prediction and warnings on and for organisation” 
(Background report for a paper presented at the Seminar on the Social and Economic Effects of Earthquake 




any of the reasons revealed in the surveys but simply due to the fact that no large 
earthquakes had occurred in developed areas since 1931 in Hawke’s Bay.113 Additionally the 
findings are explanatory – the lack of political will stemmed in large part from public 
perception of risk and civil defence. The government is likely to experience little pressure 
for civil defence from a public that perceives risk to be low, has an unclear understanding 
and even low expectations of civil defence, and also feels the government will help them 
out in other ways and who are also not aware or accepting of their own responsibilities 
during an emergency as envisioned by the government. Recall also from section 4.2 and the 
image problems identified by successive civil defence Directors, “Dad’s Army” being the 
most common epithet indicating that many who knew of civil defence did not think highly of 
it. Three themes can be discerned among the public regarding civil defence – a lack of 
knowledge about what civil defence was supposed to do, doubts among those who knew 
what civil defence was supposed to do, and therefore a generally apathetic public who did 
not pressure the government to better finance and implement civil defence.  
To better understand how the elements presented in this section and the last contributed 
to a lack of political will it is helpful to examine the concept of political will itself and look at 
civil defence through an analytic model. 
Understanding political will 
Political will was identified in scholarship114 and government in New Zealand in the 1970s 
and early 1980s as a barrier to fulfilling civil defence responsibilities at all levels.115 It is not a 
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phenomenon unique to civil defence as it has often been found to be the cause of a lack of 
government action and the source of failure to implement government plans in many 
areas.116 In fields ranging from education and environmental protection to economic reform 
and debt relief (and civil defence) political will, or the lack thereof, has been cited for 
government neglect and policy failure.117 However, it is something of a catch-all phrase that 
is rarely defined and solutions are rarely presented – as was the case with civil defence in 
the period examined in this chapter where political will was mentioned numerous times in 
Parliament and by Ministry officials but with limited details or diagnosis. As Evens observed, 
more time is spent lamenting the absence of political will than analysing what it means 
which leaves a gap between acknowledgement of its absence and mobilisation.118 The 
scholarship on political will is relatively limited considering the frequency the term is used 
but a small number of analytic frameworks have been developed – most of which cite a 
study by Brinkerhoff. 119 The foundational study by Brinkerhoff developed a generalizable 
framework for analysis in an attempt to systematically understand political will by 
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identifying its basic characteristics which serve as indicators. This framework serves as a 
useful tool for encapsulating how political will was lacking in civil defence. 
Brinkerhoff defines political will as “the commitment of actors to undertake actions to 
achieve a set of objectives…and to sustain the costs of those actions over time”.120 The 
context in which political will is most apparent, or lacking, is during time of change, or 
proposed changes. Brinkerhoff proposed five categories for analysis: 
1. Locus of initiative 
2. Degree of analytic rigor 
3. Mobilization of support 
4. Application of credible sanctions 
5. Continuity of effort 
The first indictor describes where the initiative for change exists – be it an individual actor 
or group that are proponents of change, or who may be compelled to initiate change from 
within the political system. It could also be external to the political system serving as a 
driver of change that induces, or coerces, others to take action. Salience is an important 
component of this indicator – if those with the power to initiate change do not perceive the 
importance or relevance of the issue then they are unlikely to initiate change. Therefore the 
extent to which the locus of initiative is positioned relative to those able to make reforms 
indicates higher or lower political will. The second indicator involves the degree to which 
the reformer or reform group have analysed the issue at hand and generated politically and 
technically feasible solutions. The third indicator, mobilization of support, describes the 
willingness and ability of the individual or group leading reform to generate and sustain 
                                                     




support and overcome resistance. Generally, the more support there is the more effective 
the reforms will be and therefore more political will can be generated. The fourth 
characteristic examines the existence and credibility of sanctions and incentives. A credible 
(enforceable) sanction would indicate a higher degree of political will than an initiative 
backed by weak or no sanctions. Finally, the fifth indicator, continuity of effort, refers to not 
only the effort but the resources put into reform over the long-term. An indicator of long-
term commitment would be a system to monitor progress with feedback and adjustments 
to ensure goals are met. If a reform appears to be a one-off and lacks these systems and 
resources (including financial and personnel) then it is an indicator that political will is 
lacking.  
The usefulness of the Brinkerhoff model of political will is the explanatory power it offers by 
systematically categorising the characteristics of political will which in this case is useful for 
demonstrating the deficiencies within civil defence as follows: 
1. Locus of initiative – For most of its history, civil defence did not have a champion for 
its cause, instead it received broad but shallow support; likewise, while it had a few 
detractors it did not have any strong opponents either. The impetus for new 
legislation came from outside the civil defence organisation. The amendments, 
which were a major source of confusion, were not instigated with the purpose of 
improving civil defence based on any sort of analytic rigour (as explained in the next 
point) but to simply align, or update, the civil defence structure with other laws. 
With few champions for the cause of civil defence within government and with no 
public pressure groups there was a weak impetus for change and therefore, weak 




other laws, to clarify poorly written amendments, and less so to account for some of 
the recommendations from the Abbotsford landslip Commission of Inquiry. The 
locus of initiative, if there was one, was within the position of the Director of Civil 
Defence. There were few personal and no group-based groundswells for change or 
reform. 
 
2. Degree of analytic rigor – The process of creating legislative amendments and 
ultimately new legislation was not informed by scholarship or practice in civil 
defence or disaster management, and only minimally informed by the Commission 
of Inquiry. There were practical elements to change but very little consideration 
given to the conceptual elements of civil defence. By keeping a very narrow focus on 
emergency response and thereby minimizing the amount of preparedness and 
training done between disasters, advances in the field such as the creation of the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in the USA in 1978 which 
introduced an integrated and comprehensive approach to emergency management 
had little impact on civil defence in New Zealand at the time. When civil defence was 
established in the 1940s and again in the 1960s great importance was made of the 
necessity of adapting the UK system to the unique context of New Zealand. Twenty 
years after the first Act was passed there appears to have been little effort to adopt 
or adapt practices from overseas. The main issues were clarity of responsibility, 
capacity, and finances and power, not innovation. 
 
3. Mobilization of support – The Government initially refused to allow local 




allowed non-members to be invited on occasion. With this criterion, it is easier to 
see how local level implementation would suffer, as local authorities would be 
subjected to top-down pressure with little opportunity for input into the measures 
they would be required to adopt. Additionally, no additional provisions for funding 
support were included in the 1983 Act despite considerable additional responsibility 
given to local governments and other organisations. The Government can be 
credited for inviting over 20 representatives from national organisations as a means 
of mobilizing support at that level but this also had the effect of alienating local 
authorities from decisions being made which they would be responsible for carrying 
out. For an organisation with a clearly hierarchical structure there was remarkably 
little indication of effort to engage the support of sub-national stakeholders. 
 
4. Application of credible sanctions – the Government refused to include coercive 
measures to ensure compliance by local governments, instead preferring a spirit of 
cooperation while also lamenting the lack of cooperation. The only carrot offered 
was funding for authorities who had approved plans, but the only stick was 
emphasizing moral responsibility. If plans were not made on time by local authorities 
then plans would be made for them at cost. 
 
5. Continuity of effort – The Government sent mixed messages in this feature of 
political will. On the one hand, the law stated that local and regional authorities 
must make new civil defence plans within six months of the 1983 Bill becoming law 
and then again once every three years. On the other hand, national plans had no 




seemingly randomly produced. Likewise funding for local authorities was never 
assured and could be expanded year on year or suddenly cut as happened in the 
1970s. As a result local governments could never be sure that their three-year plans 
could be implemented let alone funded or even guided by national plans. 
 
This categorisation of the findings from the previous sections indicates that political will for 
civil defence was lacking in every category. The locus of initiative rested primarily in the 
position of the Director of Civil Defence who faced all the limitations outlined above, in 
particular a lack of financial support and widely varying capacity across the organisation, but 
also a lack of insight into the real limitations of the civil defence organisation due to a 
scarcity of analytic research on civil defence. This partly explains the lack of innovation or 
adoption of modern emergency management principles into the Civil Defence Act 1983 – 
innovation came in the years after from initiatives within the Ministry and from external 
factors (see Chapter 5). The process of making the Act was inward looking but the problems 
of civil defence were only superficially understood. Although this analytic model cannot 
show it but as revealed by surveys public perception of civil defence and risk from natural 
hazards was low as well which meant little public pressure on elected officials. The outcome 
in the absence of more funding locally was to focus on capacity development centrally, 
increasing knowledge on risk and civil defence itself, and to strive to have a better-informed 
public. As the Minister of Civil Defence showed himself to be less than conversant about 
civil defence law and other important issues it fell upon the Director of Civil Defence to lead 





By the 1980s, the philosophy and principles of civil defence had existed for decades but they 
remained mostly an abstraction, a hopeful hypothesis, as legislation, convention, and a lack 
of political will inhibited their full reification. Until the government accepted greater 
responsibility for civil defence and readying the country for a major crisis civil defence 
remained a tentative and amateur institution. What started as a simple process to align civil 
defence regions with administrative regions under the Local Government Act 1974 led to a 
fundamentally different interpretation of the civil defence principles and philosophy. The 
traditional interpretation of the self-help principle and local responsibility was taken to 
mean that communities would need to respond to an emergency using resources available 
to them at the time of the crisis without considering the widely varying capacities around 
the country or if there were even appropriate capacities endogenous to any community that 
would sufficiently allow it to respond to an emergency based on the risks the community 
faced. By 1983 the interpretation of the foundational principle of self-help had changed 
from meaning community members and officials literally had to fend for themselves until 
outside help arrived to mean that community members and officials would be trained and 
provisioned to help themselves during an emergency thereby reducing the necessity of 
outside help. The principle of mutual assistance was not necessarily changed but enabled 
through legislation allowing for declarations to be made in districts not directly affected by 
an emergency in order to requisition resources and personnel. The principle of national 
guidance changed from meaning the creation of responsibilities for others to taking a 
leading role in creating the conditions for those responsibilities to be fulfilled. Not providing 




outcome – the central government will be involved in all but the most mundane of 
emergencies – and this brings into question the value of civil defence altogether. These 
realisations were largely ignored when civil defence was expanded to include recovery – as 
explored in the next chapter voluntary cooperation was the fundamental principle and very 
few resources were put into training recovery managers. As explored in this chapter it took 
elements external to the civil defence system to stimulate change and provide a platform 
for reform. 
What makes civil defence unique is the habit of giving significant responsibilities for public 
safety along with significant power but with limited training and resources. The process of 
regionalisation and the accompanying decentralisation and granting of emergency powers 
and responsibilities was in part embarrassing and disconcerting. The Civil Defence Act 1962 
and each of its successors contain among the most extensive requisitioning powers on the 
books in New Zealand, yet concerns raised about these emergency powers were brushed 
aside with the explanation that they would only be used in an emergency. Concerns about 
capacity and emergency powers were raised when the amendment Bills were in the House 
but it was not until after the Abbotsford landslip and the Commission of Inquiry that elected 
officials began to accept the push for change. When the Civil Defence Bill was before 
Parliament three Labour MPs, Gerald O’Brien, John Terris, and Phillip Woollaston, pushed 
for national training standards and bottom-up support – but the outcome was the 
continuation of a top-down structure that paradoxically emphasized local responsibility. In 
the end, only a few yokel politicians were lamely arguing for the status quo, but it was up to 
the Ministry to reinterpret the law and establish national training standards and reach out 




impossible to ignore that fact that civil defence was not going to spontaneously emerge 
from the ground up without adequate funding, training, or guidance regardless of how 
many times the government and Ministry spoke of local responsibility and the self-help 
principle.  
Throughout its history, civil defence has suffered from a significant lack of political will and 
public understanding about what its purpose and competencies are which created a catch-
22 situation. Without political will or public interest from the local level there would be little 
pressure on the government to spend more on civil defence. Without more spending local 
authorities would continue to be challenged in fulfilling their responsibilities leading to an 
uneven application of the law. And without an adequately provisioned, trained, and 
motivated civil defence organisation the public would be left with few opportunities to 
develop a strong and positive impression which resulted in little by way of public pressure. 
Without public pressure there is little political will. This cycle was broken by crisis, criticism, 
and a changed political context which provided a platform for concerned voices to be heard 
which compelled the government to address the problems facing civil defence. But this also 
led to another civil defence paradox – how to balance national guidance and local 
responsibility without overdoing the first or underserving the other? 
The Civil Defence Act 1983 served its purpose of bringing much needed clarity after the 
numerous amendments made since 1962. However, the 1983 legislation for the most part 
greatly resembled its predecessor albeit with better wording. The greatest change came not 
from within the legislation itself from but from how it was interpreted. The meaning of the 
philosophy and principles necessarily had to change to address the limitations of civil 




civil defence stakeholders. By acknowledging the limitations and accepting the necessity of 
capacity development and community engagement, the Ministry of Civil Defence also had 
to accept a different interpretation of the principle of national guidance and what it meant 
in relation to the philosophy of local responsibility. The Ministry could no longer fulfil that 
principle by producing the occasional national plan and reminding local governments of 
their moral duty to their communities. Instead, they needed to take a strong leadership 
position by engaging directly with other stakeholder groups and supporting those groups in 
the fulfilment of their civil defence responsibilities. In this way, responsibility for disasters 
became nationalised.  
The same year the government accepted a leading role in civil defence a new element was 
introduced – recovery. Unfortunately many of the same problems which afflicted civil 
defence when it was a response organisation would manifest in the Civil Defence 




Chapter 5 Civil Defence Comes of Age: A new emergency 
management and the recovery from the Canterbury earthquakes 
5.1 Introduction 
Taking up the themes of capacity, leadership, and responsibility from previous chapters, this 
chapter argues that the government’s action after the Canterbury earthquakes was a 
repetition of familiar historic patterns and places the earthquake recovery within the 
context of decades of practice within both the civil defence organisation and the broader 
governance system of New Zealand. This chapter explores disaster recovery in law and 
policy from the introduction of the Recovery Co-ordinator in 1983 to the Canterbury 
earthquakes and the limitations of the CDEM recovery framework in crisis. At the time of 
the Canterbury earthquakes, and virtually every other emergency since recovery was 
introduced to civil defence, the state of readiness for recovery has been poor in a way that 
is reminiscent of response in the 1960s and 1970s. 
The main focusing events after the passing of the Civil Defence Act 1983 are the Canterbury 
earthquakes. Accordingly, they are the focus of this chapter – specifically, the failure of the 
recovery framework under the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 and the 
necessity of new recovery legislation, namely, the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act 
2011 (CER Act 2011). The initial CDEM response to the Canterbury earthquake was the 
subject of a review commissioned by the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency 
Management (MCDEM) in 2012.1 Overall, the results were just satisfactory and the main 
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findings highlighted issues in the CDEM response which are similar to the findings of this 
chapter on recovery – a lack of professional training and practical experience for leadership 
positions, confusion between the mandate for particular roles, and a weak Ministry. 
Essentially, civil defence has been fundamentally weak in practice throughout most of its 
history. This chapter demonstrates that at the time of the Canterbury earthquakes recovery 
was essentially a paper-based component of civil defence that was poorly implemented due 
to the limitations of the response-oriented framework from which it is supposed to operate, 
the failure to adequately prepare Recovery Managers for their role, a failure to articulate 
the responsibilities between numerous recovery positions, and a failure to harmonize civil 
defence law and goals with other legislation. With the CDEM Act 2002, New Zealand has 
followed a similar trend as emergency management globally by introducing into law a risk-
based, integrated and comprehensive framework – but it has also followed the trend of 
neglecting recovery in practice. The CDEM recovery framework was developed on sound 
principles but contained very little in terms of practicality. To support recovery, this chapter 
recommends a review of the current emergency powers to ascertain their relevance to 
recovery and of capacities needed for recovery – large or small. These recommendations 
stem from the finding that the current CDEM system has done very little to identify and 
develop disaster recovery knowledge, capabilities and powers and is still response oriented 
and therefore a functional system for recovery does not exist in New Zealand. As with 
response in the 1960s and 1970s, recovery is primarily done on an ad hoc basis and relies on 






5.2 Civil defence meets emergency management: Review, reform, and risk 
reduction 
This section briefly explores how civil defence emergency management (CDEM) came into 
being in order to provide a basis for understanding the limitations of CDEM in the recovery 
from the Canterbury earthquakes. While the Civil Defence Act 1983 was a consolidation of 
amendments to its predecessor, the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 was a 
consolidation and integration of reviews and recommendations of emergency services, 
management, and law with an emphasis on risk reduction, further emphasis on local 
responsibility, and a recovery component premised on voluntary participation with 
cooperative outcomes2 - at least, initially. As with the Civil Defence Act 1983, the process 
leading to the CDEM Act 2002 was triggered by changes in local governance arrangements 
and law which sparked a review of emergency services based on the now familiar question 
of whether the country was prepared for an emergency of national significance. As always, 
the answer was “No” and the outcome was new legislation.3 
With a vision to build a “resilient and safer New Zealand”,4 the CDEM Act 2002 has six 
stated purposes – the first purpose is to “improve and promote the sustainable 
management of hazards in a way that contributes to the social, economic, cultural, and 
environmental well-being and safety of the public and also to the protection of property”; 
secondly the Act encourages communities to manage risk to an acceptable level.5 The next 
four are repetitive in that they call for planning – nationally, regionally, locally, and 
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integrated among a “wide range of agencies and organisation” that are involved in 
managing or preventing emergencies. The first two purposes appear to be new if compared 
to the Civil Defence Act 1983, but they were introduced in 1987 in the first national disaster 
recovery plan under the Domestic and External Security Committee (DESC) via the 
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC).6 The recovery plan was adopted into 
the civil defence national plan in 1988 and contained many principles that are fundamental 
to the CDEM Act 2002. Namely, it emphasized local authorities’ primary role not only in 
recovery but also in identifying and managing risks and expressly delineated the central 
government’s role in recovery as one of last resort with minimal involvement to get a 
community back to functioning after an emergency. It also emphasized recovery occurring 
in not just the built environment but also social, economic, and natural with the community 
at the centre. 
Changes in local government arrangements and the repeal of the Public Safety Conservation 
Act 1932 in 1987 led to a review of emergency services and powers throughout the 1990s.7 
The Final Report on Emergencies in 1991 established the direction of the review process.8  
The Final Report mainly dealt with the balance of emergency powers (for example, 
distinguishing between conflict-based emergencies versus civil emergencies resulting from 
natural and technological hazards) based on the premise that the central government had 
“primary responsibility for the security, safety, and welfare of its citizens” which meant that 
regardless of any delegation of responsibility for emergency and disaster management the 
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“ultimate responsibility” remained with government.9 In terms of civil defence the Final 
Report recommended a review and replacement of the Civil Defence Act 1983 as well as 
clarification on the relationship between the Recovery Co-ordinator under the Ministry of 
Civil Defence and the Recovery Coordinator under the Cabinet Domestic and External 
Security Committee (DESC) within the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet. In 1992 
the Review of Civil Defence was published which found that the existing structures were 
incapable of handling a major emergency, especially recovery, due to confusion among 
high-level roles, concerns about coordination, and a lack of clarity in statutory authority and 
accountability. The Review  recommended, inter alia, the adoption of an “all-hazards” 
approach and greater emphasis on pre-event planning, for to be put on the social elements 
of recovery, and emphasized the necessity of greater compatibility with other legislation – 
in particular the Local Government Act 1974.10 
In 1995 the Report of the Emergency Services Review Task Force was released followed by 
working papers in 1996 and 1997 which further elaborated the findings of the Final Report 
and Review of Civil Defence.11 These reports tended to focus on response and readiness, 
and to a lesser extent the role of risk reduction, either by mandate or design, but in regard 
to recovery all commented that clarification was needed on the role of the central 
government via DESC and the Ministry of Civil Defence based on the experience of Cyclone 
Bola in 1988. The most influential of these was the 1995 Report of the Emergency Services 
Review Task Force, or the Teagle report named after the chairperson, Somerford Teagle. All 
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four principle recommendations of the report were taken up either in the immediate years 
or after the passing of the CDEM Act 2002:12 
1. Establish a Ministry of Public Safety mandated to give policy advice, 
2. Adopt a scalable response model for local and central government, 
3. Accept the principle of “contingent capability” which would require a better understanding 
of the New Zealand hazardscape, 
4. Establish a “transition unit” to manage the establishment of the Ministry of Public Safety and 
which would form the core of the new Ministry. 
Instead of a Ministry of Public Safety, the Ministry of Emergency Management served as a 
“transition unit” and was merged with the Ministry of Civil Defence to form MCDEM. The 
model for response was established as the Coordinated Incident Management System 
(CIMS) in 199813 which also served as the structure for the recovery framework. The 
principle of contingent capability mainly referred to the health and housing sector, but the 
hazardscape element was integrated into civil defence through planning document required 
under the CDEM Act 2002. This is supported through knowledge generated via research 
platforms such as the Natural Hazards Research Platform and through plans made under the 
Resource Management Act 1991. 14  From this process emerged a new emergency 
management – a risk-based, all-hazards, comprehensive, and integrated holistic system15 
that was made into law and practice through the CDEM Act 2002 and its supporting plans, 
strategies, and guidelines. But the new CDEM framework neglected to overcome many of 
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the limitations of the previous civil defence regime – in particular a lack of clarity on 
recovery functions and conflicts between various statues, especially those related to land 
use and buildings. The outcome of this neglect was a new law and governance structure 
after the Canterbury earthquakes. 
In the mid-2000s, a significant amount of research was done by Resilient Organisations16 
and James Rotimi in his PhD dissertation17 on barriers to reconstruction after a major 
disaster in New Zealand – in particular by laws governing land use and buildings. The main 
findings were similar to findings presented in the 1990s at the Wellington Lifelines Forum,18 
that is, laws governing land use and buildings would serve as barriers to reconstruction as 
they were designed for business as usual circumstances. In such normal conditions the 
processes for attaining consents and other such procedures may be inconvenient and even 
time consuming, but not a substantial barrier. However, when large areas of a city are being 
rebuilt simultaneously such routine procedures would be impossible to follow given the 
time and manpower involved. Few, if any, provisions for major crises were contained in 
statutes such as the Resource Management Act 1991 and the Building Act 2004 and its 
predecessor, and the CDEM Act 2002 offered no emergency powers for recovery. To this 
end, in 2008 Resilient Organisations found that special provisions would have to be made 
after a major disaster to overcome the business as usual processes of the RMA and Building 
Act.19  These sorts of barriers were largely overcome by the Canterbury Earthquake 
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Response and Recovery Act 2010 and its successor, the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery 
Act 2011 in a rather heavy-handed manner.20 But they were relatively easy, even if not 
constitutionally sound,21 fixes; other problems with disaster recovery identified in the 1990s 
such as confusion between national level recovery coordinators remained – as did other 
problems with capacity and experience which mirrored the challenges in disaster response 
in the 1960s and 1970s. These problems come from the CDEM recovery framework itself 
which is quite broad in scope but very limited in substance and, to borrow a phrase from 
criticism of the response framework in the 1970s, lacked the wherewithal to do what was 
expected of it. Altogether, before the CDEM Act 2002 was passed both the broad legislative 
framework and civil defence governance arrangements had been identified as potential 
barriers to recovery from a major disaster. The next section explains the overall CDEM 
framework, while the remainder of the chapter explores the limitations of the CDEM 
recovery framework. 
National CDEM Framework 
The CDEM Act 2002 introduced a governance structure and planning responsibilities which 
focused on risk management and a decentralised system with significant responsibility 
placed on regional CDEM Groups based in the regional or unitary council. As with civil 
defence regions under the Civil Defence Act 1962 and 1983, the region covered by CDEM 
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Groups generally correspond with regions under the Local Government Act 2002. 22 
According to the National Plan 2005, a CDEM Group:23 
 (a) is a committee of elected representatives of local authorities in the region covered by the CDEM 
Group; 
(b) is supported by chief executives, hazard plans, EOCs (Emergency Operation Centre) and staff, and 
the involvement of communities of interest at all levels;  
(c) has established cross-boundary agreements with other CDEM Groups; 
(d) can be viewed as a consortium of local authorities, emergency services, and others delivering civil 
defence emergency management in a co-ordinated manner according to their group plans and their 
community outcome process. 
Each CDEM Group has a Coordinating Executive Group consisting of high-level members 
from local authorities, emergency services, and other related organisations – the CEG 
reflects the recommendation from the Commission of Inquiry to the Abbotsford landslip in 
1979 that the relationship between local authorities and emergency services be formalised. 
Each CEG must have:24 
1. the chief executive officer of each member local authority or a person acting on the chief executive 
officer’s behalf; and 
2. a senior Police employee; and 
3. a senior member of the Fire Service; and 
4. the chief executive officer of the hospital and health services operating in the area or a person acting 
on the chief executive officer’s behalf; and 
5. any other persons that may be co-opted by the Civil Defence Emergency Management Group. 
 
The main position in the CDEM Group structure is the Group Controller who is empowered 
during a declared emergency to direct and coordinate all resources for the emergency 
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response – the Controller’s powers end with the termination of an emergency declaration.25 
The main statutory documents under the CDEM Act 2002 are the National CDEM Plan and a 
National CDEM Strategy – these are elaborated upon with a Guide to the Plan and 
numerous Director’s Guidelines which explain various aspects of civil defence. The national 
CDEM framework also includes regional Group plans and local arrangements, as well as 
other statutes that address hazards such as the Resources Management Act 1991 and other 
agencies and organisation.26 Civil defence emergency management itself is defined as “the 
application of knowledge, measures, and practices that – 1) are necessary or desirable for 
the safety of the public or property; and 2) are designed to guard against, prevent, reduce, 
or overcome any hazard or harm or loss that may be associated with any emergency; and 
includes, without limitation, the planning, organisation, co-ordination, and implementation 
of those measures, knowledge, and practices.”27 An “emergency” in this case is similar to 
the Civil Defence Act 1983:28 
A situation that— (a) is the result of any happening, whether natural or otherwise, including, without 
limitation, any explosion, earthquake, eruption, tsunami, land movement, flood, storm, tornado, 
cyclone, serious fire, leakage or spillage of any dangerous gas or substance, technological failure, 
infestation, plague, epidemic, failure of or disruption to an emergency service or a lifeline utility, or 
actual or imminent attack or warlike act; and (b) causes or may cause loss of life or injury or illness or 
distress or in any way endangers the safety of the public or property in New Zealand or any part of 
New Zealand; and (c) cannot be dealt with by emergency services, or otherwise requires a significant 
and co-ordinated response under this Act. 
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The National Strategy contains the values, principles, and goals for CDEM, along with 
objectives for each goal. The National Strategy provides an “overarching framework for 
CDEM planning” and is supported by the National Plan, CDEM Group Plans, and local, 
organisational, and individual plans – although there is no legal basis for compelling 
individuals or most organisations to make CDEM plans. The purpose of the National Plan is 
to:29 
(a) state the hazards and risks to be managed at the national level; and 
(b) provide for the civil defence emergency management arrangements to meet 
those hazards and risks. 
The three objectives of the National Plan are:30 
(1) To provide for effective management of states of national emergency or civil 
defence emergencies of national significance through a planned and co-ordinated 
whole-of-government response. 
(2) To provide for effective recovery from states of national emergency and civil 
defence emergencies of national significance through a planned and co-ordinated 
whole-of-government response. 
(3) To provide for effective management of national support in states of local 
emergency through a planned and co-ordinated whole-of-government response. 
The CDEM Act 2002 did not introduce an entirely “new” system of emergency management, 
but it did bring into primary legislation many of the elements articulated in the first 
recovery plans – in particular risk management and the holistic sustainable development 
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principles. Response, readiness, and recovery would remain the core functions of the 
Ministry and local authorities under the CDEM Act 2002 with most risk reduction activities 
occurring under other statutes.31 In the next section it is demonstrated that recovery, as a 
component of the 4Rs (Reduction, Response, Readiness, Recovery) of civil defence 
emergency management, was sorely neglected by MCDEM in a way that is reminiscent of 
the way its predecessor underestimated the capabilities needed by local authorities to fulfil 
their civil defence responsibilities for response and readiness. Unlike response-oriented 
positions such as Group Controller which are mandatory, the main recovery positions at the 
sub-national level are not mandatory. This makes CDEM essentially a response-based 
system with an optional recovery component – that is, until a major disaster struck and new 
legislation was required. As for the central government, their role is based on a precept of 
avoidance which places them in a position of having to adapt to the demands of an 
emergency during an emergency which was identified as far back as 1942 as an undesirable 
position to be in.32 Adaptation during a major crisis in inevitable, but must be supported by 
a resilient system which means a high-level of readiness33 and as much as possible the 
reduction of uncertainty from emergency management laws and policies. In the remainder 
of this chapter it is argued that at the time of the Canterbury earthquakes, New Zealand was 
not ready to recover from any sizeable emergency using the CDEM framework. Despite the 
extensive review of laws and policies and adopting a risk-based approach and sustainable 
development principles for civil defence in the 1990s and 2000s, the fundamental issues of 
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power, funding, mandate, responsibility, and capacity were not fully reflected in the 
recovery space. 
5.3 The Limits of Civil Defence: Disaster Recovery 
“…on paper, civil defence lacks nothing…however, the civil defence organisation 
continues to lack the resources to do the job demanded of it” John Terris, 198334 
Introduction 
The above quote was made in criticism of the lack of wherewithal for civil defence 
responsibilities to be carried out when civil defence primarily meant emergency response – 
but it is an apt description of the recovery component under the Civil Defence Act 1983 and 
the CDEM Act 2002. The Civil Defence Act 1983 was mostly an unremarkable document 
compared to its predecessor but for the inclusion of a section on recovery. However, 
recovery suffered from the same type of neglect as response did in the first decades of civil 
defence in that it was primarily paper-based and lacked training, funding, and even clarity 
about the functions to be performed by the various roles within the recovery framework. 
These limitations were identified in the 1990s, as demonstrated in the previous section, and 
maintained under the CDEM Act 2002. The purpose of this section is to explore the concepts, 
principles, roles, and structure of the recovery component of the 4Rs in New Zealand in 
order to argue that after the first recovery plan was made in 1987 recovery has since been 
very much neglected. The primary reason for the establishment of the Canterbury 
Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA) was the “unprecedented”35 scale of the disaster; 
unofficially it was also due to coordination and cooperation difficulties among local 
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authorities.36 What has rarely been considered is the level of readiness in the CDEM 
recovery framework itself at the time of the Canterbury earthquakes.  
The 1992 review of civil defence warned that for civil defence to be successful there must 
be “clarity, completeness, and a public testing of the planning and performance” of civil 
defence and expressed scepticism that the hierarchical structure which places so much 
responsibility at the local level would survive a major crisis.37 The Review also predicted the 
local community would be lost in the “bureaucratic thicket” as the central government 
responded to a crisis. This section demonstrates these concerns were not heeded for 
recovery under the CDEM Act 2002 and the result was the collapse of the hierarchical 
structure and the creation of CERA – a central government run bureaucracy. This section 
and the next demonstrate that it is highly unlikely that any part of the country would have 
been ready to recover from any sizeable disaster due to a confusing governance structure, a 
failure to properly train recovery managers, and divergent policy interpretation about local 
government responsibilities and the CDEM recovery mandate. The aim of this section is to 
identify the barriers to recovery which created vulnerabilities due to the design and weak 
implementation of the CDEM recovery framework. The main problems identified in this 
section is that when it comes to recovery within civil defence, form came before clearly 
articulated functions, and principle before practice. While the CDEM principles of recovery 
were largely adopted by CERA, the concept of recovery at the highest level was based on 
avoidance, not good governance. By failing to properly plan the central government’s role in 
recovery there is little more that nationally appointed coordinators and managers could do 
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other than spend money. And this is what the government had hoped to avoid in the first 
place.38 
Recovery in civil defence: Principles, purpose, and priorities 
The first national recovery plan created under the Civil Defence Act 1983 was as much an 
aspirational document as a form of risk management for the central government. It outlines 
recovery principles and priorities for all levels of government and aims to contain the 
government’s exposure to costs from recovery while also reminding local authorities and 
citizens of their civil defence and risk management responsibilities. The government created 
a plan that was principled but pragmatic and limited their commitment to the affected 
community. Many, if not most, of the elements of the first national plan remain in place 
today.  
The first Recovery Plan, produced in 1987, was administered by Domestic and External 
Security Committee within the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet – this plan was 
copied wholesale into the National Recovery Plan under the Civil Defence Act 1983 the 
following year with some additions. The 1987 Recovery Plan identified three sorts of 
emergencies – civil defence, agricultural, and medical, and designated the Domestic and 
External Security Committee as responsible for “all post-disaster coordination”.39  It also set 
out the basic purpose, principles and priorities, namely:40  
 Restore the fabric of the affected community to allow a return to normal social and 
economic activity as quickly as possible while mitigating against future occurrences; 
 
 As much as possible, recovery should be managed by local authorities; and 
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 Central government will only be involved where local resources are inadequate to 
undertake recovery and only to the point which local authorities are able to take over. 
 
The priorities were safety of people, and then social, economic, and physical restoration. 
Implicit within this plan, and explicitly stated in subsequent plans, is that recovery would 
follow a similar form as response with successively higher levels of government being 
involved as the severity of the event grew. These principles are clear, long lasting, and 
generally accepted globally as desirable for disaster recovery – build back better when 
practical; elements in addition to physical infrastructure need recovering including the social 
fabric of a community; and local authorities need to take a leading role albeit with support 
from the central government.41 These same principles can be seen in the National Plan 
200542 and 201543 under the CDEM Act 2002 as well as the CERA Recovery Strategy.44 But 
the latter document added practical elements that were missing from previous recovery 
documents. And this highlights fundamental and persistent problems for civil defence that 
are likely to continue – the gap between principles and practice, and the gap between 
responsibilities and the ability to fulfil them. These problems manifested in each of the 
previous chapters covering 50 years of civil defence. 
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The Recovery Plan under the Civil Defence Act 1983 adopted the purpose, principles, and 
priorities of the DESC recovery plan but it was missing practical elements which would 
support implementation. The Civil Defence Recovery Plan’s two functions were to firstly 
remind sub-national stakeholders of their responsibility towards risk reduction and then 
secondly to outline areas where the central government could potentially offer and 
coordinate resources for a major recovery.45  The Recovery Plan sent a strong message of 
the government’s desire to avoid exposure to financial costs for recovery as a result of local 
authorities, individuals, and business not managing hazards or preparing for emergencies by 
fulfilling their civil defence or risk-reduction responsibilities (which were articulated in other 
statutes) – but it lacks a practical element seen in response and readiness plans that could 
compel specific actions such as training or education or planning. Likewise, with its risk-
based and community-centred principles the government’s first recovery strategy formed 
the basis of the current CDEM system but again with few provisions on how to implement. 
Although based on sound principles, in practical terms the recovery plan in New Zealand is 
based on avoidance rather than good planning. Since its earliest appearance in civil defence, 
recovery has been neglected in terms of practical considerations of implementation and 
some of the problems stemming from this – such as the confusing array of recovery 
coordinators, managers, and commissioners were carried over wholesale from one civil 
defence Act to the next. 
 
                                                     




The Recovery Framework: Form before function 
“It is the pervading law of all things organic and inorganic, of all things physical and 
metaphysical, of all things human and all things superhuman, of all true manifestations of 
the head, of the heart, of the soul, that the life is recognizable in its expression, that form 
ever follows function. This is the law.”  Louis H. Sullivan, 1896. 
Since the earliest years of civil defence there has been a graduated framework whereby 
successively higher levels of government become involved as the demands of an emergency 
exceed capacity at the lower levels. This model was adopted for recovery in the 1980s along 
with the creation of various recovery roles and was solidified in 2005 with the Guide to the 
National Plan (Figure 5-1). This structure is based on the response model which dates as far 
back as the introduction of the Regional Commissioners in the 1960s and was further 
institutionalised within the CIMS structure which was adopted for response in 1998 (Figure 
5-2).46 Unfortunately, as demonstrated in the next section, the actual functions to be 
performed by the roles within this framework were rarely explicated in any great detail. In 
other words, the form of recovery existed before the functions were clarified.  
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The creation of such a structure gives 
the impression of readiness and 
certainty – when an emergency 
becomes more challenging, clearly 
delineated levels of support are 
contributed by successively higher 
levels of government. This is only an 
illusion of certainty when in fact 
there was nothing but uncertainty 
about who would be doing what and 
when. The shortcomings of this 
format have long been known. The 
Review of Civil Defence 1992 identified 
the need for clarity in the various roles 
within civil defence – a point that was 
made again three years later by the 
Teagle Report – and also criticised the 
expectation that the local community 
would be able to withstand pressure 
from the structures above. In effect, 
one of the main problems with 
recovery in New Zealand was identified 20 years before the Canterbury earthquakes – a lack 
of clarity between the various recovery roles. By adopting and expanding the recovery 
Figure 5-1 Generic Recovery Structure 
Source: Recovery Management: Director’s 
Guidelines for CDEM Groups [DGL 4/05] 
Figure 5-1 Generic recovery structure 
Source: Focus on Recovery: A holistic framework for 
recovery in New Zealand. Information for the CDEM Sector 
[IS5/05] 
Figure 5-2 Scalable response structure 
Source: Officials’ Committee for Domestic and External Security 
(2014) The New Zealand Coordinated Incident Management System 




framework from its predecessor, the CDEM Act 2002 added to the problems of recovery.  As 
the rest of this chapter argues, not only did these roles lack defined functions but they also 
lacked the training and powers which would allow them to do their job were their job even 
clarified. Civil defence did however have principles, and priorities and purpose – but after 
these were established in the 1980s momentum was lost until the Canterbury earthquakes. 
The roles of recovery: The Disaster Recovery Co-Ordinators, the Commissioner for Disaster 
Recovery, and the Recovery Managers 
In the 1980s and 1990s four positions were created for disaster recovery under two statutes 
and two statutory regulations – these positions were all carried over under new local 
government and civil defence statutes in 2002 despite repeated notices about the confusion 
caused by a lack of a clear mandate and authority. There is no clear explanation for the lack 
of mandate but the lack of authority was by design as the CDEM Act 2002 was largely based 
on “voluntary participation” and enabling cooperative outcomes.47 
The Civil Defence Act 1983 created the position of a Recovery Co-ordinator which the 
Minister could appoint if it was felt the local authorities did not have the ability “to ensure 
the effective co-ordination of the resources necessary to restore necessary services, 
amenities, and habitation”.48 Meanwhile, under the 1987 National Recovery Plan, a DESC 
Recovery Coordinator would also be appointed if central government assistance was 
needed in order to coordinate resources and planning nationally. During a declared 
emergency the Regional and Local Controllers would be responsible for directing and co-
ordinating all resources necessary for the emergency.49 The Civil Defence Recovery Co-
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ordinator assumed all civil defence functions and powers of the Regional or Local Controller 
and functioned alongside local authorities for the purpose of restoring “necessary services, 
amenities, and habituation” but without emergency powers after the declaration ended.50 
The Recovery Co-ordinator would be under the direction of the Regional Commissioner for 
the region in which the emergency occurred until the declared emergency ended and then 
under the Secretary of Civil Defence. The 1983 statute was quite clearly focused on the 
immediate needs of the emergency and not long-term recovery but it was not clear in what 
capacity the Recovery Co-ordinator would function after a declared emergency ended as 
they would have lost the powers granted to the Regional and Local Controllers under the 
Act. Additionally, it was not clear how resources would be coordinated any better by a 
Recovery Co-ordinator than Regional or Local Controller if they did not have the power to 
compel any sort of action or requisition resources once the declared emergency ended. 
Additionally, an amendment to the Civil Defence National Plan in 1992 allowed for any 
central government department to appoint a recovery coordinator. It also allowed for the 
appointment of a local Recovery Manager to liaise between local authorities and the DESC 
Coordinator if a national Coordinator had not been appointed.51 None of these positions 
had any particular powers, only functions such as “liaise” and “coordinate” and would rely 
on the goodwill of other departments and private businesses. 
In contrast, a 1981 amendment to the Local Government Act 1974 created a much more 
powerful role in the Commissioner for Disaster Recovery. This Commissioner could advise, 
monitor, and even replace local authorities if the Minister felt they were unable to 
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adequately exercise their “powers, functions, and duties”52 – not just those related to the 
immediate needs of the recovery as under the Civil Defence Act. The powers given to the 
Commissioner were absolute in so far as the powers ordinarily given to local authorities:53  
The Commissioner, in the name and on behalf of the local authority, may exercise any power and 
shall perform all the functions and duties conferred or imposed on the local authority by this or any 
other Act, or by any instrument or otherwise. 
While the Civil Defence Recovery Co-ordinator was appointed for 28-days (extendable if 
necessary), the Local Government Recovery Commissioner had a baseline three-month 
period. The person appointed as the Civil Defence Recovery Co-ordinator could also be the 
Recovery Commissioner. When comparing the two statutes a graduated system is apparent 
– the Civil Defence Act confers upon a nationally appointed Co-ordinator the powers and 
responsibilities of a Local or Regional Coordinator but is limited to the immediate 
restoration of basic services and addressing basic needs. The Local Government Act 
however gave all powers from that Act and any other that local authorities would normally 
have to the nationally appointed Commissioner. The Local Government Act 2002 contained 
two provisions for central government to intervene via an appointed Commissioner - the 
first provision was a general case of local authorities failing to perform, the second provision 
was specifically for local authorities failing to perform in a disaster recovery.54 This provision 
allowed for a full takeover of the “powers, functions, responsibilities, and duties” of local 
authorities. The Commissioner for Disaster Recovery was eliminated by a legislative 
amendment in 2012.55 
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This potentially confusing arrangement was noted by each of the main review reports on 
emergency management in New Zealand in the 1990s56 yet it remained in place even after 
the CDEM Act 2002. Instead of adding clarity, the CDEM Act 2002 and the multitude of 
explanatory guidance documents produced since 2002 contributed to the confusion by not 
giving a clear mandate for the main recovery roles, by not making recovery planning 
mandatory which meant recovery plans would not have legal authority as do the CDEM 
Group plans, and by not granting emergency powers for recovery as there are for response. 
Under the CDEM Act 2002 a “suitably qualified and experienced person” could be appointed 
as Recovery Co-ordinator in the case that the Minister felt a Group would be unlikely to 
“ensure the effective carrying out of recovery activities in its area”.57 The CDEM Act 2002 
also states that if a Recovery Co-ordinator was appointed they would be treated as the 
Group Controller and be granted “all the functions, duties, and powers of a Group 
Controller”.58 The Recovery Co-ordinator would be responsible to the Director. The National 
Plan 2005 simply says the Recovery Co-ordinator has a role to carry out with no details on 
what that role might be.59 The Guide to the National Plan gives more detail:60 
The prime function of the Recovery Co-ordinator is to manage the work of agencies at the area of the 
emergency and to ensure that government assistance and actions are properly co-ordinated. In 
instances where such a person is appointed, local responsibility remains, and the CDEM Group 
Recovery Manager is to work with the Recovery Co-ordinator. 
Three successive documents – the CDEM Act 2002, the National Plan 2005, and the Guide to 
the National Plan, did little to elaborate on what the Recovery Co-ordinator would do. The 
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statute, the statutory regulation, and the supporting document all say the same thing: the 
Recovery Co-ordinator is to make sure the recovery is coordinated properly. There is no 
indication of how that would be done.  
There are two major issues with the description of the Recovery Co-ordinator’s role. First, 
the assumption that a Recovery Manager exists locally – it is not mandatory for one to be 
appointed. Second, a Group Controller’s powers are only available during a declared 
emergency which means a Recovery Co-ordinator’s powers would only be available during a 
declared emergency. Under the CDEM Act 2002 an emergency declaration lasts for up to 7 
days and may be extended.61 Once the declaration ended the Recovery Co-ordinator would 
be powerless. The Recovery Co-ordinator would do whatever the Director ordered, but 
there is no real obligation for “agencies at the area of the emergency” to follow the 
direction of the Recovery Co-ordinator after the emergency declaration ended. It might be 
practical for them to, but practicality is a major limitation for recovery within the CDEM 
framework. Realistically, an agency at the local level would follow the direction of their own 
Director and Minister, not the ones from Civil Defence. And this was recognized by the 
Ministry in 2005:62 
Not only will statutory powers cease, but some agencies and organisations, whose contribution may 
be linked directly to the state of civil defence emergency, may decide their role is over.  
The absence of power was intentionally done in order to have a “cooperative” atmosphere 
during recovery instead of coercive.63 The Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act 2011 
overcame this cooperative and confusing system at the national level through the Minister 
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for Canterbury Earthquake Recovery. However, there remained another recovery position 
that could potentially exist at any level – the Recovery Manager. 
The Recovery Manager 
Adding to the confusion of which role will be involved and when, and for what purpose is 
the position of Recovery Manager. The Ministry has progressed from respecting the 
“cooperative” relationship ethos that the CDEM Act was based on and merely suggesting 
local authorities create the position of Recovery Manager, to making it virtually impossible 
to make a CDEM plan without it, to proposing that it be a requirement under the Act.64 
There are three possible roles with the title Recovery Manager – National, Group, and Local 
– but the distinction is not always made in Ministry documents. Generally, unless specific 
reference is made to the National Recovery Manager the term “Recovery Manager” refers 
to the Group Recovery Manager. 
 The role of Recovery Manager has made numerous appearances in New Zealand legislation, 
legislative instruments and policy documents but has always been a weak position due to a 
lack of clarity about its role relative to the Recovery Co-ordinator, a lack of a clear mandate, 
a lack of emergency powers, and the fact that the position was only suggested and not 
required. The Recovery Manager position was first created in a 1992 amendment to the 
recovery section of the National Plan under the Civil Defence Act 1983.65 While the 
principles and positions created under that National Plan were largely carried over to the 
CDEM Act 2002 – the Recovery Manager position does not appear in the Act and was only 
mentioned in passing in the National Plan 2005. Instead, it first appeared in two documents 
                                                     
64 Office of the Minister of Civil Defence “Review of the legislative framework for recovery from emergencies” 
June, 2015. 




in December 2002, Working Together: Developing a CDEM Group Plan: Director’s Guidelines 
for CDEM Groups and Working Together: The Formation of CDEM Groups: Director’s 
Guidelines for Local Authorities and Emergency Services. In these two documents the 
Ministry simply suggests the appointment of “suitably trained and competent” Recovery 
Managers and justified the lack of powers on the premise of an overall voluntary and 
cooperative CDEM framework.66 The Ministry changed its view regarding the necessity of 
the Recovery Manager in 2005 by stating in the Director’s Guidelines to Recovery 
Management that one would be necessary during the transition from response to recovery 
– but this statement implies the position would already be filled as the Group Plan is not 
made during an emergency:67 
The CDEM Group Recovery Manager will be named in the CDEM Group plan, and will take up the role 
while the emergency is still in force and the controller is managing response efforts. 
This is confusing because the National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan 2005 only 
mentions the Recovery Manager in a short list of positions which could be considered for 
professional development.68 Nowhere in law does it say a Group Recovery Manager must be 
appointed, but it is impossible to complete a Group Plan without appointing one. The 
Director’s Guidelines to the National Plan 2005 add to the confusion by offering a short list 
outlining the role of the National Recovery Manager, but not for the Group or Local level.69 
The Director’s Guidelines for Recovery Management superseded the 2002 guide for CDEM 
Groups but it is not a legislative instrument and gave no more powers to Recovery 
Manager’s than before which meant the “voluntary” and “cooperative” nature remained. 
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Additionally, the Director’s Guideline to Recovery attempts to direct Groups to appoint a 
position while failing to say what that position entails. It was not until 2010 that the Ministry 
produced a document outlining general qualities for Recovery Managers70 and only one 
national training standard had been created for recovery management compared to over a 
dozen for response.71  
There is no clear guidance in the Director’s Guide to the National Plan of the relationship 
between the National Recovery Manager and the Recovery Co-ordinator. According to the 
Guide to the National Plan 2005, after a Recovery Co-ordinator is appointed the Group 
Recovery Manager remains and coordinates with the Recovery Co-ordinator as well as 
liaises between the Local Recovery Manager and National Recovery Manager. The Recovery 
Co-ordinator is supposed to work “at the area of the emergency” to coordinate government 
assistance and action and reports to the Director of Civil Defence.72 However, the National 
Recovery Manager works nationally but also “liaises” with Group Recovery Managers and 
“co-ordinates the recovery activity of the relevant CDEM Groups”.73 This makes it unclear 
who is coordinating – the Co-ordinator or the National Recovery Manager. If both can fulfil 
the same function then there is an unnecessary redundancy in the CDEM framework. As 
was done in the writing of this chapter, one would have to carefully read through a half-
dozen documents totalling hundreds of pages just to understand what is to be done by the 
only four positions in the CDEM recovery framework. 
Finally, the CDEM Act 2002 states the Recovery Co-ordinator is under the direction of the 
Director and whether or not the Recovery Co-ordinator takes on the powers and role of the 
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Regional Controller is to be determined at the time of appointment.74 The problem is the 
same as under the Civil Defence Act 1983 - the Regional Controller is only empowered for 
response, not recovery, and the emergency powers granted are only available for the 
duration of the declared emergency. Essentially it is a question of competence and 
convention – what could a nationally appointed Recovery Co-ordinator achieve that a 
Regional Controller could not when they are given identical emergency powers that are 
limited to the duration of the emergency declaration? 
Section Summary 
It is clear that there are major contradictions and limitations within the CDEM recovery 
framework which make it a vulnerability in a crisis and a liability towards having a resilient 
country due to the uncertainty about roles and authority. This issue is not new to the civil 
defence. The 1992 Review of Civil Defence specifically mentioned this lack of “clarity and 
completeness” as a weakness of the civil defence system and was a key point in the 
recommendation for revising the law and framework.75 The basic principle of recovery was 
to limit the government’s exposure to an expensive recovery; on top of this was added the 
principle of voluntary cooperation which gave no powers for coordination.  With vaguely 
defined functions and without granting powers it is unclear what successively higher levels 
of government would have to offer besides more money. High-level appointees may be able 
to “coordinate resources” based on convention but they had little by way of statutory basis 
to ensure this would happen. It is similar to the principle of mutual support and the Civil 
Defence Act 1962 Amendment Act 1975 as examined in the previous chapter – before this 
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amendment mutual support for emergency response was based on voluntary cooperation. 
After the Amendment a limited emergency declaration could be made in districts not 
directly impacted by an emergency which would ensure cooperation in order to requisition 
resources and personnel – uncertainty was reduced through a compulsory measure. 
Similarly, at the time of the Canterbury earthquakes the government was limited in what its 
recovery personnel could do after the declaration had ended. In order to ensure 
cooperation they would be forced to continually roll-over the emergency declaration until 
the recovery process was stable – which could take years – or rely on the voluntary 
cooperation of everyone, which didn’t happen.  This expectation of voluntary cooperation 
was eliminated in 1975 for the response phase – but retained for recovery. The lesson was 
clearly not learned until too late. Additionally, the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency 
Management is not a powerful front-line ministry and has only a few dozen staff – it is 
unlikely that specialist departments such as the Department of Building and Housing (DBH) 
or the Ministry for the Environment, or the Ministry of Business, Innovation, and 
Employment where the DBH now resides, would take direction from MCDEM in matters of 
housing and environment over the long-term. That is also assuming that MCDEM or a 
regional CDEM Group even has trained Recovery Managers, which for the most part, they 
do not. This is not mere speculation, a review of the CDEM response to the Canterbury 
earthquakes found that MCDEM’s position tucked away within the Department of Internal 
Affairs combined with a tradition of having a Minister with low seniority negatively 
impacted MCDEM’s relationship with other, larger, departments during the response.76 
There is no indication that MCDEM or the CDEM Group would have fared any better during 
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the transition to recovery than they did in response as they were still a small ministry with 
no powers and staff with limited experienced and training in disaster recovery. 
Capacity development for recovery in New Zealand 
Despite the role of Recovery Manager existing since 1992 there is little evidence of serious 
and sustained efforts to support this civil defence function even after the passing of the 
CDEM Act 2002. Although there are statutory obligations for the Ministry and CDEM Groups 
to increase, monitor, and evaluate capacity to meet the needs of their civil defence 
emergency management mandates the process has been haphazard and for recovery 
capabilities essentially stagnant at the time of the Canterbury earthquakes.77 Both of the 
first two National Strategies (2003-2006 and 2008-present) had the same goal of “enhancing 
New Zealand’s capability to recover from civil defence emergencies”.78 The CDEM Act 2002 
requires Civil Defence Groups to:79 
“…take all steps necessary on an ongoing basis to maintain and provide, or to arrange the 
provision of, or to otherwise make available suitably trained and competent personnel…for 
effective civil defence emergency management in its area.” 
One of the first documents to be published after the passing of the CDEM Act 2002 was the 
Director’s Guidelines for CDEM Groups80 which suggested that: 
…experienced and trained Recovery Manager(s) plus alternate(s) are made available for the 
entire Group for any member to utilise...Carrying out recovery following an emergency is a key 
statutory function of the CDEM Group as is making available suitably trained and competent 
personnel” (emphasis added). 
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The key words here are “competent”, “experienced”, and “trained”. In this section it is 
argued that this is another case of the Ministry creating an unsupported mandate for local 
authorities as there are no suitable or sustainable mechanisms for experience to be 
developed or shared, the training component is at a bare minimum, and a list of generic 
competencies were only developed in 2010 and are of questionable value. At the time of 
the Canterbury earthquakes recovery in New Zealand, as a practical component of CDEM, 
had barely evolved beyond the principles developed in 1987. 
The starting point for assessing capacity is the 2004 Review of Civil Defence in which 
capacity both within the Ministry in general and in the Ministry and local authorities for 
response and recovery in particular were highlighted as major issues.81 In the case of the 
Ministry this was attributed to, among other things, a high rate of staff turnover and, 
bizarrely, a lack of experience in emergency management. The Review found that after 
flooding in February 2004 “extensive demands” were imposed on smaller local authorities 
not only for the response but the prolonged recovery, and the Ministry itself found their 
resources exceeded.82 
Competence and Experience 
In 2009 a series of publications were made available by the Ministry as part of a programme 
with the stated aim to “provide a comprehensive and knowledge-based CDEM professional 
development system for New Zealand”. 83 The first part of this process was a generic list of 
shared “competencies” across CDEM positions such as “Leadership is demonstrated through 
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strategic decision making that influences others and drives change”.84 Each competency is 
ranked from 1-3 for each CDEM position – on the ground responders for example received a 
“1” for this leadership competency whereas Controller and Recovery Managers were given 
a “3”. In other words, those in charge need to come up with a plan and try to get people to 
implement it which of course has been the major failing of civil defence since 1962. The 
following year a set of publications, called “Role Maps”, for CDEM functions were published 
but there is little to distinguish one role from another due to considerable overlap and 
similarly worded statements with vague meaning. For example, an “essential attribute” for 
the Recovery Manager is “Demonstrates empathy, and willingness to understand and 
respect others’ needs”.85 This could be applied to any role not just in the CDEM system but 
in any situation where humans interact. The second stage was intended to look into 
“specific skills and knowledge required to carry out key roles” but so far, there is no 
evidence that it took place. This may be due to the demands of the Canterbury earthquakes 
starting in late 2010 in which case it could be said that as questionable as the value of this 
competency framework is, it was too little and too late coming as it did seven years after 
the law was made. 
It is not clear exactly how these competency role maps were acted on but a national 
assessment of CDEM capacity in 2012 indicates serious issues existed in terms of recovery 
capabilities – in particular for professional development.86 Recovery scored far lower than 
any other aspect of civil defence with the report noting that “CDEM Groups consistently 
scored the lowest in this goal, in many cases reaching the ‘requires attention’ zone…Most 
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interviewees acknowledged that recovery was the ‘poor cousin’ of emergency management 
and needed to be more fully understood and embedded across their Group and/or 
district.”87  But the results of the capacity review do not tell the whole picture. For example 
the highest score was achieved for the indicator “An appropriately qualified Recovery 
Manager, and alternate(s), is identified and formally appointed”.88 But this measures two 
variables – qualification and auxiliary arrangements – and the qualification, as is 
demonstrated in the next section, is minimal. Outside of the review it was also noted in 
2012 that MCDEM’s problems with staff turnover as it relates to capacity development had, 
at least temporarily, recurred.89  
Concerning experience, there is no clear indication of any systematic method since the 
CDEM Act 2002 was passed to increase this aspect of civil defence. According to MCDEM, no 
national training exercises delivered since 2002 have included recovery – they have focused 
almost entirely on response.90 Events which demand a managed recovery occur rarely in 
any one region and large-scale events occur once every few generations which means real-
world experience is also minimal. Currently the Ministry offers “lessons learned” from local 
recovery on an ad hoc basis, but there is no systematic method for allowing Recovery 
Managers in New Zealand to gain experience or even knowledge in their role. A solution to 
this is proposed in Chapter 6 – undoing some of the decentralisation of CDEM and 
establishing a national cadre of recovery managers. 
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The current capacity development strategy through MCDEM is based on:91 
 University courses and advanced qualifications 
 Professional development courses 
 Training and certificate qualifications 
 Integrated Training Framework 
 CDEM Induction tools 
Of the university programmes not one focuses on recovery – at most it is included as part of 
a general “emergency management” course. All focus on response, risk reduction, or 
resilience – all of which could be argued as a part of recovery but none explore recovery as a 
process or function of emergency management on its own. As has been argued in many 
places and demonstrated in Canterbury – recovery is not simply an extension of response 
nor is it simply a process of “risk reduction” done after the fact. For Professional 
Development Courses, at present (mid-2015) there are no courses for Recovery Managers. 
The Controller course offered through Massey University reflects the Controller’s function 
which stops at recovery – the Controller is responsible for the transition to recovery but 
recovery itself is the responsibility of the Recovery Manager. The other Professional 
Development courses are for developing knowledge on hazards and response-related 
aspects of emergency management.92 Training and certificate qualifications are limited to 
one course on recovery aimed at local authorities – NZQA 7333. The course runs for 3-5 
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days. Recovery is mentioned in other modules but only so far as the transition to recovery 
from response which is the focus of those modules. The Ministry’s Integrated Training 
Framework courses are only at the foundational level.93 Likewise, the CDEM Induction tools 
are for staff who are new to CDEM.94 This is the extent of recovery management training in 
New Zealand – one short-course that many or most Recovery Managers have not done and 
no training exercises that includes recovery. Compare this to training for CDEM responders 
which includes a half dozen core courses, weekly training sessions, annual large-scale 
training exercises, and regular deployments for flooding and search and rescue. So of course 
MCDEM, the Canterbury CDEM Group and the CDEM Act 2002 were replaced by CERA and 
the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act 2011 – they had no power, limited experience, and 
virtually no training – and as the previous section demonstrated there was a lack of clarity 
and planning for the main recovery roles under the CDEM Act 2002. But the limits of civil 
defence were not only functional and practical, the next section explores contradictions in 
policy and law which put the CDEM Act 2002 at odds with the National-led government. 
Section Summary 
The brevity of this section is indicative of the extent of capacity development that exists for 
disaster recovery in New Zealand. The Ministry created a mandate for CDEM Groups to have 
experienced, competent and trained personnel but did little or nothing to enable the 
realisation of this mandate for recovery management. The  Ministry provided very little 
guidance for developing local capacity in recovery in a situation that is similar to response in 
                                                     
93 Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management “Training and certificate qualifications” 
www.civildefence.govt.nz/cdem-sector/capability-development/cdem-training-and-courses/training-and-
certificate-qualifications/ 






the 1960s and 1970s. At that time, as explored in Chapter 4, guidance was limited to “do 
civil defence” to the community until help arrives. But this was roundly criticised at all levels 
from local authorities to the Director of Civil Defence and finally in Parliament. The solution 
was to build a national training school which focused almost entirely on response 
capabilities. At present, one national course exists for training Recovery Managers 
compared to over a dozen for civil defence emergency responders. No system exists for 
gaining recovery experience whereas civil defence responders train weekly and have annual 
large-scale exercises. The competency standards MCDEM created for recovery are so limp 
and generic as to be impractical. Appointing a Recovery Manager is not even mandatory – 
not even during a disaster recovery as with the Christchurch City Council in 2010. Even if 
one was appointed it would not be entirely clear what they would do in relation to 
nationally appointed recovery managers and coordinators. At the time of the Canterbury 
earthquakes the CDEM recovery framework lacked substance and clarity. The power, 
money, and decision making remained at the national level while responsibility remained a 
local issue – after the Canterbury earthquakes even that was largely taken away with the 
establishment of CERA and the collapse of the CDEM recovery structure. The familiar refrain 
of “local responsibility” is present throughout the CDEM literature from 2002-2010, but for 
recovery the situation is remarkably and unfortunately similar to response 30 years prior – 
similarly it took a major disaster to bring action on the limitations of civil defence. Recall the 
Review of Civil Defence in 1992 which specifically identified a lack of training, clarity, and 
completeness as potential sources of failure in crisis – and suggested the structure that puts 
so much weight on the local level would be replaced by a top-down approach. Of course an 
institution like CERA was necessary, there was no viable practical element in the CDEM 




necessitated CERA and the CER Act 2011 is the fundamental question of where 
responsibility for community welfare ultimately rests. 
False expectations: Wellbeing and the “proper” role of local government 
There is a fundamental divergence between the two major political parties in New Zealand 
regarding local authorities and community wellbeing. The impact on civil defence is that, 
depending on whether National or Labour are in government, the CDEM Act 2002 and the 
recovery framework will be either directly aligned with or opposed to the government’s 
policy on local governance and community wellbeing. In this section it is demonstrated that 
local government law under each party contain widely varying expectations of responsibility 
for wellbeing and planning on local authorities during an emergency and disaster recovery 
relative to a business as usual environment. In reference to the research questions and the 
Canterbury earthquakes – the government took a leading role in the recovery not only 
because of the limitations in civil defence already identified in this chapter but also because 
of the National-led government’s political ideology.  
Under the National government, community wellbeing is the domain of the central 
government. Under the CDEM recovery framework, it is unequivocally the domain of local 
authorities via the regional CDEM Group. Under the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act 
2011, wellbeing is a part of the recovery strategy which is managed by CERA and the 
Recovery Minister. This makes it congruent with National’s platform but contrary to 
Labour’s. With the enactment of the Local Government Act in 2002, the Labour government 
aimed to bring a form of governance to New Zealand that emphasized partnerships 




authorities to have a broad responsibility for the wellbeing of their communities.95 At the 
same time, civil defence was brought in line with local government law – the Local 
Government Act 2002 and the CDEM Act 2002 share a similar statement of purpose and 
responsibility for local authorities concerning community wellbeing:  
Local Government Act 2002 CDEM Act 2002 
The purpose of this Act is to provide for 
democratic and effective local 
government that recognises the diversity 
of New Zealand communities; and, to that 
end, this Act: 
(d)provides for local authorities to play a 
broad role in promoting the social, 
economic, environmental, and cultural 
well-being of their communities, taking a 
sustainable development approach. 
 
s3(a) The purpose of this Act, which repeals and replaces the Civil 
Defence Act 1983, is to— 
(a) improve and promote the sustainable management of 
hazards (as that term is defined in this Act) in a way that 
contributes to the social, economic, cultural, and 
environmental well-being and safety of the public and 
also to the protection of property; 
s38(a) All persons exercising functions in relation to the 
development of civil defence emergency management 
plans 96  under this Act must have regard to— (a) the 
responsibility of people and communities to provide for their 
own well-being and the well-being of future generations 
 
Since its inception, civil defence and the wellbeing of communities have been a local 
responsibility.  This was reaffirmed generally with the passing of the CDEM Act 2002, after 
which the Ministry further elaborated the point specifically in the recovery context. In 2005, 
MCDEM defined recovery as “[r]egeneration of the social, emotional, economic and physical 
wellbeing of individuals and communities”. 97  Planning for recovery is done by local 
authorities via the CDEM Group or at the district level.98 Pre-Canterbury earthquakes, the 
central government limited its role in recovery to providing assistance in circumstances of 
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an “unusual type or magnitude”.99 The keyword here is “assistance”, not “assuming primary 
responsibility”. A statement by the Director of Civil Defence in 2009 leaves little doubt 
about where responsibility for community wellbeing lay: 100 
The Group’s members have a legislated responsibility, as well as a moral responsibility, 
to…manage the wellbeing of their communities in times of stress. 
As for the civil defence roles performed by central government, recall the recovery 
framework and roles from previous sections of this chapter – the nationally appointed roles 
were responsible for coordinating resources nationally and liaising with CDEM Groups who 
had responsibility for planning and implementing recovery. By design, the CDEM recovery 
framework limited the government’s involvement to providing assistance and high-level 
coordination and placed responsibility for community wellbeing at the local level. 
The National Party has a very different view on which level of government is responsible for 
community wellbeing. The National Minister for Local Government was as clear about 
community wellbeing and local government as the Director of Civil Defence, except with the 
opposite message in 2007: 101 
The broad purpose of the Local Government Act 2002 covering social, economic, cultural, 
environment wellbeing is unrealistic. It creates false expectations about what councils can 
achieve and confusion over the proper roles with respect to central government. 
 Subsequently, the National government systematically eliminated wellbeing as it pertains 
to local authorities with amendments to the Local Government Act 2002. Under National, 
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the mandate for local authorities changed with the removal of all mention of wellbeing and 
local authorities.  
Compare the Labour-led purpose above with this Amendment in 2012 under the National 
government: 102 
The Act…provides for local authorities to play a broad role in meeting the current and future 
needs of their communities for good-quality local infrastructure, local public services, and 
performance of regulatory functions. 
Likewise, the purpose of local authorities changed. The Local Government Act 2002 states 
the purpose of local authorities is:103 
(b) to promote the social, economic, environmental, and cultural well-being of 
communities, in the present and for the future.  
The 2012 Amendment replaced that section with:104 
(b) to meet the current and future needs of communities for good-quality local 
infrastructure, local public services, and performance of regulatory functions in a 
way that is most cost-effective for households and businesses. 
In 2013, Labour reiterated their message on community wellbeing in a way which 
corresponds with the CDEM view on wellbeing:105 
Community wellbeing, as determined by local communities, needs to be placed at 
the heart of local government purpose and decision-making. 
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Despite all of this work to make community wellbeing the sole responsibility of the central 
government under the Local Government Act, the CDEM Act 2002 remains unchanged. The 
difference between the two statutes now is a matter of governance versus administration. 
Under the Local Government Act 2002 in its original form, and under the CDEM Act 2002, 
local authorities (via the CDEM Group) were ultimately responsible for community wellbeing 
and various forms of community engagement – the relationship between communities, 
local authorities and central government was one of partnership. Under the amended Local 
Government Act, local authorities are responsible for administering central government 
policies at the local level and providing services to their communities that could not be 
better provided by the private sector. National’s 2007 statement on local authorities and 
the amended Local Government Act created a gap between expectations put onto local 
authorities during  business as usual and what is expected of local authorities (via the CDEM 
Group) after a disaster. Although the CER Act 2011 preceded the amendments to the Local 
Government Act, the National party had made their stance clear and had already started 
the process to assume responsibility for community wellbeing before the Canterbury 
earthquakes occurred. With this understanding it is clear why CERA and the CER Act 2011 
were inevitable – the ideological differences between the Labour and National parties 
created a gap that would have required National to accept a fundamentally different 
governance arrangement than what they preferred. The Canterbury earthquake recovery 
governance structure is a natural outcome of the National government’s position on local 
governance – but it is still at odds with the CDEM Act 2002. 
Without a legislative amendment the gap remains and it creates uncertainty. If civil defence 




would be a profound transformation for civil defence and fundamentally change the nature 
of CDEM planning. If the current CDEM law is retained then it would be necessary to 
articulate in which circumstances local authorities and central government will have 
responsibility for community wellbeing. But this raises the uncomfortable question – at 
what point is community wellbeing too much for local authorities? In terms of financial 
costs, is there a price point that determines when the central government will take over? Or 
is it a qualitative measure? Whatever outcome the Canterbury earthquakes have on civil 
defence, the CDEM recovery framework was inoperable due to the lack of planning, training 
and emergency powers and as this section shows under a National-led government due to a 
fundamental difference in political ideology.  
5.4 The problem with recovery: Failure, success, and taking responsibility 
The new emergency management system was supposed to be holistic and sustainable, but 
it has clearly been incremental and failing that, derivative, and focused primarily on 
response, leaving recovery as the perpetually neglected component of emergency 
management. At best, the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management failed to 
support the mandate for capacity development. At worst, the Ministry’s failures prolonged 
and worsened the recovery from the Canterbury earthquakes by not putting resources 
toward identifying the capabilities and powers needed for recovery management and failing 
to develop trained and experienced Recovery Managers. Worryingly, the Minister of Civil 
Defence has also proposed granting emergency powers for recovery management in a move 
that is suggestive of her predecessors in the 1970s as examined in Chapter 4 as these 
powers are not accompanied by plans for capacity development. Also reminiscent of early 




redefining what successful recovery means and denying that any problems exist for all but 
the largest disasters using specious arguments and evidence. 
Despite the lack of effort put into capacity development and MCDEM’s own findings on the 
deplorable state of recovery in 2012, the Ministry claimed success in recovery in 2013: 106  
The CDEM recovery framework has been consistently successful in facilitating the recovery of 
communities following emergencies. Examples since the Strategy’s introduction include recovery 
efforts following several floods in different parts of the country. As part of recovery from the 
Gisborne earthquake in 2007, work was done to strengthen buildings in the region…However, 
the experiences following the Christchurch earthquakes have shown that the recovery 
framework does not adequately provide for recovery from an emergency requiring large-scale 
recovery efforts. 
This quote is from a document reporting on progress made on the National Civil Defence 
Emergency Management Strategy 2007 and states that the assessment period runs from 
2008-2013 – but the only specific example given of a successful recovery is from the 2007 
Gisborne earthquake. The Ministry does not cite any particular cases of successful flood 
recovery – instead, they gloss over the issue with a vague reference to “several floods in 
various parts of the country”. The National Strategy 2007 differed little from its predecessor 
which was published in 2004 and covered the period 2003-2006. The goals for recovery in 
both are almost identical: 
 To enhance New Zealand’s capability to recover from disasters 
Each Goal had a small number of objectives. The objectives for recovery under the 2007 
Strategy are: 
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 Implementing effective recovery planning and activities in communities and across 
the social, economic, natural and built environments 
 Enhancing the ability of agencies to manage the recovery process 
There is little evidence to suggest that the Ministry succeeded at this goal or in these 
objectives. As demonstrated in the previous section there are few Recovery Managers and 
even fewer who have received capacity development programmes specifically for recovery 
management. The claim to success is based on unspecified flooding events and the Gisborne 
earthquake which occurred before their specified period and even that is not a good 
example. Reference to flooding and the Gisborne earthquake recovery was also made in the 
2012 CDEM Capabilities Assessment report – but in that document the flooding was cited as 
situations where “crucial experience was gained” – not exactly a ringing endorsement of 
success for the CDEM recovery framework. Before 2008 New Zealand did not have a 
“consistently successful” experience with flood recovery. Recall in the previous section the 
Ministry’s own review of the recovery from flooding in 2004 which found the Ministry and 
local authorities stretched to their limits.107  Again, this is not a strong endorsement of the 
CDEM recovery framework as those floods were nowhere near the “large-scale” as the 
Canterbury earthquakes which was the standard the Ministry referred to in their statement. 
Perhaps it is unfair to expect the CDEM recovery framework to have worked well only two 
years after the Act was passed. However, the recovery from the Matata floods in 2005 – 
which was one of the largest flooding events in the past decade – was subject to 
considerable criticism due to the excessive focus on the built environment and failures in 
the social environment in terms of wellbeing (psychosocial health), community engagement, 
                                                     




and participation – fundamental elements of the CDEM recovery framework.108 Perhaps 
other, less well-documented floods were consistently successful but the evidence suggests 
that would be due to happenstance and not because of the recovery framework. The 2012 
CDEM capability survey gave recovery the lowest score among the 4Rs and found that less 
than 60% of the surveyed Groups had actually identified and trained a Recovery Manager109 
and most recovery plans were “fairly basic”.110 Recall also that there is only one national 
training course for Recovery Managers. New Zealand somehow went from having 
consistently poor form in flood recovery from 2002-2007, to being “consistently successful” 
in 2008 onward with no apparent changes in law, policy, strategy, objectives, goals, or 
training and a 40% chance that an area affected by a flood did not have a trained Recovery 
Manager and almost a 70% chance that recovery plans did not incorporate risk reduction (a 
fundamental component of building back better).111 
As with claiming success in flooding, citing the Gisborne earthquake recovery as a success 
case is difficult to substantiate. It was previously described by civil defence officials as a time 
for learning – the lesson learned by the Mayor of Gisborne was to strengthen buildings to 
be more earthquake resilient.112 In 2009, the alternate CDEM Group Controller during the 
Gisborne response, Peter Higgs, lamented the slow pace of recovery which he attributed to 
delays with insurance companies and the requirement for the Council to have “high 
standards” for the rebuild.113 Be that as it may, the media at the time reported on a speedy 
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recovery for businesses in Gisborne but in a survey of the Gisborne business community it 
was attributed to the earthquakes occurring right before peak Christmas shopping season 
(20%) and the necessity of opening as soon as possible to not lose sales (15%) while 40% 
attributed it to the closeness of the community itself.114 Only 3% cited civil defence as 
facilitating recovery, and an equal number cited effective pre-disaster planning.115 
Somehow, in the course of one year, recovery went from being a weak link and being 
described as the “‘poor cousin’ of emergency management [that] needed to be more fully 
understood and embedded across… Group(s) and/or district(s)” 116 to a success case. Given 
the lack of training, abysmal results in the survey of recovery planning, and cases of less 
than successful recovery the Ministry cannot reasonably claim consistent success in small-
medium size emergencies. Likewise, the local authorities in Canterbury cannot reasonably 
shoulder the entire blame for a disorganised recovery – what chance did they have given 
the confusion about recovery roles and a lack of capacity within the CDEM recovery system?  
On the other hand, it could be argued (and this seems to be what MCDEM is saying in 2013) 
that recovery from small-medium size emergencies is not complicated and needs no more 
than a multi-day workshop for training, vaguely defined competencies, and no mandatory 
planning or even a Recovery Manager. But this is contradicted by a June 2015 proposal by 
the Minister of Civil Defence for a two-tier system – small-medium size events and large 
events, each of which will have a different set of powers and guidelines.117 Under the 
proposed two-tier system, legislative amendments would make recovery planning and the 
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appointment of a Group Recovery Manager mandatory and would give special emergency 
powers for recovery from small-medium size emergencies. Why would the Minister propose 
these changes to a system that the Ministry described as “consistently successful”?  
Given the history of civil defence explored throughout this dissertation, implementation of 
the proposed changes will be highly challenging if the Ministry fails to assess the capacities 
needed for Recovery Managers and provide training. To repeat the main message from 
Chapter 3 and 4 – legislating responsibilities does not cause the identification and 
manifestation of the capabilities required to fulfil them. As explored in Chapter 4, this was 
recognised, accepted, and addressed with response in the 1970s and early 1980s but 
somehow recovery escaped scrutiny until the Canterbury earthquakes. Since the 1980s, 
extensive work has been put in to response capabilities assessment and training – but not 
recovery. Additionally, there is no evidence to suggest that the proposed powers to be 
granted for recovery are appropriate – they are the exact same as granted for response with 
the exception of powers of requisition.118 This reliance on response models should also be 
reconsidered. The post-2002 recovery strategy was modelled on the CIMS response 
structure which in turn had systematized the response model which had been in place since 
the 1960s. More thought should be put into whether this is an appropriate model or if 
recovery has particular functions or demands that would be better served in an alternative 
structure. An alternate model is suggested in Chapter 6. 
                                                     





The aim of this chapter is not to discredit the CDEM recovery framework or the principles on 
which it is based. As stated earlier, the principles are 
widely recognized and recommended in scholarship 
and practice. Even though the recovery framework was 
not implemented under MCDEM during the Canterbury 
earthquake recovery its core elements were adopted 
by CERA. The CERA recovery strategy draws 
significantly from the CDEM recovery strategy which 
was principles-based and these principles formed the 
foundation of CERA’s work.119 The CERA ‘petal’ shape, 
which puts community in the centre with the natural, 
built, social, economic, and cultural component on 
the perimeter, is almost identical to the conceptual 
framework for recovery under CDEM (Figure 5.3 and 
5.4). The focus on community and public 
participation are also key components of the CERA 
and CDEM recovery documents.  
The problem then was not the recovery principles 
but the wherewithal to fulfil them. In other words, 
of course a specialised agency was necessary and of course the recovery faced numerous 
challenges and troubles from the earliest stages – the country has done so little to prepare 
itself for recovery that any other outcome is difficult to conceive. The DPMC in 1987 and 
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Figure 5.3 CDEM Components of Recovery 
Source: Focus on Recovery: A holistic 
framework for recovery in New Zealand. 
Information for the CDEM Sector [IS5/05] 
Figure 5-4 CERA Components of Recovery 
Source: Canterbury Earthquake Recovery 
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MCDEM in 2005 adopted various recovery principles but did little to bridge the gap between 
the principles and a practical recovery. To this end, many questions remain unanswered. 
What are the capabilities needed for a good Recovery Manager? How can Recovery 
Managers get experience in something that happens so rarely? What can CERA tell us about 
recovery that was not known before the Canterbury earthquakes? What can CERA tell us 
about recovery powers and capabilities? How would a similar size emergency be managed 
under a Labour government? Ultimately, decisions on recovery readiness in New Zealand 
should be based on empirical evidence, not a few questionable examples of “success” or 
one big failure.  
MCDEM has failed in the recovery component of civil defence and then claimed success 
anyway while allowing the blame for failures in the Canterbury recovery to be placed on 
Mother Nature and local councils. It is disingenuous to claim success in a handful of local 
flooding cases and a small earthquake when so few communities had any sort of recovery 
preparedness and there are numerous cases of poor performance in recovery. It is short-
sighted to say that the recovery system was not suitable for a large-scale recovery – there 
was very little sincere and sustained effort to train Recovery Managers at any level. They 
have moved the goalpost from having suitably trained Recovery Managers to “successfully” 
recovering from small-medium size emergencies. And maybe this is acceptable, without 
evidence it is impossible to say what the required capacities are for managing the recovery 
from a small, medium, or large emergency. On the other hand, it is difficult to accept that 
the failure of the CDEM recovery framework in Canterbury was a result of the 
“unprecedented scale” or political discord among local authorities and between local and 




recovery framework beyond the printing press. Until the Ministry is honest with its 
assessment of the recovery framework and until steps are taken to better understand and 
address the capability gap in recovery – as was done for response 40 years ago – recovery in 
New Zealand will remain the poor cousin of civil defence emergency management. 
A note on the proposed changes to the CDEM recovery framework 
At the time of writing the main outcome of the Canterbury earthquakes on civil defence law 
appears to be a two-tiered system for recovery with selective response powers granted for 
small-medium sized events and a suite of powers being considered for long-term recovery 
from major events. In 2014 public submissions were invited by the Regulations Review 
Committee as part of an inquiry into the legislative response to future national emergencies. 
The aim of the inquiry is to “establish the most appropriate legislative model for enabling 
and facilitating response to, and recovery from, national emergencies once a state of 
emergency has been lifted, while maintaining consistency with essential constitutional 
principles, the rule of law, and good legislative practice.”120 Essentially, the Review will 
create a best practice model of emergency powers for use after a declaration has ended but 
certain aspects of the emergency still require special attention, especially in the long-term. 
The Minister for Civil Defence released a statement explaining the direction she aimed to 
take recovery including a two-tiered system with emergency powers for Recovery Managers 
to use in small-medium size emergencies and a second tier for large emergencies.121 In June 
2015, a new National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan was released which 
overcame some of the limitations of its predecessor by incorporating sections from other 
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CDEM documents and clearly stating the mandate for National and Group Recovery 
Managers.122 It also has a section on risk reduction which was oddly missing from the 2005 
National Plan despite risk reduction being one of the 4Rs. Recall that in the 2005 National 
Plan the only mention of the Recovery Manager position was in a list of roles that could 
receive capacity development – also recall that many regions do not have a trained 
Recovery Manager. The mandates for the National Recovery Manager and Group Recovery 
Manager in the new National Plan appear to be compiled from the Recovery Management 
Director’s Guidelines for CDEM Groups in 2005 and the Guide to the National Plan 2005. 
Soon after the National Plan 2015 was released the Minister of Civil Defence proposed 
eliminating the role of Recovery Co-ordinator and making it mandatory to appoint a Group 
Recovery Manager and make a Group Recovery Plan.123 The Minister also proposed giving 
Recovery Managers the same powers available to Controllers during a response – minus the 
powers of requisition for the transition period to recovery after an emergency has ended:124 
 carry out works, clear roads and other public places, and remove, dispose of, secure 
or make safe dangerous structures and materials; 
 provide for the conservation and supply of food, fuel and other essential supplies 
such as water; 
 disseminate information and advice to the public; 
 evacuate premises and places, and exclude people and vehicles; 
 enter onto premises, for example, to perform an assessment; 
 close roads and public places; 
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 give directions to stop and activity or to take any action, to limit the consequences of 
the emergency and potentially for the purposes of coordinating recovery efforts; 
 require information for the recovery, e.g. from lifeline utilities. 
But this still leaves open the question of capacity – to repeat previous sections and 
chapters: simply creating a position in law does not manifest the capabilities necessary to 
fulfil that position’s functions. The government acknowledged a long time ago that relying 
on endogenous capacity within a community was not a reliable way to prepare for 
emergency response. Yet, as this chapter has demonstrated, very little had been done at the 
time of the Canterbury earthquakes to prepare the country’s Recovery Managers for 
disaster recovery and there is little indication in the Minister’s statements or in the 
Regulatory Review process that any more will be done than putting more responsibilities 
onto local authorities – only this time with more power. This is a repeat of the 
regionalisation process in 1975 where regional authorities were given civil defence 
responsibilities and emergency powers but with variable funding and little or no training. 
The familiar historic pattern continues. 
5.5 Conclusion 
Civil defence has long struggled with the question of public safety and community welfare 
and where responsibility ultimately rests. The fundamental flaw of civil defence is the 
unfunded and unsupported mandate which is justified with important sounding noises 
about local responsibility. The outcome was an emergency management recovery system 
that was hardly fit for purpose. Recovery was a novel element of civil defence in 1983 and 
remained as such while risk reduction became the predominant philosophy and response 




first appearance in 1983 to the Canterbury earthquakes and the limitations of the CDEM 
recovery framework in crisis. Between those periods an extensive review of the emergency 
services was undertaken and a radically different approach to emergency management 
adopted. With the new emergency management came significant empirical and theoretical 
scholarship, best practices for risk reduction, readiness and even better response 
capabilities. But recovery has always been an under-explored element of disaster 
scholarship and in New Zealand a grossly underserved element of civil defence emergency 
management. The Ministry has argued that the recovery situation in New Zealand is good 
enough given the “successful” recovery from local flooding and the Gisborne earthquake 
with the only change needed for small-medium size emergencies is granting emergency 
powers while the main issue for recovery overall is managing large-scale events.125 There is 
little evidence to support the first claim, and by suggesting emergency powers should be 
granted the Ministry is on track to repeat the mistakes of its past – recall the previous 
chapter where granting powers did little to enable a better civil defence system. The ability 
to actually use the powers is the critical factor. The country was not prepared for a large-
scale event not simply because of the limits to rebuilding as identified by Rotimi and 
others,126 or the “unprecedented” scale of the event, or even the political infighting in 
Canterbury but also due to an extraordinary gap in training and experience between 
recovery and the other 3Rs and the failure to reconcile local responsibility under the CDEM 
Act 2002 with the Local Government Act 2002. When so little was done for recovery it is just 
as absurd to blame the earth for shaking too hard as the source of failure of the CDEM 
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recovery framework as it is to take credit for a successful local recovery simply because the 
ground didn’t shake hard enough. Recall the delinquent manner in which emergency 
powers were handed out in the 1970s and the nonsensical claims that civil defence had 
done well in the past and would do so in the future – to paraphrase Charles Darwin, the 
CDEM recovery strategy carries the indelible stamp of its lowly origin. Due to the lack of 
training as with response in the 1960s and 1970s, the CDEM recovery framework simply 
gave permission for local capacity to be engaged during an emergency but with even less 
added value due to the lack of emergency powers. It must be acknowledged that not 
providing adequate training and resources for recovery management and not aligning 
responsibilities under civil defence law with other laws will simply hasten the involvement 
of the central government and necessitate new laws during an emergency which brings into 
question the value of civil defence altogether.  
At the time of the Canterbury earthquakes the CDEM recovery framework was limited by 
many of the same issues response had faced 40 years ago – primarily this stems from a 
reliance on principles over practice. At the national level the recovery principles are based 
on avoidance rather than success – especially for large or complex emergencies. They were 
created based on the desire to reduce the government’s involvement and exposure to 
financial costs but they say little about governing or conducting an effective recovery. Most 
of the responsibility was put at the local level while the power, decision making, and money 
was at the top. After the Canterbury earthquakes even the responsibility was taken away 
from the local level and the structure collapsed. It also appears that MCDEM grossly 
underestimated the demands of a large recovery and are now settling for good enough in 




events and one moderate earthquake with no documented evidence of the CDEM recovery 
framework being an essential component of those events. The evidence from those events 
in fact is quite the opposite. At present, the recovery principles do not contain much by way 
of getting better at recovery - the assumption about capacity is that if local authorities 
cannot manage then the central government will assist - but that is just a way of throwing 
money at a problem without accounting for the expertise and capabilities that might make a 
recovery process better – and perhaps even more affordable. There is a conflict here – the 
government has stated the most effective recovery is done by local authorities and sets out 
numerous guidelines and principles to ensure that takes place. Yet it has done so little to 
add value to the CDEM recovery framework by failing to support the practical 
implementation of those principles. Additional weaknesses in the system are caused by 
uncertainty about roles and functions – and this is nothing new but it took the destruction 
of a city to compel the government to do something about it. But simply giving Recovery 
Managers a job description still falls short. Recovery from a major disaster – which is the 
condition for central government involvement – is being done a disservice by not having 
mechanisms and processes in place to increase the effectiveness of the government’s role in 
recovery – recommendations to this end are given in the next chapter. Finally, the CDEM 
recovery framework and the principles it is based on are highly vulnerable to the election 
cycle owing to the uncertainty about which level of government is responsible for 
community wellbeing. Paradoxically, the system designed to create a “resilient New Zealand” 
is itself a major source of vulnerability by giving a false assurance of the level of 
preparedness for a major disaster and conflicting messages about where responsibility for 




At the time of the Canterbury earthquakes there were many gaps in the CDEM recovery 
framework that could have been bridged earlier if there had been a better appreciation for 
the trends, traditions, and limitations of civil defence as every weakness identified in this 
chapter had been raised already for other aspects of civil defence in the past, and even for 
recovery in the past 20 years. Again, the Civil Defence Review Panel in 1992 was 
prophetic:127 
“It will be of no satisfaction after a major event to have a resulting enquiry decide 
that a single part of the structure failed to perform because of difficulties in its 
relationship with any other part of the structure. The public would rightly be 
unforgiving if such a situation arose when it should have been foreseen.” 
This quote could be applied to any of the limitations identified in this chapter – the lack of 
clarity between recovery roles, the lack of congruence between the CDEM Act 2002 and the 
Local Government Act 2002, and the lack of mandate, power, and training for recovery 
managers. There have been many missed opportunities to improve disaster recovery in New 
Zealand. Perhaps if civil defence hadn’t once again been forgotten or ignored when changes 
were made to local government law (recall the Local Government Act 1974 as discussed in 
Chapter 4 Section 4.2) the National-led government would not have had to scramble to 
make a new emergency law during a crisis. Perhaps if there were more than one short-
course on recovery the Canterbury recovery process would have gotten off the ground 
smoother and been better managed by “trained and experienced professionals”. Perhaps if 
there were greater clarity between the functions of Recovery Coordinator, Recovery 
Manager, Recovery Commissioner, and the DESC Recovery Coordinator the Canterbury 
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recovery would have been better coordinated from the start. Perhaps if the Ministry had 
identified the necessary and desirable capacities for Recovery Managers sometime between 
1992 and 2010 the Canterbury recovery would have been better managed – at the very 




Chapter 6 Conclusion – Delusions of adequacy and 
delinquencies in public safety 
“Now all the duties of Rulers are contained in this one sentence, The safety of the people is 
the supreme Law” Thomas Hobbes 
6.1 Introduction 
For all its neglect, inconsistencies, and incoherence, civil defence is a rather straightforward 
proposition. Yet, since the Cold War the civil defence system in New Zealand has been 
fundamentally flawed in all of its incarnations in what can justly be described as a 
mishandling of a very powerful area of law. The disturbing trend throughout each chapter in 
the history of civil defence is the distribution of extraordinary responsibility and powers 
without the associated training or resources to fulfil and utilize them. It is difficult to 
imagine another area of law where such a discrepancy occurs. The aim of this chapter is to 
provide answers to the research questions and give recommendations for future research 
and on improving the CDEM recovery framework. Taking a historical perspective, this 
dissertation analysed the development of civil defence emergency management law and 
policies in New Zealand and found that the legislative and organisational response to the 
Canterbury earthquakes was not only necessary but inevitable. These conclusions are based 
on the evidence which shows the trends and traditions of civil defence are such that 
principles come before practice, form before function, and the political will for change is 
primarily brought about through crisis, criticism, or an attempt to catch up with changes 
outside of civil defence. The outcome of a new statute, authority, and recovery framework 




the CDEM Act 2002, the government offered neither resources nor powers, only 
responsibility. Moreover, the divergent interpretation of local responsibilities between the 
two major political parties in New Zealand made the CDEM recovery framework sensitive to 
the election cycle. The outcome was inevitable, because disaster recovery was subject to 
the same trends and traditions as disaster response decades earlier which entailed reliance 
on admirable but flaccid principles due to the absence of enabling conditions for 
implementation.  
6.2 Summary of findings 
The aim of this dissertation was to answer a very basic question – Why CERA? Why a new 
governance structure and law when an emergency management law had been created only 
a few years before? Why was the CDEM recovery framework not suitable despite being 
cited as a model for other countries? The official reason was the scale of the recovery from 
the Canterbury earthquakes and the great demand for coordination. In the media, discord 
among local authorities and between local and central government suggested a need for a 
stronger authority to manage the recovery. But what of the civil defence recovery 
framework itself and the various recovery roles therein? The short answer to “Why CERA” 
can be answered not just in terms of scale or squabbling but of how robust the recovery 
framework was at the time of the Canterbury earthquakes. The CDEM recovery framework 
was weak and a vulnerability as it contained great uncertainty about the functions to be 
fulfilled, lacked power and authority, was contrary to the government at the time’s view on 
local responsibility, and lacked mechanisms for capacity development and gaining practical 
experience, and was essentially an optional component of civil defence. But recovery is not 




lines between the roaring 40’s, it is inevitable. And the CDEM recovery framework was 
designed in such a way that the central government and an organisation like CERA were not 
only necessary, but also, inevitable. Of course adaptation during a major crisis is also 
inevitable, but adaptation must be preceded by a resilient system which means a high-level 
of readiness.1 At the time of the Canterbury earthquakes, New Zealand was not ready to 
recover from a major disaster using the CDEM framework. 
Revisiting the Research Questions 
How, and why, have the philosophy, practice, and governance of civil defence 
emergency management evolved in New Zealand and what did they mean in the 
aftermath of the Canterbury earthquakes? 
Despite being created in anticipation of serious emergencies, the evolution of civil defence 
has primarily been in reaction to events. The tendency has been to allow external 
circumstances to dictate the pace and nature of change which has resulted in the main 
drivers being crisis, criticism, and catching up with socio-political changes. Relying primarily 
on circumstances to drive change has meant that while civil defence emergency 
management has evolved considerably since its Cold War origins, evolution does not mean 
uniform improvement. Evolution is a specific adaptation to the current environment which 
meant that changes were often piecemeal and biased toward immediate issues rather than 
long-term robustness and reliability. It took the threat of national destruction from nuclear 
war to motivate the government to create a national response system, and a  Commission 
of Inquiry into the 1979 Abbotsford Landslip to compel the government to create the 
                                                     





enabling conditions for that national response system to be reliably utilised in crisis. The 
outcome was the establishment of a national training school that primarily readied the 
nation’s civil defence personnel for response. National planning was initially absent under 
the pretence of “local responsibility” until the Director of Civil Defence was brought to task 
by the Ombudsman’s Office in 1964 which immediately resulted in the Ministry making 
national response plans.  Since then, response planning has been a consistent and 
mandatory component of civil defence at all levels – albeit with often poor outputs but the 
planning process itself at least brought together emergency management stakeholders to 
talk about response. But the gap between principles and practice persisted in recovery due 
to an outdated interpretation of local responsibility – disaster recovery followed the same 
trends and traditions as response and it took a crisis of national significance to compel the 
government to bridge the gap. At the time of the Canterbury earthquakes the CDEM 
recovery framework was lacking basic elements to enable implementation that existed for 
response – training, emergency powers, resources, and guidance to supplement 
responsibilities under the law. This meant that at the time of the Canterbury earthquakes 
the CDEM recovery framework was an impracticable component of civil defence which 
necessitated the government taking a leading role in the recovery. The outcome of the 
Canterbury earthquakes on CDEM has so far only resulted in clarification of national and 
regional mandates for recovery managers and a proposal for emergency powers for the 
transition from response to recovery. There is still a gap in knowledge, capacity 




Why were disasters nationalised? How did the central government come to take a 
leading role in civil defence despite the philosophy of local responsibility and 
principle of self-help?  
Disasters were nationalised through the realisation that national preparedness for a major 
disaster could not be achieved solely, or even primarily, from the ground up. National 
preparedness is more than the sum of local plans – it requires guidance and support in the 
form of money, training, and knowledge generation and sharing. The philosophy of local 
responsibility and the self-help principle have evolved throughout the history of civil 
defence. While initially they meant local authorities would have to respond to an 
emergency with whatever resources and capabilities they happened to have, incidents such 
as the Inangahua earthquake in 1968 and Abbotsford landslip in 1979 compelled the 
government to change their interpretation. The government took the lead in emergency 
response through training, funding, and leading national exercises for disaster response. 
These national exercises also form a part of the national readiness plan which the 
government necessarily leads to better prepare the public and emergency services. It has 
also taken a leading role in risk reduction by supporting research through the National 
Hazards Research Platform, the EQC Research Programme, and Resilience to Nature’s 
Challenges (RNC) National Science Challenge. Of course civil defence is still very much a local 
responsibility, but with that responsibility comes training, planning support, national 
guidance documents (however numerous and confusing) and emergency powers along with 
courses in how to use them. This does not apply to recovery. The nationalisation of disasters 
– or the assumption of greater responsibility by the government in preparing the country 




and desire among local authorities – in other words, recovery is reliant on a coincidental 
alignment between local capacity and the demands of an emergency just as response was in 
the 1960s and 1970s. Failing that, the only option is for the central government to intervene 
and spend and legislate their way through a recovery as happened in Canterbury in 2010 
and 2011. Adding to this is the fundamental divergence between the Labour and National 
parties – depending on which party is in power the CDEM Act 2002 will either be directly 
aligned with or opposed to the government in terms of local responsibility for community 
wellbeing. As community is at the centre of the CDEM recovery framework it makes 
recovery planning by local authorities very difficult as their plans would have to change with 
every new government in order to be implementable - even if CDEM Act 2002 itself did not 
change. With the latest changes to the National Plan, the proposed changes to the recovery 
section of the CDEM Act 2002, and hopefully with lessons learned from CERA, New Zealand 
is well positioned to bridge the gap between principle and practice and make recovery at 
least as operable as response. This however will require a more active role taken by the 
central government, extensive research to understand the capabilities needed for recovery 
at all levels, and a mechanism to institutionalise the recovery experience and reduce the ad 
hoc way it has been practiced to date (see sections 6.3 and 6.4 for recommendations). 
Was the creation of the Canterbury recovery framework under the CER Act 2011 
and CERA an anomaly necessitated by the extreme nature of the event or was it an 
outcome of vulnerabilities within the CDEM recovery framework? 
The post-Canterbury earthquake recovery framework under the CER Act 2011 and CERA is 
an anomaly in that it is a deviation from the intended process for disaster recovery under 




Canterbury earthquakes. A disaster of the scale of the Canterbury earthquakes was the 
primary reason for creating and sustaining a civil defence system – but that system failed 
when it was needed most. The post-Canterbury recovery framework was an outcome of 
familiar historic patterns which resulted in shortcoming within the CDEM recovery 
framework which limited its implementability during a crisis. The familiar historic patterns 
are the central government putting significant responsibilities onto local government 
without sufficient guidance or financial support or consideration for the demands on local 
capacity that civil defence responsibilities would have. Additionally, the divergence between 
the two main political parties regarding local responsibilities and community wellbeing put 
the CDEM Act 2002 and the CDEM recovery framework at odds with the National-led 
government at the time of the Canterbury earthquakes. Using the CDEM recovery 
framework would have meant National accepting a governance structure fundamentally 
opposed to their ideology on local governance. The CER Act 2011 adopted the principles 
from CDEM, and the responsibilities, but went one step further and provided the means for 
the principles to be implemented and also more closely aligned local responsibilities and 
community wellbeing with the National-led government’s ideology. The Commission of 
Inquiry into the 1979 Abbotsford Landslip revealed disparate capacity between 
communities for responding to emergencies. Although this issue had already been raised 
earlier by the Director of Civil Defence, Major-General Robin Holloway, it took such a crisis 
to compel the government to provide professionalised training for civil defence – but that 
training primarily focused on response. Similarly, the Canterbury earthquakes compelled the 
government to do for recovery what they had long ago done for response – bridge the gap 




trends and the limitations within the CDEM recovery framework, a new law and institution 
were necessary and inevitable. 
6.3  Questions for future inquiry 
This dissertation has demonstrated the limitations of civil defence emergency management 
at the time of the Canterbury earthquakes, and explained how it came to be in such a state. 
In the early stages of research a major limitation was the lack of literature on civil defence 
emergency management in New Zealand. Since Rawlinson’s thesis in 1971 there have been 
no such extensive studies of the laws and policies governing civil defence.2 Director of Civil 
Defence, Major-General Robin Holloway, noted in 1981 that more was known about the 
impact earthquakes would have on buildings than society – and this statement is valid 
today.3 There are major gaps in knowledge about emergency management in law and 
practice in New Zealand as scholarship and funding has largely followed the trend 
internationally of focusing on risk reduction. Since the 1990s there have been considerable 
publications on risk reduction but it is primarily focused on the built and physical 
environments, the closest that scholarship has come to CDEM is through evaluating risk 
management and CDEM planning in comparison to other areas of law, in particular the 
Resource Management Act 1991.4 The findings in this dissertation indicate avenues to 
future research that could only be answered as the Canterbury recovery process, as 
administered by CERA, came to an end. Currently the CDEM Act 2002 and the recovery 
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framework are under review and two government review processes are underway on CERA 
and the Canterbury earthquakes.5  The following questions all aim to provide insights on 
what can be learned about the administration, governance, and capacity demands of a 
large-scale disaster recovery: 
For government institutions, especially at the local level, is recovery simply business 
as usual but in a compressed timeframe or are there elements of recovery that 
necessitate additional training, capabilities, or knowledge beyond what is written in 
the CDEM recovery framework? 
For the CDEM sector, what capacities are necessary to fulfil the mandate of Recovery 
Manager?  For roles other than the Recovery Manager, to what extent do the 
capabilities required for disaster recovery differ from business as usual? What 
powers are needed for disaster recovery? More specifically, are the demands of a 
recovery sufficiently different from response to warrant a different set of powers?  
More broadly, should each statute on the books have an “in case of disaster” 
recovery section or provision, or is it preferable for the government of the day to 
create legislation specific to the context of a major disaster? Or, should the CDEM 
Act 2002 be amended to give it the power to override other legislation in the mid to 
long-term to facilitate a timely recovery? 
Inquiry into recovery capacities versus business as usual should not be limited to leadership 
positions such as the CEO, mayor, or even the Recovery Managers. MCDEM has a little over 
three dozen staff, the Canterbury CDEM Group office less than a dozen, while CERA had 
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over 200 staff – what factors impacted their work compared to business as usual? If there 
were differences, were they apparent throughout the recovery process or did they change 
at different stages as the recovery progressed? 
Insights into these questions would help answer two bigger questions - does the CER Act 
2011 provide a replicable framework for recovery from future disasters? And, what can be 
done to improve the implementability of the CDEM recovery framework in crisis – large and 
small? More research must be done – not only on the lessons learned from CERA. There is a 
paucity of scholarship on civil defence in New Zealand – in particular social and legal 
scholarship. The large government-funded programmes – National Hazards Research 
Platform, the EQC Research Programme, and Resilience to Nature’s Challenges (RNC) 
National Science Challenge – devote most of their funding to understanding and correcting 
risk in the built and natural environment. Only a small proportion of funding is available for 
the social sciences and policy-oriented research, and even less for law. Finally, notable by its 
absence is the lack of scholarship on Maori culture and disasters.  
6.4 Policy implications: Suggestions for improving the national recovery framework 
in New Zealand 
This dissertation has revealed a number of contradictions in civil defence, but the greatest 
paradox is how to balance national guidance and local responsibility without overstepping 
one and underserving the other. The government has always been a reluctant leader in civil 
defence - most often by hiding behind the philosophy of local responsibility. But for each of 
the 4Rs circumstances have forced the government to take a leading role. The Ombudsman 
in 1964 compelled the government to take a leading role in civil defence planning; the 




lead in engaging and preparing the community in civil defence as a form of response and 
readiness; the Abbotsford landslip in 1979 showed the necessity of professionalised training 
for responders and civil defence personnel which compelled the government to take the 
lead in capacity development; the wake-up call for risk reduction came in the 1980s from 
disasters at home and abroad and the government’s fear of footing the bill for disaster 
recoveries great and small; and the Canterbury earthquakes compelled the government to 
take a leading role in the recovery from the “unprecedented event” despite the fear of such 
an event being the one thing that sustained the civil defence organisation throughout the 
years. Now that there is a precedent the government should continue the historic trend and 
take a leading role in disaster recovery.  
Instead of having only local and regional Recovery Managers with widely varying training 
and an almost universal lack of experience, recovery should be centralised with a 
permanent cadre of National Recovery Managers in a revision of the long-standing 
philosophy of local responsibility. Just as the principles of civil defence were reinterpreted 
for response in the 1970s and 1980s, so too should they be for recovery. It would be most 
efficient and effective to have a cadre of centrally located Recovery Managers that attend 
every recovery to observe, advise, or assume control as needed. In the case of specialist 
knowledge which is not needed regularly by local and regional authorities it is far more 
practical to develop the necessary capabilities centrally and dispatch recovery management 
experts as needed than to rely on regional and local recovery managers who may be called 
upon only on extremely rare occasions. This permanent cadre of recovery managers should 
be based in the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management in Wellington and 




an emergency was declared. Institutional knowledge of the demands of recovery in this 
country will be built up, stored centrally, and utilised in every recovery by one agency 
attending every emergency instead of some agencies attending a few. New Zealand is not so 
large and diverse a country that local knowledge is truly far from experts from outside the 
region. Local knowledge could be further enhanced by having regional Recovery Managers 
seconded to the National Recovery Office as a National Recovery Manager in order to gain 
experience in recovery management around the country instead of only during an actual 
recovery situation in their own territory. As they occur so infrequently the opportunity to 
gain hands-on experience is minimal if Recovery Managers are limited to their own district 
or region. Instead of relying on often-reluctant council staff and response-oriented 
emergency managers for recovery from an event they will most likely never see in their 
lifetimes, that knowledge should be developed and captured through the experiences of 
many emergencies being attended to by one department. Essentially, the current system 
expects people to rise to the occasion when, as any successful coach and competitor know, 
you fall to the level of your experiences and training. Therefore, every recovery from a 
declared emergency should be attended by a professional National Recovery Manager who 
observes and if necessary advises or even assumes control. In this way best practices can be 
captured, stored, and disseminated by being utilised in every recovery event. This would 
accommodate the philosophy of local responsibility while accepting the limits of civil 
defence in a major emergency. 
This proposal would not only provide New Zealand communities with better trained and 
experienced recovery managers it would also contribute to greater certainty in recovery. 




unclear when and for how long and under what circumstances and with what capabilities or 
even which particular office would be in control which creates uncertainty about lines of 
communication, authority, and ability. The current system not only creates unnecessary 
uncertainty but also jeopardizes the accumulation of knowledge and experiences in 
governing recovery by decentralising the task under the philosophy of local responsibility 
and allowing recovery to be conducted on an ad hoc basis. The current system also 
underestimates the capacities needed for effective recovery management – in New Zealand 
the capacities needed for recovery have hardly been considered at all. The central 
government stopped relying on endogenous capacity and minimal training for response in 
1983 but started recovery on a similar path as response in that same year by failing to 
support the recovery framework. This means that endogenous capacity will be the driver of 
recovery until the central government feels more help is needed but it does nothing to 
improve the capacity of local authorities to manage a recovery. It also does nothing to 
improve the chances of the central government effectively contributing anything more than 
money which is what they wanted to avoid in the first place. Of course when the central 
government assumes control of a recovery they bring with them great power – and great 
responsibility, unfortunately there is no guarantee that the requisite capacities will also 
manifest. The central government has always been a reluctant leader in civil defence and 
just as it has with the other 3Rs the central government should take a leading role in 
recovery. Putting into law that a “suitable person” should be found to manage a recovery 
amounts to relying on a chance alignment between the demands of an emergency and local 
capacity.  When it comes to government responsibility and capability, the victims of the 
next major disaster should not have to rely, as their predecessors in Canterbury did, on 




capabilities and competencies needed for recovery management – the research can now be 
done and suitable people trained and given experience, and an institution created for 
recovery management over the long term instead of in the dust of a rebuild. 
6.5 Conclusion 
This dissertation provided insights into how the emergency management system in New 
Zealand came to find itself falling far short when it was needed most. The answer is found in 
its history. This dissertation has shown that the failure to engage with recovery until forced 
to was not an anomaly – there is a now familiar historic pattern within civil defence of the 
government introducing responsibilities but doing little to support their fulfilment until 
compelled to by crisis, criticism or changes external to civil defence – usually a combination 
of all three. This dissertation has found that it was not simply the scale of the disaster in 
Canterbury – of course emergency services can be overwhelmed and adaptation will be 
necessary. Nor was it due to the inability of local authorities to function well – although this 
may have been a function of poor recovery planning. The government failed to adequately 
prepare the country for recovery from any sort of disaster – large or small. 
The main message of the findings in this dissertation is that recovery needs an institution, 
not an individual. That institution should be adaptable but that does not mean ad hoc. This 
lesson has been learned countless times and was written in the first paragraph of the 
foundational document of civil defence in New Zealand in 1938.6 One of the problems 
identified in this dissertation is the CDEM system contains assumption that every 
eventuality can be prepared for by scaling up existing systems to meet the demands of an 
event. But this creates an illusion of certainty by assuming that a disaster is simply the sum 
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of its parts and all that is needed is a higher level of government – with more power and 
money. But this system put form before function and created responsibilities without a 
clear mandate which has been shown to result in inaction before a disaster and confusion 
during a disaster. Creating a role without articulating or supporting the capabilities needed 
to fulfil that role resulted in an unreliable system. Normally with decentralisation the central 
government gives up responsibility to local authorities and with that the power to fulfil 
those responsibilities – this did not occur for CDEM recovery. It cannot be said that the 
principles the recovery framework is based on failed; the failure was in the expectation that 
they could be implemented by an undertrained, underfunded, unexperienced and 
underpowered governance system. It is concerning that the government has consistently 
been so willing to give responsibility for public safety in crisis to local authorities and 
volunteers along with considerable emergency powers but with limited means to prepare 
for or carry out those responsibilities and utilize those powers. 
CDEM needs stronger leadership from the national level – this can take the form of funding 
or training, or by undoing some of the decentralisation of responsibility by establishing a 
National Recovery Office which includes regional Recovery Managers on secondment. It 
must be accepted that for some aspects of civil defence local responsibility is a barrier to 
community wellbeing and a vulnerability as not all communities are going to be prepared to 
lead a recovery alongside business as usual governance – and the central government 
should have more to offer than cash and a firm hand. Recall Chapter 2 where it was argued 
that the intensity of a hazard in itself is not the root cause of a disaster, it is the catalyst that 
exposes vulnerabilities created by decisions made in the social environment. The main 




necessarily locally derived. Rather, vulnerabilities are part of many processes, often 
originating far from the local level where a disaster occurs. In this way, civil defence is stuck 
in its own history. This dissertation has shown that the conditions which necessitated a new 
institution after the Canterbury earthquakes developed over decades in the civil defence 
emergency management system and the relationship between local and central authorities. 
CERA and the CER Act 2011 were not anomalies and are outcomes of the long-term 
processes, policies, laws and practice of civil defence in New Zealand.  The experience of 
recovery from the Canterbury earthquakes and the subtle inevitability of another disaster 
are reminders that ultimately, responsibility for civil defence, public safety, and community 
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